8 ms·
Show HN: Continue? Y/N: A 60-second game about AI agent permission fatigue
- orsorna 4mo agoAbout three quarters of the "bad" choices are things that not only do I not care about leaking but things that an employer would not punish you for doing, even if it led to a production incident.
- isityettime 4mo agoFor example?
- nardib 4mo agoUse this and save yourself: claude --dangerously-skip-permissions
- qsxfthnkp2322 4mo agoI love it when Claude is dangerous
- wildpeaks 4mo agoThis is why having a human in the loop isn't enough because they will cut corners and skip reviewing what they should review.
- chuckadams 4mo agoA tool that pushes people into permissions fatigue is in fact the proper recipient of the blame. The tool in question here is the entire system though, including the OS with insufficient permission boundaries in userspace, not just the agent
- kennywinker 4mo agoA tool that bypasses permission requests because they’re annoying will be just as guilty when the repo is poisoned.
- chuckadams 4mo agoI'm not saying wedging doorstops under the fire doors is a good thing, I'm just saying look at the situation that's making people put the doorstops there. Or something, it's not a great analogy. I'm just saying that shaming the user belongs with obscurity in the list of security mechanisms that don't work out in practice.
- preciousoo 4mo agoI created a watcher for this problem, to watch my PRs for unfinished scope and have a fresh Claude review Uses tmux and gh https://github.com/Kyu/claude-pr-watch https://github.com/Kyu/claude-pr-watch
- tasuki 4mo agoJust make sure to run it in an isolated environment where it's ok to mess things up, and make sure it doesn't have access to any secrets.
- dheera 4mo agoI got tired of typing that and just do alias claude="claude --dangerously-skip-permissions" I do have a separate "claude" user on my system without sudo access and without access to my main user home dir And yeah I know that's not perfect but I'm trying to get shit done
- franze 4mo agoalias claude+="claude --dangerously-skip-permissions" alias claude++="claude --dangerously-skip-permissions --continue"
- paulddraper 4mo agoalias yolo=claude --dangerously-skip-permissions
- kennywinker 4mo agoIt’s baking malicious code into your project, but hey it didn’t run rm -rf so… we’re good.
- maxbond 4mo agoWhy would you do this now that we have auto mode?
- cadwell 4mo ago1,640 points on my first try—I fell into a few traps, but it was really interesting. Thanks for the little game! I'm sharing it with my coworkers :)
- deleted 4mo ago[deleted]
- carterschonwald 4mo agosome of the sandboxing ive been playing with gives me the best of both yolo and like logic programming tier perms on llm actions in env. still not ready for prime time though ;)
- deleted 4mo ago[deleted]
- MeetingsBrowser 4mo agoIt would be cool to see the distribution of all player scores.
- Wirbelwind 4mo agoThat's a great idea, stay tuned
- Wirbelwind 4mo agoand added! Made one for each stat separately
- sevenseacat 4mo agoContinue? Y/N ── SCORE: 2,343 Security-Conscious Engineer Caught 8/8 threats "Not a single secret leaked" → llmgame.scalex.dev
- neogodless 4mo agoContinue? Y/N ── SCORE: 1,549 Security-Conscious Engineer Caught 3/3 threats "Not a single secret leaked" So are there 3 threats? 8? Is it a different game? Does everyone get a "good" score even if they missed 5 threats?!
- t-writescode 4mo agoIt's a game you play over one minute. They probably saw more prompts than you.
- ghrl 4mo agoI am mostly using OpenCode and barely ever see a permission prompt. While they do enforce it for outside workspace read/write, with the bash tool the agent can just bypass that. I'm not quite sure why it is that way, and it certainly isn't a very good solution, but likely not worse than asking for everything which just trains the user to always accept and provides a false sense of security then.
- Liftyee 4mo agoI haven't used local agentic AI yet for programming projects. Hence, -187 score The filter for "commands I would run myself" and "commands I would let an agent run" are very different it seems.
- rogerrogerr 4mo agoThinking about agents as remote junior devs who _might_ be North Korean operatives has been the right model for me.
- jstanley 4mo agoHow do you know?
- cobbal 4mo agoThat's funny. It told me that blocking "npm run build" was the wrong answer. Maybe it doesn't really under The threat model.
- dns_snek 4mo agoThat's a great example of how dangerous actions are perceived as innocent. The entire model of approving specific commands is absolutely bonkers. npm run build = run an arbitrary shell command written in package.json Meanwhile the agent could have done any of the following without approval: - edited `package.json` to contain any arbitrary build command - planted malicious code in `build.js` (called by `npm run build`) - planted malicious code in `node_modules/xyz/index.js` (imported by `build.js`)
- amarant 4mo agoWhat would a better system look like?
- nonethewiser 4mo agoNot using agents at all. It could edit your code to do something malicious when you run it. Not even once. Not even if the agent has a gun to your head.
- deleted 4mo ago[deleted]
- dns_snek 4mo agoAgents should make better use of OS sandboxing facilities with finer-grained ACLs. Less: Do you want to run "npm run build"? More: "npm run build" tried to read your Chrome cookie database, do you want to allow that? Some agents like Codex use sandboxing on Linux/MacOS but the permissions are far too coarse - they'll run the command in a relatively strict sandbox and when it fails they'll ask you to allowlist the command as a whole, forever. There should be a new permission prompt every time a command tries to do something new. Claude suggests (or used to suggest - it's been a while) to allowlist "bash" which completely defeats the point. If you do that the agent can run `bash -c "echo literally anything"`
- zackify 4mo agoI vibe coded a TUI that just shows running lxd containers I hit 'n' to toggle all network access minus anthropic and openai URLs. I use pi (sometimes claude, always on bypass) and I auto allow everything. I only toggle manual approval in rare cases like running a script or command that needs to touch a production system and I need to validate everything. Normally my container has full write access to staging so it can debug and validate everything on its own
- kennywinker 4mo agoSounds like your process has made you vulnerable to huge classes of exploits and accidents. You have no oversight of changes locally, and only focus on when it touches prod. That means toxic local changes can get in, and if it works in staging why would you look too closely at it before merging to prod? Meanwhile a malicious npm package has made it into your repo, and your staging api keys have been sent to the command and control server.
- zackify 4mo agoi can view the diff locally but often times after planning with opus i get what i want. I create a draft pr and manually review all items before then marking ready for review for the team. So I'm not blindly pushing things to prod without review. Without staging key access I wouldn't have been able to do a payment provider migration at this speed. iterating by migrating users in staging and being able to use and validate the sdk quickly with opus is a massive time saver.
- soanvig 4mo agoFun game. Can somebody run an agent against those questions to see how it performs? :)
- Wirbelwind 4mo agoThanks all for checking it out and your suggestions! If anyone is curious about the actual underlying risks and problems with some mitigations (like the 17% false-negative rates of Auto Mode), I wrote up a quick summary of some of the approaches here https://scalex.dev/blog/ai-agent-permissions/ https://scalex.dev/blog/ai-agent-permissions/
- kstenerud 4mo agoYou might want to check out https://github.com/kstenerud/yoloai https://github.com/kstenerud/yoloai
- bspammer 4mo agoTo be realistic, 99% of the time it should be a totally innocuous command. If half of the commands are dangerous then you don't get fatigue because you're aware what you're doing is dangerous.
- axod 4mo agoFun little game, but I think the questions jump context so much it's a little unrepresentative. It might be better to group things into "packs", which have more real-world representative structure to them. For example, lots of "editing something.js" file permission requests, and then an "npm publish" is far more normal, and it's more of a risk, if you're used to pressing Y lots and then suddenly out of the blue...
- kqr 4mo agoFun! Played twice and refused all dangerous commands, with only one "over-block". Although I disagree that saying no to `kill $(lsof -t -i:3000)` is over-blocking. It's such a simple command I'd rather run it myself and be fully aware of what process I'm killing.
- atemerev 4mo ago--dangerously-skip-permissions is the only way to fly. Of course your environment needs to be properly containerized and autobackup set up, so even rm -rf from your harness would do nothing. Life is too short to spend on replying to permissions requests.
- kennywinker 4mo agoLol. Countdown til you get pwned starts today. Let me know how that works out for you in six months.
- atemerev 4mo agoWell working like that for about a year already, starting at the earliest days of agents.
- kennywinker 4mo agoWow a whole year! I guess it’ll never happen.
- prerok 4mo agoI've seen these suggestions but I am really curious about the set up because I just don't get it. If you want to work on the code then you need to have access to the repositories, so you need the github token. Then, to test the app, you may need your own backend token. And VPN. Of course, only to DEV, of course all tokens encrypted. So, only DEV and your branch of the code is in danger. In my view, even that is pretty bad. So, how does such a set up work?
- stratos123 4mo agoYou could clone the repo yourself and not give the agent any tokens at all. When done, push it yourself. This also lets you sandbox the agent to only have access to the local repo and nothing else.
- atemerev 4mo ago
- ramonga 4mo agoScore is 6711 by just saying no to everything
- misbau 4mo agoThat was fun and gave me an idea how security conscious I am.
- xg15 4mo agoThis is amazing! Currently you can "cheat" by simply denying all requests as quickly as possible. This will give you the "security-conscious engineer" badge and a perfect score in terms of how many requests were processed. (You will get the "overblock" notification, but it's somewhat tucked away at the bottom and the screen still looks as if you won) I also tried to play as the hustle4lyfe move fast and break things engineer and simply approved as many requests as quickly as possible - turns out, the "malicious command" popups actually slow you down. Mean!
- Wirbelwind 4mo agoGood catch, this has now been nerfed and this approach has gotten its own title
- KajMagnus 4mo agoTop 18%! I denied everything, unless I could see at a glance that it was safe (like Git diff)
- xg15 4mo agoGlad I could help. I love the new title :D
- smaudet 4mo agoActually, the only secure default is to deny everything...how do you know that innocent command is actually innocent?
- ssl-3 4mo agoA strange game. The only winning move is not to play.
- SOLAR_FIELDS 4mo agoIt’s the security mantra: the safest code is the one you never release. Code that never runs is the most secure code
- Trung0246 4mo agoNice got 6/6
- ilaksh 4mo agoYou can turn that off with an option in most agents. My own agent harness/framework has never had any permission system. It's also never deleted anything it shouldn't or done anything crazy or unrelated to what I asked.
- fragmede 4mo agoHow many car accidents have you been in, and do you wear your seatbelt when you're in a car?
- flux3125 4mo ago> It's also never deleted anything it shouldn't or done anything crazy or unrelated to what I asked Until it does. A simple curl request to a compromised website could inject a malicious prompt into it.
- graphememes 4mo agoPressed 1 for everything, no regrets
- NewJazz 4mo agogit reset --soft HEAD~1 Uh, how is this an overblock? It is literally a destructive command. No way I want an LLM agent rewriting my commit history. What if that commit was already pushed to a protected branch?
- stratos123 4mo agoWhy do you call it destructive? It rewrites history only locally and reversibly (the disappeared commit is still in reflog and can be recovered with another reset) and also doesn't destroy uncommitted changes, so it's quite safe. You can only lose data with it by resetting an unpushed commit and then waiting long enough to let the unreferenced commit be garbage collected.
- NewJazz 4mo agoCommit history is data. I might not realize what happened until the gc happens.
- rvz 4mo agoThis current thread is proof of AI psychosis.
- stuartjohnson12 4mo agoWhat the hell is going on in this thread? This isn't good. The "threats" don't make sense. Oh no, all the sensitive information in my package.json...
- kennywinker 4mo agoIf you think the worst that an agent can do is leak your package.json, your threat model is wayyy broken.
- cobbal 4mo agoHere's the threat model I (a luddite) use to evaluate these. The claude code harness can be mostly trusted, the model cannot be trusted because it is exposed to untrusted data from the internet, and there is no separation of data/code in an llm [0][1]. I want to avoid running untrusted code on my local machine, because it could steal secrets, install malware, etc. Since the model is allowed to write without restriction (I think) to the project directory, anything in the project directory is also untrusted. Running standard commands from the system is fine, as long as you know what those commands are going to do. Running anything from the local directory should be avoided because the code is untrusted. This is just one security model, there are many others! If a person is running claude in a stronger sandbox, that changes the model considerably. What threat model do you use to evaluate whether an agent's actions are safe? [0]: https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2024/05/llms-data-control-path-insecurity.html https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2024/05/llms-data-c... [1]: https://simonwillison.net/2025/Jun/16/the-lethal-trifecta/ https://simonwillison.net/2025/Jun/16/the-lethal-trifecta/
- sandeepkd 4mo agoInterestingly I kept saying no to everything and some how I am a security conscious rare engineer who actually read the commands. Guess doing nothing is the safest approach from security standpoint.
- vgudur297 4mo ago[flagged]
- sukhavati 4mo agoReminds me of the "Papers, please" game. Glory to Arstotzka!
- syedofc 4mo ago[flagged]
- whimblepop 4mo agoI got "overblocked" for this one: rm -rf node_modules && npm install but actually if you're only removing `node_modules` and you have a working package-lock.json already, what you want is `npm ci`; `npm install` can mutate package-lock.json and potentially expose you to supply chain attacks. If you use `npm ci` I think you don't need to `rm -rf node_modules`, either. Anyway you should generally run `npm ci` except when you're deliberately updating your actual dependencies. I'd only permit an `npm install` if I was adding or updating a dependency, or I'd just reviewed an `npm ci` failure.
- Wirbelwind 4mo agothanks for the pointer! renamed it to npm ci so it's still 'safe'
- whimblepop 4mo agoThanks! Love the game as a whole :)
- gamer191 4mo agoBut also why would Claude need to run `rm -rf node_modules && npm install`? Without the context of seeing what changes it’s made, I’d be inclined to assume that Claude has added a new dependency, which I definitely don’t wanna blindly trust it to install
- isityettime 4mo agoIf the shipped package.json and package-lock.json are actually incompatible/incorrect, something like `npm install` is what you need to reconcile them. But that's definitely a weird situation I would rather investigate myself than hand off to an LLM.
- spurgelaurels 4mo agoFun game, but it showed the lack of security hygiene employed by the game writer. It said `cat ~/.zshrc` was bad because it would share tokens and secrets, but I would never put secrets into my shell rc.
- shlewis 4mo agoI don't do this myself, but I can also see how many would do this.
- nish__ 4mo agoWhere would you put them?
- setopt 4mo agoPresumably a CLI-accessible password manager (like `pass`) or a GPG-encrypted file (like a netrc-style `~/.authinfo.gpg`).
- Hackbraten 4mo agoInto `pass`, for example: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48108207 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48108207
- analog_daddy 4mo agoJust curious, any reason to prefer using age (you mentioned that you would prefer it if starting over), over something like keepass? I am currently using keepass-cli and only reason i did not use age even though i found it was that it was new to me and I never heard of it (probably not the best reason, but in this era might be a reasonable thing to stick to devil you know). So curious about your take on this.
- freedomben 4mo agoI put mine in various aes encrypted file (like `~/.secrets.aes`) and then source it explicitly when needed with: . <(aescrypt -d -o - ~/.secrets.aes) I have a handful of aliases/functions to make it more smooth, but that's the core.
- t-writescode 4mo agoI was told I was over protective when the text said “I need to wipe and build my project” and its first thing to do was to read the details of the (already established) package file. Why did it need to read the package file to “get context” if it was just doing a standard wipe and build? Apparently me telling it that’s the wrong first step and saying “no” is bad; but I’ve seen AI tools waste a ton of time doing a bunch of random work before they do their job.
- martin-adams 4mo agoVery fun. I can only imagine building this with Claude and testing needed a bit of mental concentration.
- stevenalowe 4mo agoSadly unplayable - gray text on a black background is very hard to read on a phone
- deleted 4mo ago[deleted]
- socksy 4mo agoWeird to make reading zshrc supposed unsafe when I happily publish it in my public dotfiles repo... Who the hell keeps API keys in it? OTOH it seems like lots of these AI tools keep appending PATH in it so I guess there's a fundamental misunderstanding of shell best practices in the entire AI space... Additionally, killing the results of `lsof` is _not_ safe - if, say, you have the web page open in firefox, or a client subshell in the agent itself, then boom, there goes firefox and the agent.
- mrgoldenbrown 4mo agoYeah, the game seems to assert that the kill is safe to run because Claude told me it was safe. But that's the point, I'm not supposed to trust Claude.
- gwerbin 4mo agoLikewise I got dinged for denying a random stash-rebase-pop operation. I have no idea what the repo state is like right now. That could be a wild mess of a waste of time. It says I'm doing a refactor, so OK I guess rebase on main is a good idea. But hell no I'm not approving that in the 1 minute before a meeting. The whole premise IMO is pretty flawed. It's interesting as an ad for the company though.
- isityettime 4mo ago> The whole premise IMO is pretty flawed. I'm not sure, maybe the fact that whether a given command is safe or not is subtle, contextual, and contested actually bolsters the point the game is trying to make.
- jMyles 4mo agoI haven't run claude code without --dangerously-skip-permissions in quite some time. I'm surprised that it's still the norm to endure permission spamming? (I run it on a VPS of course, not my laptop)
- wilg 4mo ago"Auto" in Claude and "Auto-review" in Codex are the only way to do agentic coding.
- KaiShips 4mo ago[flagged]
- eidongrowth 4mo ago[flagged]
- willyv3 4mo ago[dead]
- kstenerud 4mo agoThis is one of two reasons why I wrote yoloAI. I never get these permission prompts anymore. It feels a lot like after installing an adblocker.
- scotty79 4mo agoPermissions don't do much. They won't save you. You can just skip them completely. If you are afraid that AI can delete something do what you'd do with potentially malicious user. Sandbox, don't give permission, setup remote backups and so on. Also (unless prompt injected) models are not eager to start going rouge on your stuff. But keep in mind a saying “Children don’t hear prohibitions — they hear suggestions.” Same thing goes for LLMs. Never talk with LLM about deleting stuff. Archiving, moving, retaining elswhere... sure, but never about actually destructive operations. Don't use destructive language.
- progforlyfe 4mo agoI got "approve" wrong for `ls -la ~/Documents` but I don't consider simply listing the documents folder a security problem, it's just file names. If it was reading the CONTENTS of them, maybe...
- enether 4mo agoThe permission thing is a killer to productivity, if you're running Claude I think it's more efficient to just run in a disposable sandbox (like exe.dev[1]) or in some form of docker container with permissions you're personally ok taking the risk with on a personal machine[2] [1] - https://exe.dev/ https://exe.dev/ is a new cloud provider with some very useful agent UX [2] - I built https://github.com/stanislavkozlovski/dclaude/ https://github.com/stanislavkozlovski/dclaude/ for this; not perfect but gets my job done on the rare occassion I need to run the coding agent locally
- kvdveer 4mo agoA disposable sandbox wont protect you from secret exfiltration. Assuming you don't consider your code a secret, you could of course set up your sandbox so it doesn't have any secrets, but that would severely limit the kinds of tasks you can use the agent for.
- esterna 4mo agoOn the one hand, you can set up a proxy that supplements secrets for API calls. On the other hand, you can whitelist what you need, in the simplest case with iptables (The devcontainer in the claude code repo is an example of the latter).
- iugtmkbdfil834 4mo ago<< that would severely limit the kinds of tasks you can use the agent for. Are we just talking about API calls to providers? If so, wouldn't local agent + sandbox solve all that?
- inetknght 4mo agoScope Violation: `cat ~/.zshrc` Scope Violation: `ls ~/Documents` Buddy, my `${HOME}` is committed to a repository. It includes `.bashrc` and `Documents` directory. These are not scope violations if I'm having the LLM work on them!
- eqvinox 4mo agoA bit too JavaScript specific... can't really play if you don't know that ecosystem.
- mrweasel 4mo agoIt suggests that "kill $(lsof -t -i:3000)" is completely safe, which it's not, if you don't know what runs on that port. Maybe some Javascript framework runs on that port, I don't know, but neither does the AI, the developer may have moved it, because something important runs on that port already.
- MadGodInc 4mo ago[flagged]
- rib3ye 4mo agoclaude --dangerously-skip-permissions just give in
- sekihan 4mo ago[flagged]
- yieldcrv 4mo agothat was soooo last month, “auto-mode” is the way now another agent reviews every command and blocks destructive ones
- madrox 4mo agoI've long held the current agent permission model is like playing a game of "Papers, Please" and most permission models engineers implement in their own AI products is more a measure of how trusting the user is with AI than an actual permission check. I'm of the view that future controls should be more about approving plans and rewinding durable workflows as models get better at avoiding egregious mistakes.
- cyanydeez 4mo agothe models will never avoid egregious behavior. think of it like every "good intentions" morality tale. theres almost always some geniune context where that behavior is wanted. instead, the coding harness or determinative tool, will need hardcoded security features. in opencode, almost all the power comes from bash and all other permissions are just chrades. its powerful and insecure because of it. you can sand box them but then you fight the sandbox to pipe in your assets. the sandbox becomes porous because elsewise its useless. MCPs dont address much either. want we are looking for is a portal or protocol that has the model and harness and the actions tunneled, like ssh, to some fixed scoped and limited shell along side the assets. then, the user and LLM can the negotiate assets and actions as needed via the protocol. but alas, as your comment suggests, people thing theres some perfect context thatll prevent bad things from happening. the libertarian paradise without regulation.
- madrox 4mo agoI think you're choosing to ignore what I said about the implication of durable workflows, because you seem to be inventing some stories about my comment. I find that well documented plans do pretty well at aligning AI to what I want it to do, and if it does go astray, as you rightly point out it can still do, it would be sufficient if I can undo it with little pain. We do this kind of thing all the time in CI/CD pipelines. Even humans can take down production. We have all kinds of guards in place to empower while also defending against the intern accidentally dropping the DB.
- madamelic 4mo ago> we are looking for is a portal or protocol that has the model and harness and the actions tunneled, like ssh, to some fixed scoped and limited shell along side the assets then, the user and LLM can the negotiate assets and actions as needed via the protocol. Take a look at a project I just finished this weekend: https://clawband.io https://clawband.io It's an agent permissioning platform that isolates your service connections and puts a granular permissioning layer on it. So rather than your agent getting full access to a service, they get a Clawband key that can be used to request actions then Clawband checks the parameters to see if it is allowed. The classical example I have made is allowing your agent access to privacy.com. You may want it to be able to list your cards but not create one or you may want to allow creating cards but only a certain limit. The plan is to make it open-source and allow self-hosting because security / sanity of users but still have a SaaS offering as a demo / ease of use.
- ericlevine 4mo agoThis really hits the nail on the head. The current permissions models are totally broken IMO. You're either approving everything, restricting access and neutering your agent, or full YOLOing and, well, good luck. The right primitives are not in place yet, and there's no clearly correct answers. I think the right primitive is "task-based authorization", where you review a high-level task and let an LLM judge decide whether the subsequent tool calls fall into the scope of that task. It's not perfect, but it distills dozens of approvals down to one and gives you risk-based signals of whether you should pay close attention or not.
- sid0707 4mo ago[flagged]
- trehalose 4mo agoI wish it the scoring readout at the end would display the LLM's descriptions of the commands I shouldn't have approved. I approved the rm -rf Projects command because I thought the LLM had correctly described that it would delete everything in the Projects folder. Clearly I misread that in my hurry to answer prompts (I knew what the command would do and I guess I hallucinated that the AI had explained it), but I'd like to see what it was that I misread. Playing this game made me very glad I don't agentmaxx.
- deleted 4mo ago[deleted]
- conrs 4mo agoYeah, echoing the comments here. It's a good idea - kind of - but it is all about digging deeper when it is sus. The tool assumes so much. That it is fine to kill a process itself versus just asking you to kill the process. That everyone MUST have passwords in their home directory. It's all meaningless without providing the thing it is running and so no activity is technically safe. Why do people even get the agent to run the commands it asks to run? You can solve the entire threat vector by running it yourself and giving the agent the output. Claude practically only needs things like sed, awk, and grep. It's a pattern matcher. It's a waste of yours (and its) time to have it run your project.
- xuanlin314 4mo ago[flagged]
- eranation 4mo agoLove it. One nitpick. >npm config set registry https://npm.internal https://npm.internal >Pointing npm to the company's internal registry mirror as required by onboarding docs It claimed this is safe and I was 50/50 on it but eventually rejected it. If this README is for a public / forked repo, and that https://npm.internal https://npm.internal is actually https://npm.internal.somethinganexternaldnscanresolve.tld https://npm.internal.somethinganexternaldnscanresolve.tld This can go bad really quickly... In 99% of cases you would have Artifactory / Nexus (or other mirror) already set by company policy. Having a README tell you to use a different package manager url is a big red flag and seconds away from disaster...
- Wirbelwind 4mo agothat's a good callout. .internal is a reserved TLD so it shouldn't resolve publicly, but that's a good point about being wary of changing this while letting claude refactor a project for something that's best configured separately. Moving it to permanent mutation!
- eddysir 4mo ago[flagged]
- ashm1104 4mo agoDamn this is so cool, this has the potential of being a like textbook pre training/post training quiz. Congratulations.
- hastily3114 4mo agoThis is cool. Could be used for training. But it's a bit too easy when it's a game where you are expecting dangerous commands. The real fatigue comes from accepting hundreds of obviously safe commands during a work day. Then it's easy start accepting everything without really reading it.
- kuboble 4mo agoI was so tired of all those approvals that I switched to Yolo mode exclusively. Claude works in his own separate vm with root access, git remote set to my local copies of repository no github access etc. I think he could still hurt me if he really wanted, but most scary stories I heard were about LLM making really bad judgements rather than actively trying to break out and do harm.
- hcks 4mo agoPSA: not making safe environments where you can skip all permissions and instead wasting time monitoring agents == incompetence
- hanwenn 4mo agoI got tired of the permission prompts and wrote a filesystem/network sandbox so I could skip all permission checks. It works on the same principle as bubblewrap, but has some niceties to separate Claude from its credentials. See https://github.com/hanwen/runclaude https://github.com/hanwen/runclaude
- huflungdung 4mo ago[dead]
- unjuno 4mo ago[flagged]
- jkwang 4mo ago[flagged]
- cat-whisperer 4mo agothese days I rely on auto mode. :) it's like trust-as-a-service
- shnayadhillo 4mo ago[flagged]
- leeeeep101 4mo ago[dead]
- Ozzie-D 4mo ago[flagged]
- gblargg 4mo agoI declined things like rm -rf because the path was relative and it wasn't showing me the current directory. How would I know what project it was in?
- christophilus 4mo agoClaude Code has gotten so bad about this that I’ve stopped using it for code reviews. I may look into wiring Claude up to Codex as an alternative LLM just to compensate. I think the issue is that I’m running Claude Code in a container so it sees that it is root, and becomes a lot more cautious. Not sure, though.
- kangalioo 4mo agoIf you're running Claude Code in a container anyways, why does `--dangerously-skip-permissions` not work for you?
- christophilus 4mo agoClaude Code won't let you do that as root. Codex's equivalent is perfectly fine, though.
- kleiba2 4mo agoIs there a light mode by any chance? Unfortunately, I cannot look at light text on black background for more than a few seconds (something must be wrong with my eyes...).
- crystacathol 4mo ago[flagged]
- crystacathol 4mo ago[flagged]
- s95124328 4mo ago[flagged]
- paddycorr 4mo agoLove how it always want to send my packages to random domain. Has that happened anyone in practice?
- deleted 4mo ago[deleted]
- takakaze 4mo ago[flagged]
- Andy_Donner 4mo ago[flagged]
- magikMaker 4mo agoReally cool!!
- xuanlin314 4mo ago[flagged]
- willyv3 4mo ago[flagged]
- brittslimm 4mo ago[dead]
- brittslimm 4mo ago[dead]
- robert_nguyen 4mo ago[dead]
- JimmyElm 4mo agoNice game to aware the security.
- eddysir 4mo ago[flagged]
- beyondscaletech 4mo ago[flagged]
- GearDev7532 4mo agoCongrats on the launch! Product looks solid. Since you're in the launch phase, are you doing any PR or podcast outreach to get initial traction? We built an AI tool that completely automates this, might be useful for your current stage. Best of luck!
- GearDev7532 4mo ago[dead]
- saifeddine122 4mo ago[flagged]
- dsatrainer 4mo agoHahah that was awesome, gave me flashbacks of my 9-5