5 ms·

With photos, I could see a cryptographic solution. Of course it would still need some kind of centralized trust, but it's doable if people cared enough. It coul

by jfyi 1mo ago

With photos, I could see a cryptographic solution. Of course it would still need some kind of centralized trust, but it's doable if people cared enough. It could be applied by cameras themselves.

chrisjj 1mo ago
> It could be applied by cameras themselves. And equally faked by bots.
- hamdingers 1mo ago
  If it were generally possible to forge cryptographic signatures we'd have bigger things to worry about than AI generated photos.
  - chrisjj 1mo ago
    I agree, but this doesn't require a general capability. The suggestion is a camera could apply the signature. Cameras could be hacked.
    - hamdingers 1mo ago
      A camera could be hacked with unrestricted physical access, but that doesn't make the suggestion unsound, it only requires there be a process for revoking trust in specific signing keys. This is already part of C2PA. And the value of the signature is also going to vary by who claims it. Improbable photos signed by a random camera body sold to an anonymous consumer should be treated with more suspicion than one a newswire agency publicly claims, for instance.
    - jfyi 1mo ago
      A camera should not need to be hacked. What do you expect to accomplish by hacking the camera? We should be able to move certificates on and off it because they would most likely expire anyway. So, you can get the keys from the camera, what then? You use openssl to sign an image that shouldn't be signed... what then? You do this enough and get caught, you lose your cert and can never pass the kyc to get another one. Then every picture you used it for in the past would start showing a big red exclamation point with a note, "This is a scumbag user known for forging images".
      - chrisjj 1mo ago
        > You use openssl to sign an image that shouldn't be signed... what then? You do whatever you want with your provably genuine fake image. > You do this enough and get caught How are you going to get caught? By the signature owner repudiating some of the images "he" signed? I can see that working out for him.
        jfyi 1mo ago
        Same way it works for tls and code signing. Public reports bad actors to the signing authority. They and/or independent firms investigate. You self report theft. It's not like we are inventing pki from scratch here and wondering what an implementation would look like. We have decades of use to look at. Besides wasn't your argument "hacking" a minute ago? So you concede that then? You seem to have moved on.
        chrisjj 1mo ago
        > Public reports bad actors to the signing authority. Public would know the pics were fake let alone know who to report. > They and/or independent firms investigate. What's to investigate? You have a fake pic that is indistinguishable from genuine and "proved" by a sig.
        jfyi 1mo ago
        Yes, "the public" includes experts in the subject field and independent witnesses to events. If your argument is that images can't be verified, you are going to need to provide some kind of backing to that. We know well that there are watermarks and tell tale signs to go off. Regardless, if they are depicting real world events, outside confirmation can be used. You also don't seem to understand the point of the signature. It's not to prevent fake images, it's to tie an identity to images so that that trust can be established and permanently lost in the case of a malicious actor. Your arguments repeatedly have failed to engage with the actual system proposed.
        1mo ago
inigyou 1mo ago
So take a photo of a screen showing an AI image.
- jfyi 1mo ago
  The premise is not that it couldn't be faked. It would be more practical to remove the key from the hardware and just use it to sign images if you wanted to do that. The idea is that a centralized source of trust would revoke certificates belonging to bad actors or those that were stolen.
  - inigyou 1mo ago
    Cool. Every time I want to pass off AI images I'll buy a new Nikon camera. Always a Nikon until their cert is revoked. I'll short their stock before that.
    - jfyi 1mo ago
      Why do you assume the cert would be tied to the camera?
eloisius 1mo ago
This is already a thing. Leica cryptographically signs images. Useful for establishing trust for photojournalists I guess. I’m not sure how deep the chain goes. Do they have hardware attention down to the sensor? You could take a picture of a screen, but that would likely have some other tell-tales. Especially if Leica took another step like putting a depth sensor in the package and added its data to the signature.

by jfyi 1mo ago

With photos, I could see a cryptographic solution. Of course it would still need some kind of centralized trust, but it's doable if people cared enough. It could be applied by cameras themselves.

chrisjj 1mo ago

> It could be applied by cameras themselves. And equally faked by bots.

hamdingers 1mo ago
If it were generally possible to forge cryptographic signatures we'd have bigger things to worry about than AI generated photos.
- chrisjj 1mo ago
  I agree, but this doesn't require a general capability. The suggestion is a camera could apply the signature. Cameras could be hacked.
  - hamdingers 1mo ago
    A camera could be hacked with unrestricted physical access, but that doesn't make the suggestion unsound, it only requires there be a process for revoking trust in specific signing keys. This is already part of C2PA. And the value of the signature is also going to vary by who claims it. Improbable photos signed by a random camera body sold to an anonymous consumer should be treated with more suspicion than one a newswire agency publicly claims, for instance.
  - jfyi 1mo ago
    A camera should not need to be hacked. What do you expect to accomplish by hacking the camera? We should be able to move certificates on and off it because they would most likely expire anyway. So, you can get the keys from the camera, what then? You use openssl to sign an image that shouldn't be signed... what then? You do this enough and get caught, you lose your cert and can never pass the kyc to get another one. Then every picture you used it for in the past would start showing a big red exclamation point with a note, "This is a scumbag user known for forging images".
    - chrisjj 1mo ago
      > You use openssl to sign an image that shouldn't be signed... what then? You do whatever you want with your provably genuine fake image. > You do this enough and get caught How are you going to get caught? By the signature owner repudiating some of the images "he" signed? I can see that working out for him.
      - jfyi 1mo ago
        Same way it works for tls and code signing. Public reports bad actors to the signing authority. They and/or independent firms investigate. You self report theft. It's not like we are inventing pki from scratch here and wondering what an implementation would look like. We have decades of use to look at. Besides wasn't your argument "hacking" a minute ago? So you concede that then? You seem to have moved on.
        chrisjj 1mo ago
        > Public reports bad actors to the signing authority. Public would know the pics were fake let alone know who to report. > They and/or independent firms investigate. What's to investigate? You have a fake pic that is indistinguishable from genuine and "proved" by a sig.
        jfyi 1mo ago
        Yes, "the public" includes experts in the subject field and independent witnesses to events. If your argument is that images can't be verified, you are going to need to provide some kind of backing to that. We know well that there are watermarks and tell tale signs to go off. Regardless, if they are depicting real world events, outside confirmation can be used. You also don't seem to understand the point of the signature. It's not to prevent fake images, it's to tie an identity to images so that that trust can be established and permanently lost in the case of a malicious actor. Your arguments repeatedly have failed to engage with the actual system proposed.
        1mo ago

inigyou 1mo ago

So take a photo of a screen showing an AI image.

jfyi 1mo ago
The premise is not that it couldn't be faked. It would be more practical to remove the key from the hardware and just use it to sign images if you wanted to do that. The idea is that a centralized source of trust would revoke certificates belonging to bad actors or those that were stolen.
- inigyou 1mo ago
  Cool. Every time I want to pass off AI images I'll buy a new Nikon camera. Always a Nikon until their cert is revoked. I'll short their stock before that.
  - jfyi 1mo ago
    Why do you assume the cert would be tied to the camera?

eloisius 1mo ago

This is already a thing. Leica cryptographically signs images. Useful for establishing trust for photojournalists I guess. I’m not sure how deep the chain goes. Do they have hardware attention down to the sensor? You could take a picture of a screen, but that would likely have some other tell-tales. Especially if Leica took another step like putting a depth sensor in the package and added its data to the signature.