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Most of the exploits are for opensource/free software. I don't know what methods where used to find these exploits but I am starting to think security through
by merelydev 3mo ago
Most of the exploits are for opensource/free software.
I don't know what methods where used to find these exploits but I am starting to think security through obscurity might not be a bad thing in this day and age, where someone can just let bots loose on your codebase.
- serf 3mo agollms are fantastic disassembly partners, they're quite good at labeling functions from various dissassemblers -- the net losses from losing the benefits of open source , imo , outweigh the protection afforded by hiding your source code in yet another layer that is more and more easily unrolled through automated procedures.
- spongebobstoes 3mo agodisassembly only applies to client side software something like nginx could arguably be more secure if it was closed source (I am a proponent of and contributor to open source)
- gpm 3mo agoOnly until a single server running nginx is hacked and the binary leaked though...
- Hizonner 3mo agoUm, the nginx binary would have to be in the hands of hundreds of thousands of server operators. And the set of server operators is rich in the kind of person who would attack it. Not to mention the huge number of leaks you'd get. Maybe if it's some server-side software that you only use yourself...
- deleted 3mo ago[deleted]
- blensor 3mo agoAnd isn't it also mostly a transitioning issue. Those open codebases will be constantly scanned for potential security issues and getting more and more hardened. There are probably a lot of easy wins that are going to be discovered over the next few years but it should taper out after a while.
- merelydev 3mo agoFair point but it assumes we all have access to LLMs with the same capabilities.
- yjftsjthsd-h 3mo agoI don't think that's exactly it. OSS only needs someone to have a strong LLM to check for bugs. If your software is proprietary, it's a competition between just you and whatever model you have vs any attacker and whatever model they can lay hand to.
- GTP 3mo agoI don't see the difference. > OSS only needs someone to have a strong LLM to check for bugs. The same applies to propietary, closed-source code. It being closed-source means that the source isn't generally available, but the executable is. Hence, someone with a strong model can still reverse it and find vulns.
- andai 3mo agoI was thinking the only obscurity now is when the program is sitting on the other side of a network. (And has very strict rate limiting?)
- maxloh 3mo agoOpen source is a good thing, but I don't think what you are proposing is accurate. A different way to frame this would be that those bugs would never be surfaced or exploited if the software were proprietary.
- throwaway613746 3mo ago[dead]
- derektank 3mo agoPresumably, one could let the bots loose on your own codebase first. The question is one of financing of course. If your end users are enterprises willing to pay for a support contract, they probably care enough about not getting hacked to endure the higher prices that would let you throw enough tokens at the problem. Other open-source projects might have a harder time.
- grayhatter 3mo ago> I don't know what methods where used to find these exploits but I am starting to think security through obscurity might not be a bad thing in this day and age, where someone can just let bots loose on your codebase. I'd love to hear why you think obscurity is bad, if you now think maybe it's good in the LLM age? I'd also be interested if you could describe exactly what or how you think security through obscurity works, or doesn't? I've been thinking a lot about how to better teach this concept, so I'm looking to understand exactly how everyone thinks/understands how it currently works, or should work, or what it should do. I don't care about the "correct" answer, (I have ddg too :P) I'm interested in general expectations from SWE's that I might teach at work, instead of opinions of security eng speaking about theory.
- merelydev 3mo ago"one ought to design systems under the assumption that the enemy will immediately gain full familiarity with them" - Claude Shannon https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kerckhoffs%27s_principle https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kerckhoffs%27s_principle
- grayhatter 3mo agoIf you believe this, then why did you say? > starting to think security through obscurity might not be a bad thing
- merelydev 3mo agoBecause of asymmetric differences, I don't have access to powerful LLMs but attackers might. And also the complexities of software dependencies (supply chain vulnerabilities), my software depends on packages not in my control and I don't have time to audit the entire stack.
- asadotzler 3mo agoPerhaps the answer is to depend only on packages that come from people that are more competent than you so you can know if or when your program is compromised that it'll most likely be your fault and not theirs.
- IshKebab 3mo agoI think LLMs might actually have a bigger effect on closed source software - the tedium saved on open source bug hunting is significant, but on closed source software the tedium of finding bugs is extreme because of all the reverse engineering, but LLMs will chew through that. So there's probably a lot of low hanging fruit.
- Gigachad 3mo agoBecause pretty much all server software is open source. Hackers only care about attacking stuff that’s exposed to the network.
- michael-ax 3mo agoaha