5 ms·
I'm thankful. Congress skirted their duties for 40 years. This legislative / executive codependency then created a tightly connected and interdependent governa
by anonymouse008 2y ago
I'm thankful.
Congress skirted their duties for 40 years. This legislative / executive codependency then created a tightly connected and interdependent governance system, outside the purview of the judicial 'checks and balances.' This is why things like warrantless mass tapping and the Patriot Act became 'good law.'
We are unwinding decades of bad governance. This is a joyous occasion, along with the ACJ decision from last session.
Before anyone says there were still checks and balances - if you feel the need to, you have no idea what Cheveron meant
- godzillabrennus 2y agoExactly. If Congress seeks to regulate air, water, land, and space pollution, from American companies, they should appoint industry experts who intend to leave public sector jobs for lucrative private sector jobs by going to work for the companies the laws need to regulate. It’s worked great for politicians who become lobbyists or prosecutors who go work for big law. It’ll work great here too.
- intended 2y agoAbsolutely! We should also make sure that no one in agencies is safe. It’s only the industries and courts which can do the work - only for a short while, you know, till congress gets less gridlocked. Seeing how polarized and partisan things are, it will only be a few decades! Plus seeing how some of the court positions have been, I can only think that lobbying is going to become a massive business ! So much growth!
- cryptonector 2y agoregulatory capture has joined the chat
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]
- throw0101b 2y ago> Congress skirted their duties for 40 years. Delegation dates back to (at least) the early 1900s: > Since 1935, the Court has not struck down a delegation to an administrative agency.15 Rather, the Court has approved, without deviation, Congress's ability to delegate power under broad standards.16 The Court has upheld, for example, delegations to administrative agencies to determine excessive profits during wartime,17 to determine unfair and inequitable distribution of voting power among securities holders,18 to fix fair and equitable commodities prices,19 to determine just and reasonable rates,20 and to regulate broadcast licensing as the public interest, convenience, or necessity require.21 * https://constitution.findlaw.com/article1/annotation03.html https://constitution.findlaw.com/article1/annotation03.html And from 1825: > It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative. [23 U.S. 1, 43] But Congress may certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself. * https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-supreme-court/23/1.html https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-supreme-court/23/1.html Delegation is a key component of governance and predates the US with Ministers of the Crown, and once the the US was formed with Secretaries/Directors/etc, all of latter which are approved by the US Legislative branch through (e.g.) Senate-approved appointments.
- cryptonector 2y agoThis is not about delegation. This is about interpretation of the limits of delegated power. Under Chevron the executive agencies decided that without check. Before Chevron and after Raimondo it's the courts that decide. The 40 years of Chevron were an aberration.
- throw0101b 2y ago> The 40 years of Chevron were an aberration. The Chevron ruling was codifying what was already happening for decades: > When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones: "Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches." * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chevron_U.S.A.,_Inc._v._Natural_Resources_Defense_Council,_Inc https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chevron_U.S.A.,_Inc._v._Natura... There is plenty of oversight in interpretation and Congress does not need to micromanage interpretation or implementation. Delegation as a principle of government pre-dates the formation of the US with Ministers of the Crown, and was continued post-formation as that's why there are Secretarys of Department X/Y/Z or Directors of Agency A/B/C. The People (through their representative in Congress) are fine with agencies doing the interpretation. Those agencies are headed by an Executive of The People (President), and are run by administrator who are People-approved (through Congressional hearings and Senate approvals). The Legislative branch can dial up and dial down the flexibility of interpretation any time they want through Acts that change how the department/agency involved works, or through altering leadership (Secretarys, Directors) of the agencies.
- sanktanglia 2y agoahh yes our good ole non partisan judicial system will surely save us
- autoexec 2y ago> This is why things like warrantless mass tapping and the Patriot Act became 'good law.'...Before anyone says there were still checks and balances - if you feel the need to, you have no idea what Cheveron meant It's wild to think that either of things couldn't have been possible without Chevron. Congress would have passed anything required to allow those to become law.
- ncarlson 2y agoWhat is "the ACJ decision from last session"? For that matter, what is ACJ?