twr

5 ms·

1.
by twr 8y ago
Apple also weirdly limits the capabilities available to free developer accounts, like AutoFill and built-in IPSec/IKEv2 VPN support. https://help.apple.com/developer-account/#/dev21218dfd6
2.
by twr 8y ago
If you didn't trust the closed source disassembler you use, for whatever reason, you would verify the assembly output, not the actual software. In practice this is often done unintentionally anyway: it's common to run a debugger (
3.
by twr 8y ago
This is a good point, which should be brought up more. Although you probably meant key id or key fingerprint, not keyserver ID, which would imply something else. You're supposed to do additional verification of PGP keys, either through
4.
by twr 8y ago
Linux/BSD distribution mirrors don't control the package signing keys, maintainers do. Similarly, Google doesn't possess the ability to push out updates for third-party apps, without fundamentally redesigning the OS with a pl
5.
by twr 8y ago
No, there's no effective difference between those examples, apart from maybe post mortem analysis. It's also a poor method of key discovery, as hueving said.
6.
by twr 8y ago
It doesn't take ridiculous confidence to analyze shell scripts. In the hundreds of scripts I have read, few were more than 100 lines long. It shouldn't take more than 60 seconds (probably 30 or less) to mentally build a list of al
7.
by twr 8y ago
I agree with you that Keybase should release their backend code. My comment about (server source code- derived) trust was made in the context of users who would remain using the official keybase.io API servers, which would probably be the v
8.
by twr 8y ago
I didn’t dispute the description of Keybase being labeled a walled garden. I opposed it being too-broadly called proprietary, when it’s not — only the backend is. And for anyone only using the official keybase servers, that’s irrelevant fro
9.
by twr 8y ago
I'm glad the mobile apps don't download code, and I really appreciate the correction on Lavabit; ugh, that project was embarrassing. I'm personally not happy with auditing local clients unless I have a mild assurance that oth
10.
by twr 8y ago
Considering the whole point of end-to-end encryption is to reduce or eliminate necessary trust in the middleman, this seems like a minor, but still valid concern. Open sourcing the backend code wouldn't allow you to attest to what&#x27
11.
by twr 8y ago
Proprietary? The backend maybe, but the keybase clients are open source. Some of the code is a little rough, and completed API docs would be nice, especially concerning KBFS, which is still missing. It's still under heavy development t
12.
by twr 8y ago
The quote is from the front page of protonmail.com, and it's been there since 2015. As the only description of encryption on the front page, it gives the unequivocal impression that all email is end-to-end encrypted. Regarding email be
13.
by twr 8y ago
secured automatically with end-to-end encryption is a funny way of saying secured automatically with TLS. If some messages are being encrypted on the server, then it's not end-to-end. (I'd also argue that end-to-end encryption c
14.
by twr 8y ago
I mean, if you want visceral, there is this shameful email from Dan Harkins: https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg10971.h...
15.
by twr 8y ago
I think this sentiment explains half of the negative reactions I’ve seen towards Moxie over the years. I guess it pays to be likeable.
16.
by twr 8y ago
I don't know if this is correct, but, I once got the impression that Signal Desktop was under the sole purview of a new hire at OWS. In other words, Moxie doesn't review the commits. I hope I'm wrong, but even if I'm not
17.
by twr 8y ago
Given the absent security of desktop Linux, and the dreadful opsec of its users, as revealed by many cryptocurrency wallet thefts, I wouldn't place much trust in persistent PGP secrecy unless all participants used Heads, and renewed ke
18.
by twr 8y ago
Signal, WhatsApp, Matrix et al. show notifications when the participant’s device keys change. You’re right that most users don’t verify. The opportunity for detection or prevention of common forms of surveillance is better than none at all.
19.
by twr 8y ago
Again, you can be sure, by comparing the safety numbers. It's the same as comparing SSH or GPG key fingerprints. If someone else masquerades as Bob, the numbers won't match. See section III-D3, key fingerprint verification : htt
20.
by twr 8y ago
It isn't. I rarely send sensitive messages, however, so I feel that some surveillance potential is acceptable, to save time and effort. The few times where I did, I first verified both ends. I perform the safety number verifications in
21.
by twr 8y ago
Signal doesn't entrust security to carriers. Messages are sent E2E encrypted to the registered device over the internet. If someone MitMs a device, the safety numbers would not match on either end. Signal, and the Signal server operato
22.
by twr 8y ago
Unbound lets you forward queries to nameservers matched by the query (sub-)domain. *.internal queries can be sent to the local nameserver, for example, while others can be forwarded to the public nameserver. Minimal unbound.conf example:
23.
by twr 10y ago
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/26589529219124838... Edit: https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/40897761692683059... https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump&
24.
by twr 10y ago
Here's an alternative to wrapping GPG, using .gnupg/gpg.conf: personal-cipher-preferences AES256 AES personal-digest-preferences SHA256 SHA512 personal-compress-preferences Uncompressed default-preference-list SHA256 SHA
25.
by twr 10y ago
You can just pipe xz instead, although you may want to shred the original file: xz < file | scrypt enc - > file.xz.enc And I agree: scrypt (the program) is much better for password encrypting documents. It is only a few thousan
26.
by twr 10y ago
I didn't know Colin also wrote an encryption utility that uses the scrypt KDF. It does seem better than using GPG to password encrypt files.
27.
by twr 10y ago
> When the system is installing an update to an app, it compares the certificate(s) in the new version with those in the existing version. The system allows the update if the certificates match. If you sign the new version with a differe
28.
by twr 10y ago
I was curious what that meant with "even if the server is malicious." Turns out, in short, the Mylar paper creates a distinction between the "web site owner," and "the server operator." It shouldn't need t
29.
by twr 10y ago
Interesting. It makes sense to be strict when parsing stream input. Skipping the redundant central directory section hadn't even occurred to me. Bonus points for eliminating the stupid comment confusion dilemma! On second thought, not
30.
by twr 10y ago
That is an excellent explanation, thank you.

More ›