trevelyan

6 ms·

1.
Beyond Hurwicz: incentive compatibility under informational decentralization(arxiv.org)
2 points by trevelyan 7mo ago|0 comments
2.
When Intuition Is Wrong: Majoritarian Attacks Are Solvable [video](youtube.com)
1 points by trevelyan 2y ago|0 comments
3.
The General Grievous Attack(saito.tech)
2 points by trevelyan 2y ago|0 comments
4.
by trevelyan 2y ago
i use this regularly now. highly recommend over zoom.
5.
by trevelyan 3y ago
The prompts shown literally invite the LLM to complete the copyrighted text by providing unedited selections and asking the machine to finish those. Even if this is problematic in a small number of cases it is not a use case that undermines
6.
by trevelyan 3y ago
Perhaps you are being a bit cynical? There are certainly no problems that can't be solved by giving more money to government initiatives like the MaRS Centre in Ontario. These institutions also create jobs and are businesses of a certa
7.
by trevelyan 3y ago
You missed the last paragraph. The dominant strategy for users is indeed to broadcast two nodes.
8.
by trevelyan 3y ago
the irony is that POW is actually more complex here, which is why it is vulnerable to these attacks
9.
by trevelyan 3y ago
The sybil-proof mechanism here is not POS but a variant of POW.
10.
by trevelyan 3y ago
I think perhaps you should read the paper if you want to have a deeper discussion? An understanding of how the mechanism works should make it clear how the solution enables outbound payments to network nodes, which -- in turn -- creates a f
11.
by trevelyan 3y ago
Do you want your transaction fee to pay for mining, or do you want it to pay for the servers that run the network? If it pays for mining, who pays for the servers that run the network?
12.
by trevelyan 3y ago
You seem to be concerned about censorship attacks -- attacks that necessarily involve orphaning work in some capacity -- either orphaning blocks produced by honest nodes, or orphaning (refusing to include) tx-embedded routing work being sen
13.
by trevelyan 3y ago
You're not describing a sybil attack. You're talking about censorship. If you want to address that, your best strategy is to incentivize people to run access points that do not censor. This requires payouts to routing nodes in pro
14.
by trevelyan 3y ago
> There are no excess hops in the attack I am describing. As above, you're not describing a sybil attack. Adding a bunch of 1st hop nodes to a network doesn't mean that those nodes are conducting a sybil attack. If you want to
15.
by trevelyan 3y ago
> However depending on the architecture that is the only motivation needed and depriving others of rewards; in the long term this could result in centralization of routing nodes (by control) and finally censorship. Highly recommend readi
16.
by trevelyan 3y ago
Author of the original paper this write-up was based on here. The sybil attack as a theoretical problem is defined in the "Red Balloons" paper ("information propagation without self-cloning") so that might be a good star
17.
by trevelyan 3y ago
The attack vector you are describing doesn't work. If an attacker owns 1010 nodes and collects inbound transactions on 1010 nodes, then they have to relay those transactions to a second-hop block producer, which halves the value of tho
18.
by trevelyan 3y ago
Saito isn't an obscure blockchain. The formal proof of its sybil-proof properties is also chain-agnostic. https://github.com/SaitoTech/papers/blob/main/sybil/A_Simple... It would be difficult t
19.
A Simple Proof of Sybil-Proof [pdf](github.com)
3 points by trevelyan 3y ago|0 comments
20.
Tolerating Malicious Majorities – Advances in Distributed Consensus(saito.tech)
6 points by trevelyan 3y ago|0 comments
21.
by trevelyan 4y ago
thank you for sharing this
22.
by trevelyan 4y ago
Chiming in because we have an open source game engine on Saito ( https://saito.io/arcade ) which imo is the future of crypto gaming but is usually overlooked by people who want to talk about crypto gaming because what they wa
23.
by trevelyan 4y ago
> they have zero power to do anything related to consensus. Suggest reading what Vitalik has to say if you're going to offer this kind of objection: https://github.com/ethereum/research/blob/master&#x
24.
The Future of Open Source Software(medium.com)
6 points by trevelyan 4y ago|2 comments
25.
by trevelyan 4y ago
It's paraphrasing Marx. Satoshi did comment on the need for the network to provide a better incentive to P2P network nodes. He was well aware that a major class of essential nodes is expected to do work for free while miners are handed
26.
by trevelyan 4y ago
The miners are certainly working for profit, yes. The P2P network consists of volunteers who are not paid for running nodes, and whose contribution is basically guaranteeing open access to all of the data flows (confirmed and unconfirmed bl
27.
by trevelyan 4y ago
Saito consensus is simply superior on the cases author identifies. You can still use hashing to ensure fair payments without spending 100 percent of the block reward on it. Is the binding of the payment to the act of producing blocks which
28.
by trevelyan 4y ago
If you read the whitepaper it flags (first paragraph) that the problem with payment systems that rely on trusted third parties like Visa is not that they don't work but that these parties are compelled to mediate. You may not mind your
29.
by trevelyan 5y ago
BANAL-52 is 96.8% identical to SARS-CoV-2. That is not particularly close. You need to get above 99% to even come close to zoonotic origin on this. We also know that coronavirus samples from bats from Laos were shipped to WIV. Those samples
30.
by trevelyan 5y ago
It's interesting how much the incentive section in cryptocurrency reads like the Saito critique of Bitcoin.

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