tprynn

6 ms·

1.
by tprynn 2y ago
ActiveSupport adds tons of great convenience methods to Ruby and you can require it even outside of Rails! blank, present; date and time conversions like 1.month.from_now; except; enumerable methods like pluck... It's just lovely
2.
by tprynn 2y ago
I am. Pinning is a footgun with negligible real world security impact: https://tprynn.github.io/2022/12/06/cert-pinning-bad.html
3.
by tprynn 3y ago
You tell a fun anecdotal narrative but in other cases those workers show up unannounced and threaten to separate families if they don't allow entrance even though of course that's unconstitutional. You can't reduce it to a si
4.
by tprynn 4y ago
This is true, by default Android apps do not trust user-installed certificate authorities. IMO the easiest solution if you're doing security testing on a dedicated device is MagiskTrustUserCerts[1]. If you're not testing on a dedi
5.
by tprynn 5y ago
I am not sure how this is getting so many upvotes, but the claims in the readme do not appear to be supported by evidence. Those claims are so extreme that they are simply not believable without much more evidence, rather than what is in th
6.
by tprynn 5y ago
Visual Studio Code has built-in support for remote development. It runs a local agent on the remote server via SSH which does essentially whatever you would be doing locally (e.g. viewing, editing, searching) and only sends the minimal resu
7.
by tprynn 5y ago
It's showing a little age, but this list from Tech Solidarity gives you an intro to (1): https://techsolidarity.org/resources/basic_security.htm
8.
by tprynn 5y ago
I agree with the principle, but the way these arguments have been summarized here has led to near-complete strawmanning. It's like the author started from the blog title and then came up with their own contextless, binary arguments.
9.
Toxic Tokens: Using UUIDs for Authorization Is Dangerous(research.nccgroup.com)
4 points by tprynn 5y ago|0 comments
10.
by tprynn 6y ago
Yes, it's basically a side effect of activating Emergency SOS. The five-press shortcut works on all iPhones as far as I'm aware. As the doc says: "If you use the Emergency SOS shortcut, you need to enter your passcode to re-e
11.
by tprynn 6y ago
Signal could add app-level encryption, but who would this serve? Signal can't do anything better than what the OS/hardware provides in terms of encryption. Even if they let you specify your own signal-specific password/encryp
12.
by tprynn 6y ago
The instructions posted by the dev directly include instructions for pulling the APK from your phone which was installed through the Play Store. https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/tree/master/rep
13.
by tprynn 6y ago
uBlock Origin in advanced mode is gorhill's suggested replacement. If you have never used uMatrix before most likely uBlock Origin is what you should be using, and can easily accomplish the "globally block facebook domains" e
14.
by tprynn 6y ago
BinData ( https://github.com/dmendel/bindata ) is a Ruby gem for this, basically using a DSL in Ruby to declaratively define binary data formats that can be both read and written.
15.
by tprynn 6y ago
EMR is just an automated way of deploying open source components (Hadoop and co.) - there's some glue code there but the equivalent "open" version is probably the Hortonworks stuff (now owned by Cloudera): https://
16.
by tprynn 6y ago
With DNS rebinding, you can still only send HTTP requests* to the target. With this attack, you have a direct, raw TCP/UDP socket. (*) I'm simplifying, what I mean is that DNS rebinding still limits you to only what you can do in
17.
by tprynn 6y ago
We don't have to consider anything near unlimited resources here - you can do a masscan of the internet on commodity hardware in an hour, or you have a shodan sub (they've sold lifetime basic subscriptions before for $5). Actually
18.
by tprynn 6y ago
The cost of any additional untargeted attack attempt is essentially zero in most cases. It doesn't matter whether you are trying your exploit on 100 hosts or 1 million. An attacker willing to spray exploits across the internet has basi
19.
by tprynn 6y ago
By itself, disclosing version information provides little to no security consequence. If you are using an outdated, vulnerable server version, you will be exploitable regardless of whether you present a version number in the vast majority o
20.
Code Patterns for API Authorization: Designing for Security(research.nccgroup.com)
2 points by tprynn 6y ago|0 comments
21.
by tprynn 6y ago
I think it's generally a poor assumption to assume that any two internet "crowds" are the same people. Some commenters care about X and some about Y and we can almost never tell what the overlap between those groups is. The h
22.
by tprynn 6y ago
It's a real system dialog popped by the OS when the install script requests superuser privileges. It's not fake, and the password goes to the OS, not the script.
23.
by tprynn 6y ago
Curious what the higher-level solution to CSRF/SSRF is? I’m struggling to think how it could be prevented except at the browser level (for CSRF). And for SSRF if there’s a legitimate need for a network path between two services but one
24.
by tprynn 6y ago
I enjoyed the post and like the idea of Tailscale[^1], but agreed. As long as there's some path to the Internet, you can't trust your LAN. I mean, that's kind of the whole point of modern network security: even on a trusted n
25.
by tprynn 6y ago
Presumably power is disconnected by the T2 chip. Different from mechanical disconnect via a physical switch, but equivalently effective if you trust the T2 chip. (And if you don’t ... well, you can’t use the MacBook securely at all.)
26.
by tprynn 6y ago
If you read the article, it seems like it has both of those features, though I'm not sure what exactly you mean by "UDP relay".
27.
by tprynn 6y ago
Macbooks since 2018 physically disable microphones and webcams when the lid is closed: https://www.businessinsider.com/apple-macbook-air-and-2018-m...
28.
by tprynn 6y ago
Copying comment from previous thread: Systemic issues: * Creds scattered throughout source code, including DB / AWS creds, "fixed" by removing but still present in git history * Numerous crypto vulns: nonces / AES-ECB *
29.
by tprynn 7y ago
Systemic issues: * Creds scattered throughout source code, including DB / AWS creds, "fixed" by removing but still present in git history * Numerous crypto vulns: nonces / AES-ECB * What's even the point of blockcha
30.
by tprynn 7y ago
Really? I find that brakeman is a pretty amazing tool which finds a number of surprising issues. Of course, these days the vast majority of Rails apps already have brakeman set up, so it's used more as part of the commit process and le

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