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todd-davies
searching Neon…
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8 ms
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todd-davies
4mo ago
Correct, the click through from AI Overview is better than nothing, but it's not typically (anywhere near as) high as it would have been if the website was shown in the results without AI Overview at all. Furthermore, opting out of AI
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Letting publishers opt-out will not fix AI Overviews
(doi.org)
2 points
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todd-davies
4mo ago
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0 comments
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Publishers in UK can opt out of Google AI search results
(bbc.co.uk)
10 points
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todd-davies
4mo ago
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6 comments
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Who Are Tech Experts and What Can They Bring to Antitrust Enforcement?
(techpolicy.press)
2 points
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todd-davies
8mo ago
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0 comments
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todd-davies
10mo ago
The argument of technical impossibility seems implausible, although it would no-doubt be difficult. Whether there can be enough engineering will mustered within the company to separate out the AdTech stack from the rest of Google's ser
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todd-davies
1y ago
I think the competition/antitrust law community is beginning to develop some effective antibodies against some of these. Bork's ideas are pretty well and truly debunked these days, and issues with regulatory capture, lobbying etc.
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todd-davies
1y ago
Absolutely not! But I've never been a materialistic person and lived below my means while I worked in tech, so my quality of life didn't really drop. Although academia isn't anywhere near as lucrative as tech was, I find my w
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todd-davies
1y ago
I guess it depends on your circumstances. In Europe, for instance, the cost of a degree is sometimes quite low. My gateway from tech to law was a part-time masters degree in political science, and which cost around 200 euros a semester (in
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todd-davies
1y ago
Many of us in the antitrust/competition law community are trying. One issue, specific to digital markets, is that the field has very few people who are both legally and technically literate. If you're a technical person looking fo
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todd-davies
3y ago
Criminal sanctions in competition/antitrust law cases are an option in some jurisdictions, notably in the US and the UK (but not in the EU). For an ageing but interesting case, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lys
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todd-davies
3y ago
There are a few ways to think about this. One is deterrence based on cost-benefit analysis, which is essentially a game theoretic way to think about firm behaviour. The logic here would be to fine the firm enough to deter anti-competitive b
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todd-davies
3y ago
(edit) TL;DR: see tivert's comment. In most cases, the Commission sets a fine which is based on the harm caused by some anti-competitive conduct, with relatively small adjustments for extenuating or attenuating circumstances. In this i
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todd-davies
3y ago
Note that this fine is made up of 0.04bn of fine and 1.8bn of deterrent against future anti-competitive behaviour [1]. The the 2006 fine-setting guidelines allow the Commission to do that [2]. We should read the 1.8bn lump sum (roughly 0.5
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todd-davies
3y ago
The specific guidelines that the Commission is relying on were written in 2006 [1]. [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A...
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Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's Proposed Data Rules
(schneier.com)
2 points
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todd-davies
3y ago
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1 comments
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todd-davies
3y ago
> In October, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) proposed a set of rules that if implemented would transform how financial institutions handle personal data about their customers. The rules put control of that data back in t
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todd-davies
3y ago
No worries :) You're right that the law shouldn't be arbitrary. Lots of what the law is applied only when a cases passes legal tests to determine if some conduct violates the law. These tests are applied the same way to everybody
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todd-davies
3y ago
Let's wait and see what the remedy will be in this case. For the past few decades, antitrust enforcement has mostly relied on fines as opposed to requiring firms do something differently. As a result, courts and agencies don't hav
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todd-davies
3y ago
> It seems like the implicit assumption is that there must be a harm somewhere, we just haven't found it yet... isn't any business's primary purpose to compete with / harm competitors? As a general rule, firms want to
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todd-davies
3y ago
I can't think of a good example for a sass product. I'm sure it goes on though and I'm always interested in hearing about examples! A similar strategy which seems to be quite common these days is to cross-subsidise, which is
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todd-davies
3y ago
Yes, it's a bit of a problem for the field! Like many aspects of antitrust, predatory pricing applies cleanly for an industrial-era economy but as you point out, it's less clear how to translate it into the context of 21st century
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todd-davies
3y ago
Dropping prices below cost to wipe out competitors is predatory pricing which is prohibited under the antitrust laws. It's not always easy to prosecute, but it against the law nevertheless.
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todd-davies
3y ago
Great example. Another one is state governments joining a union or federal system, such as US states joining the Union or European states joining the EU, and becoming bound by federal/EU law.
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Strange Loop Conference won't be happening again
(twitter.com)
30 points
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todd-davies
3y ago
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1 comments
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todd-davies
3y ago
For sure they are throwing lawyers at it. It's 13bn after all. But the underlying reason for the appeal is the same; the law is not yet clear as to what should happen.
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todd-davies
3y ago
What's the cause of all the flip flopping between Apple having to pay the bill or not? I think the main problem that this area of law is fundamentally uncertain and hard to apply. Legal mistakes get made, and judgements get appealed un
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todd-davies
3y ago
Likewise, thanks for being polite. I agree with you that regulation has costs. I never intended to communicate that it didn't. Yet, at risk of stating the obvious, the fact that something has costs doesn't make it not worth doing
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todd-davies
3y ago
Power is notoriously hard to define. In antitrust "market power" is usually defined as either the ability to set prices above marginal cost, or an ability to act free from competitive constraint (i.e. if the firm takes some action
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todd-davies
3y ago
Good point. I don't think the FTC is myopically focused on mergers, but on anti-competitive behaviour in general. That said, I don't think we have a good handle on the imitation problem, there's probably some great research q
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todd-davies
3y ago
The VC side isn't my area so I don't think I have very good thoughts on it. Perhaps somebody with more expertise can chime in. That said, there's lots of great work about financialization and antitrust coming out, and I shoul
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