tehryanx

7 ms·

1.
by tehryanx 5d ago
never flagged a comment faster, gross.
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by tehryanx 2mo ago
Pedant here. Using "for instance" here implies that you will be providing an example of how begging the question and raising the question are not the same thing. You've provided a definition and a source, not an example.
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by tehryanx 5mo ago
It makes a lot of sense to use an MCP for git and everything else if you want observability across many users. It gives you a place to shim security controls, monitoring, and alerting into the tool call pipeline.
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by tehryanx 5mo ago
I find it even more fascinating that a few of them aren't.
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by tehryanx 5mo ago
I know you're right that there's a saturation point for context size, but it's not just context size that the larger models have, it's better grounding within that as a result of stronger, more discriminative attention p
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by tehryanx 5mo ago
newer models have larger context windows, and more stable reasoning across larger context windows. If you point your model directly at the thing you want it to assess, and it doesn't have to gather any additional context you're no
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by tehryanx 5mo ago
I get what you're saying, but I think this is still missing something pretty critical. The smaller models can recognize the bug when they're looking right at it, that seems to be verified. And with AISLE's approach you can it
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by tehryanx 5mo ago
I first mirrored these in the early 2000s because I was worried it would eventually vanish. my mirror has been gone for decades, and the original survives. :)
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Show HN: Whorl – Fingerprinting LLMs as horrible password generators(bountyplz.xyz)
2 points by tehryanx 6mo ago|0 comments
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by tehryanx 7mo ago
where is anthropic hyping like that? Most of what I see coming out of anthropic is deep context releases on research they're doing.
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by tehryanx 8mo ago
The real problem here is that this is now the only way the maintainer/reporter can reasonably work. Proving out a security vulnerability from beginning to end is often very difficult for someone who isn't a domain expert or hasn&#
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Show HN: Chordle. Learn to identify pitch by playing Wordle with chords(codepen.io)
2 points by tehryanx 8mo ago|1 comments
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by tehryanx 11mo ago
Rolling your own browser is 10x more dangerous than rolling your own auth or crypto. Building on top of chromium is a good thing here.
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by tehryanx 11mo ago
Yes it does. He's refuting that in this part of the post: > When they finally did reply, they seem to have developed some sort of theory that I was interested in “access to PII”, which is entirely false. I have no interest in any PI
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by tehryanx 1y ago
based on the description, I think it's using something similar to GLAN https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.13064
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by tehryanx 1y ago
this feels like a hundred accidents waiting to happen.
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by tehryanx 1y ago
Forgive me for belaboring, but I think we're talking past each other a bit. I do understand that in your model the LLM can't send anything unsafe through to the rest of the system. What I'm saying is that the LLM can be manip
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by tehryanx 1y ago
Personally, I think there's a piece missing in the analogy. I understand that you can put some kind of human-verified mediator in between the LLM and the tool its calling to make sure the parameters are sane, but I also think you'
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by tehryanx 1y ago
Assuming you feed everything into another context to make safe, doesn't the problem just come with it? Why can't the LLM propagate misbehaviour into that stage?
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by tehryanx 1y ago
It really concerns me that this is an afterthought rather than MVP table stakes.
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by tehryanx 1y ago
I don't think it is beyond the scope of MCP. Browsers have controls to prevent cross-origin data exposures, and this protocol is designed to bridge origins across a context that they all have access to. It's breaking the existing
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by tehryanx 1y ago
Sure, but the leak risk is happening in a place outside the site's control. If the purpose of the MCP-B tool on mail.com is to summarize your email, then the site needs to allow the agent to pull your email into the context window. Onc
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by tehryanx 1y ago
I appreciate your responses here. The thing that still really stands out to me as a completely novel risk in this framework is that the extension is automatically seeking out and attaching to these servers as soon as a page gets loaded. Thi
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by tehryanx 1y ago
sandboxing is a general term for actor isolation, and its context agnostic. For example, when you use the sandbox attribute on an iframe in a web application, it's not the user that's untrusted, it's some other user that&#x27
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by tehryanx 1y ago
I do think the threat model here is a bit unique though. If I'm running two MCP servers on my machine, I'm the one that installed them, I'm the one that assigned what permissions they have in my environment, and I'm the
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by tehryanx 1y ago
I'm not following. Say I have your browser extension running, and it's interfacing with an MCP-B enabled banking application using my session to access my data in that app. I also have it connected to MCP-B enabled rogue web app t
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by tehryanx 1y ago
an untrusted, but permitted, user is why sandboxes exist. There are plenty of times you want to allow an untrusted user to have capabilities in a system, that's why you restrict those capabilities.
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by tehryanx 1y ago
I think the point is that you shouldn't be giving the agent the same privileges as the user. This is one of the biggest issues with how people are using agents rn imo. The agent should be treated as an untrusted user in your client, gi
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by tehryanx 1y ago
hard disagree here. I think crypto currencies are built on hype and bluster and scams, but blockchain as a technology is actually super interesting. There are plenty of cool use cases for an open immutable ledger that aren't scammy.
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by tehryanx 1y ago
The goal isn't to access harmful content, that's just how they're demonstrating that this technique can bypass the alignment training. The general case is what's interesting. If the agent you're using to manage the

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