swordswinger12

9 ms·

1.
by swordswinger12 8y ago
I don't really understand the threat model in which this provides a real security benefit. If someone can inspect the contents of memory, can't they also recover the encryption key somehow?
2.
GasToken: buy/sell Ethereum gas(gastoken.io)
4 points by swordswinger12 9y ago|0 comments
3.
by swordswinger12 9y ago
Zadie Smith's essays are tremendous. I highly recommend her earlier collection "Changing My Mind".
4.
by swordswinger12 9y ago
AEZ uses a non-standard AES variant in a sui generis fashion; as a result some people have called its security into question: https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/832.pdf Point being, its inclusion in the final CAESAR portfoli
5.
by swordswinger12 9y ago
Ah, thanks for the reply Tony. This would indeed prevent the problem I described. Kinda curious about the downvotes, since tptacek's original comment suggested nothing like CHAIN or STREAM, but on crypto HN you gotta roll with the punc
6.
by swordswinger12 9y ago
>you can almost always delegate that kind of interface up one layer in your application stack and pass AES-SIV chunks of messages. Without additional precautions this approach is vulnerable to a fairly basic chunk-reordering attack, sinc
7.
by swordswinger12 9y ago
Does anyone know if the IOTA devs ever wrote down a justification for using a hand-rolled hash instead of, like, SHA-256? If so, can you link it in a comment? EDIT: I feel compelled to explicitly say that this was a mind-bogglingly stupid t
8.
by swordswinger12 9y ago
The short answer is yes. There are some (slow) ways to fix this: https://people.csail.mit.edu/nickolai/papers/goldwasser-we.p...
9.
by swordswinger12 9y ago
All FHE schemes can run a full-blown virtual machine, but you might not live long enough to see Ubuntu finish booting up.
10.
by swordswinger12 9y ago
I may have missed something in the whitepaper, but using a confidentiality-only encryption scheme like AES-CTR seems bad because it enables trivial attacks on file integrity (bit-flipping attacks and such). How does Storj protect the integr
11.
by swordswinger12 9y ago
The author incorrectly calling them "elliptical curves" is like nails on a chalkboard. An "elliptical" is an exercise machine or an adjective used to describe something shaped like an ellipse. The set of points in a fiel
12.
The Cost of Decentralization in 0x and EtherDelta(hackingdistributed.com)
1 points by swordswinger12 9y ago|0 comments
13.
by swordswinger12 9y ago
You're letting your modern biases color how you view Tacitus' writings. Most people educated in the last ~hundred years or so were taught "history" as you understand it - an impartial account of the facts of an actual ev
14.
by swordswinger12 9y ago
Can you explain how you would use FHE instead of garbled circuits in the Arx range query data structure? I don't see how that would work - wouldn't you have to (re-)introduce interaction to let the server learn intermediate result
15.
by swordswinger12 9y ago
TFHE is not even in the same galaxy as CryptDB. Comparing the two is like comparing an apple and a 2007 Honda Civic. They're polar opposite approaches to executing queries on encrypted databases.
16.
by swordswinger12 9y ago
Fully homomorphic encryption isn't tremendously useful for database queries - you end up having to put the entire database in a massive FHE ciphertext, then expressing the query as a circuit which requires time linear in the size of th
17.
by swordswinger12 9y ago
This paper is a fairly convincing counter-argument to another recent work ( https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.03501 ) on physical adversarial examples for autonomous vehicles. The other paper argued there was "no need to w
18.
by swordswinger12 9y ago
This isn't for lack of trying on the part of cryptographers - unconditional proofs of security for most modern cryptosystems would imply that P and NP are separate. For example, a direct proof that SHA-256 is collision-resistant would
19.
by swordswinger12 9y ago
There needs to be a word to describe the practice of arrogantly explaining a researcher's own results back to them on HN. Maybe HNsplaining?
20.
by swordswinger12 9y ago
The failures of the academic cryptography community to provide solutions to real-world problems in general are well-documented, and I will not belabor them here (q.v. Rogaway's "The Moral Character of Cryptographic Work"). I
21.
by swordswinger12 9y ago
Another really interesting potential benefit of this work is enabling users to create longer, more complicated passwords. The idea is that if users are less encumbered by typos and small errors, they'll be able to use stronger password
22.
by swordswinger12 9y ago
To be clear: nowhere in this paper did we claim any particular solution is useless. However, the degree to which these systems are useful, and what situations they are useful for, is not well-understood. Prior work has shown that the encryp
23.
by swordswinger12 9y ago
If your threat model is having a hard disk stolen, simply using full-disk encryption or whatever Redis offers is probably fine. Fair warning, though: this is a really weak threat model and won't do anything to protect the data against
24.
by swordswinger12 9y ago
It's worth pointing out that trusted execution for individual queries does not, in general, rule out the attacks discussed in this paper. If the database collects (for example) frequency information about queries, inference attacks can
25.
by swordswinger12 9y ago
The original goal of the academic "encrypted database" proposals like CryptDB was security against this kind of adversary. The idea was that if all the data is encrypted even when you're querying it, you get some security aga
26.
by swordswinger12 9y ago
To protect against an attacker with physical access to a machine may indeed be futile, but it should be possible to provide some measure of security against a malicious process running on the machine. Defending sensitive data if the DB pr
27.
by swordswinger12 9y ago
Whoa, really? Is this analysis available publicly somewhere? It would be really useful for further research on this topic.
28.
by swordswinger12 9y ago
Some IC3 people at Cornell have been looking at this in the context of smart contracts: http://www.initc3.org/files/Gyges.pdf
29.
Why Your Encrypted Database Is Not Secure(eprint.iacr.org)
6 points by swordswinger12 9y ago|0 comments
30.
by swordswinger12 9y ago
There is a lower bound by Bennett et al. ("Strengths and weaknesses of quantum computing", SIAM JoComputing 1997) that shows Grover's algorithm is optimal for the generic search problem, so further lowering the asymptotic run

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