Y
HN Search
Hacker News Search
new
|
comments
|
top
|
jobs
sweis
searching Neon…
1.
▲
2.
▲
3.
▲
4.
▲
5.
▲
6.
▲
7 ms
·
1.
▲
by
sweis
27d ago
The HAWK attack was on a 3rd round PQC candidate that had been under adversarial review by experts for 3 years. It is an outlier and most vulnerabilities are easier to find.
2.
▲
by
sweis
3mo ago
The NSA is not trying to weaken ML-KEM. The IETF TLS working group is simply trying to publish a pure ML-KEM specification. It does not impact the hybrid ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem specification at all. The context of this is that D.J Bernstein h
3.
▲
Assessing Claude Mythos Preview's cybersecurity capabilities
(red.anthropic.com)
328 points
by
sweis
5mo ago
|
53 comments
4.
▲
Stop Using Encrypted Email
(securitycryptographywhatever.com)
10 points
by
sweis
1y ago
|
2 comments
5.
▲
by
sweis
1y ago
“ There was a bug in an OpenPGP library which finally gave us an excuse to tear encrypted email via PGP to shreds. Our special guest William Woodruff joined us to help explain the vuln and indulge our gnashing of teeth on why email was neve
6.
▲
by
sweis
2y ago
I dug into this once and the "theoretical ideal" of 3 originated in a 1950s paper about vacuum tube computers, which itself immediately backed off and said the choice of base 2 is frequently justified. https://sweis.med
7.
▲
by
sweis
3y ago
The video of the talk is online now too: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7VWNUUldBEE
8.
▲
by
sweis
3y ago
The best estimate I've seen is that we need about 5-7 orders of magnitude more qubits and 1-2 orders of magnitude lower error rates: https://sam-jaques.appspot.com/quantum_landscape_2023
9.
▲
by
sweis
3y ago
Rambus bought Cryptography Research about 12 years ago: https://www.rambus.com/rambus-completes-acquisition-of-crypt...
10.
▲
by
sweis
3y ago
NIST P-256 curve seed came from the X9.62 specification drafted in 1997. It was provided by an NSA employee, Jerry Solinas, as an example seed among many other seeds, including those provided by Certicom. Read this for more details: https:
11.
▲
by
sweis
3y ago
"High q-bit proprietary technology" and "specialized de-latticing algorithms" are made up terms that nobody uses.
12.
▲
How were the NIST ECDSA curve parameters generated?
(saweis.net)
5 points
by
sweis
3y ago
|
1 comments
13.
▲
by
sweis
3y ago
A post talking about how Jerry Solinas provided the NIST ECDSA curve parameters and anecdotes of how they were chosen.
14.
▲
by
sweis
3y ago
NIST post-quantum standards resulted from a 8+ year process and public competition: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography
15.
▲
by
sweis
3y ago
The record quantum computers can factor is 21 -- and that is by cheating by already knowing the factors are 3 and 7. There are other results that use special form composites which don't count. So a QC can factor a 5 bit number with Sho
16.
▲
by
sweis
3y ago
This is appearing at Crypto'23: https://crypto.iacr.org/2023/program.php Video of a previous lecture is here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4xNk3B-4TKs
17.
▲
Black-Hole Radiation Decoding Is Quantum Cryptography
(arxiv.org)
4 points
by
sweis
3y ago
|
1 comments
18.
▲
by
sweis
4y ago
Is this using unauthenticated AES-CTR mode? https://github.com/meshtastic/Meshtastic-device/blob/0447808... https://github.com/meshtastic/Meshtastic-device/blob/0447808... htt
19.
▲
Landscape of Quantum Computing in 2021
(sam-jaques.appspot.com)
3 points
by
sweis
4y ago
|
0 comments
20.
▲
by
sweis
4y ago
The record for factoring using a quantum computer is 21. Don't read that as 21 bits. 3*7. This has been the record for 12 years and that is arguably a result that is "cheating" with a priori knowledge of the factors. There ar
21.
▲
by
sweis
4y ago
Oded Goldreich's "Foundations of Cryptography" books are the rigorous, theoretical oriented books used in many grad-level crypto courses: https://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~oded/foc-book.html Neil Koblit
22.
▲
by
sweis
4y ago
You can't just base a business in a QOZ and call it a QOZB. It needs to generate 50% of its gross income from within the zone and 40% of its intangible property (e.g. software) must be used for business within a zone. Further, there ar
23.
▲
by
sweis
5y ago
I think we are many, many years away from a quantum computer being able to break 256-bit ECC: https://sam-jaques.appspot.com/quantum_landscape https://www.bsi.bund.de/EN/Topics/Cryptography/Qu
24.
▲
by
sweis
5y ago
I don't think QKD is practical, yet there are constantly companies trying to sell it. I don't really understand who is the market -- not big companies and not the US government. The NSA recently issued guidance to government agenc
25.
▲
by
sweis
5y ago
A quantum computer is not "infinitely parallel" and though it's still an open problem, it's considered unlikely that that quantum computers can solve NP-complete problems in polynomial time.
26.
▲
by
sweis
5y ago
I don't think a balanced-ternary Setun was ever built in hardware. It was emulated on a base-4 machine according to this contemporaneous RAND report by Willis Ware [1] The Setun creator N.P. Brousentsov made a lot of dubious claims, in
27.
▲
by
sweis
5y ago
For context, this site was at Mt. Zion Missionary Baptist Church in West Oakland. It was intentionally located there to target the local underserved communities. At the time, California was in phases 1A and 1B. This was intended for elderly
28.
▲
by
sweis
5y ago
There's also a web-based relay for magic-wormhole: https://webwormhole.io/ https://github.com/saljam/webwormhole
29.
▲
by
sweis
5y ago
This book is mostly minimal examples in whatever Python library the author decided to use. There are some major gaps. For example, the section on Python libraries doesn't even mention the most commonly used Python crypto library (crypt
30.
▲
by
sweis
5y ago
"WHO Points To Wildlife Farms In Southern China As Likely Source Of Pandemic" https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2021/03/15/9775278... https://www.nytimes.com/2021&#
More ›