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skaul
searching Neon…
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6 ms
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by
skaul
5mo ago
Credit to bsclifton for the idea!
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skaul
5mo ago
It's not but given that Perplexity doesn't have an API and blocks automated downloads, I'm not sure what else to use. Explained in the docs: https://github.com/ShivanKaul/chromium-drift/blob/mai
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skaul
5mo ago
Sorry about that! I've fixed the colors and contrast now.
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skaul
5mo ago
Thanks, fixed now.
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How far behind is each major Chromium browser?
(chromium-drift.pages.dev)
197 points
by
skaul
5mo ago
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66 comments
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Bash script to check if you were hit by the axios supply chain attack
(github.com)
1 points
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skaul
6mo ago
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0 comments
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Why Brave is opposing Google's Android developer registry
(brave.com)
7 points
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skaul
7mo ago
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0 comments
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skaul
7mo ago
I worked with Ralph when he was at Brave. I fondly remember many long walks in downtown Vancouver with him, getting tea at Matchstick and chatting about Rust and privacy and ancient Egyptian hieroglyphics. I still can't believe this. H
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by
skaul
7mo ago
Programming languages need to give the developer a way to iterate (map, fold, for-loop, whatever) over a collection of items. Over time we've come up with more elegant ways of doing this, but as a programmer, until LLMs, you've st
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skaul
7mo ago
Programming with LLMs is fundamentally different than going from a lower-level to a higher-level language, even apart from the whole non-determinism thing. With a programming language, you're still writing a for-loop, whether that'
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skaul
8mo ago
You can add these to your `~/.claude/settings.json`: "env": { "CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_FEEDBACK_SURVEY": "1", "CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC": "1", "DIS
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skaul
8mo ago
We used to use Bloom filters in 2019, funnily enough: https://brave.com/blog/improved-ad-blocker-performance/
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skaul
8mo ago
That is correct.
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skaul
8mo ago
We use the same adblocking engine (adblock-rust) on all platforms, including iOS, hence the shared memory savings.
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skaul
8mo ago
> Or does it still replace them with ads for scanmy cryptocurrency? Brave never did that. Brave blocks third-party ads & trackers by default. (disclaimer: I lead privacy and adblocking at Brave)
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Brave overhauled its Rust adblock engine with FlatBuffers, cutting memory 75%
(brave.com)
507 points
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skaul
9mo ago
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274 comments
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skaul
9mo ago
[BOTH FILLED] Brave Software | C++ Engineer, Filterlist Engineer | REMOTE | Full-time Brave is building a privacy-first browser and a more transparent Web for over 100M users. On the privacy team, we are looking for: - C++ Engineer: Working
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skaul
10mo ago
Self-plug but if anyone is interested in learning more about how browser fingerprinting works and the different protections browser makers deploy against it, I wrote a longer post about this a few months ago: https://pitg.network
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skaul
10mo ago
This would be akin to Chrome sending the user's (unmodified) URLs to Google. Even Chrome thinks that that would be really bad for user privacy, and goes through elaborate techniques to not leak the user's direct browsing to Google
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Comet sends all your URLs to Perplexity servers and there's no way to stop it
(shivankaul.com)
2 points
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skaul
10mo ago
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2 comments
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skaul
11mo ago
This is easy in Brave, just go to brave://settings/shields/filters and enable the "YouTube Anti-Shorts" filter list.
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skaul
1y ago
> Even if you know the source of the text before you feed it to the model you still need to solve the problem of how to send untrusted text from a user through a model without that untrusted text being able to trigger additional tool cal
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skaul
1y ago
You're right that if the user logs into a sensitive website, the "isolated browsing" mitigation stops helping. We don't want the user to accidentally end up in that state though. Separately, I can also imagine use-cases
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skaul
1y ago
> I haven't seen a single credible technique from anyone that can distinguish content from instructions You specifically mean that it's ~impossible to distinguish between content and instructions ONCE it is fed to the model, ri
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skaul
1y ago
> you reply to me like I need to be lectured That's not my intention! Just stating how we're thinking about this. > defense in depth is to prevent one layer failure from getting to the next We think a separate model can help
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skaul
1y ago
That was in the blog from the starting, and it's also the most important mitigation we identified immediately when starting to think about building agentic AI into the browser. Isolating agentic browsing while still enabling important
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skaul
1y ago
That's not how defense-in-depth works. If a security mitigation catches 90% of the "easy" attacks, that's worth doing, especially when trying to give users an extremely powerful capability. It just shouldn't be the
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skaul
1y ago
(I lead privacy at Brave and am one of the authors) > Instead they believe model alignment, trying to understand when a user is doing a dangerous task, etc. will be enough. No, we never claimed or believe that those will be enough. Those
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Browser Fingerprinting in 2025
(pitg.gitlab.io)
5 points
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skaul
1y ago
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1 comments
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by
skaul
1y ago
(disclaimer: I lead privacy at Brave and wrote the article) See the blog post for how we implemented this: https://brave.com/privacy-updates/35-block-recall/#how-we-im... . We took Recall's guidance for web br
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