reifyx

6 ms·

1.
by reifyx 2y ago
In Italy I saw a replication of Fra Angelico's Annunciation as a sculpted relief intended for the blind.
2.
by reifyx 3y ago
if you work from home, a sticky note with a strong password might be safer than a memorized employee-chosen password
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by reifyx 4y ago
"Just" is used in chess commentary frequently and usually a bit too flippantly as the speaker hasn't gone through all the necessary calculations as the players have to. Sam Shankland mentions this. https://youtu.be
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by reifyx 4y ago
I haven't used this for large deployments but I use it for my personal server and it works perfectly. Almost everything is built in and I can easily write my own custom operations when I need them. Documentation is good and the operati
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by reifyx 4y ago
Having played around with Clojure and Scheme for a while (but never got too serious), I always thought homoiconicity and macros were extremely cool concepts, but I never actually ran into a need for them in my everyday work. >Now, if we
6.
by reifyx 4y ago
I think both the idea and execution are great. These games would be useful even just as problem statements. I like that each problem clearly defines the desired tone and goals, and that the sample solutions have explanations. Both in techni
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by reifyx 5y ago
Yes, that's exactly what we both agreed on 6 comments ago. The question is, is the ability to delete messages critical enough to require in any possible secure messaging solution, at the expense of features like email search, archiving
8.
by reifyx 5y ago
>The premise of cryptographically secure messaging is that you have an adversary recording all your message traffic. Agreed. >Lack of forward secrecy implies, logically, that if your long-term secret is ever compromised, every message
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by reifyx 5y ago
Your argument is that forward secrecy is important in messaging because forward secrecy is important in messaging? I'm not trying to be argumentative here, I actually don't understand what the reason it's so critical is, nor
10.
by reifyx 5y ago
I agree with you there. But is your point that any secure email system must critically have forward secrecy, or its insecure? Even though forward secrecy really only gives you any benefit for the messages that you delete, which most peopl
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by reifyx 5y ago
But this only applies for messages that are deleted on your local device (either manually or through an automatic timer). Otherwise, whatever adversary stole your keys can steal your message archive too, they're on the same device. Now
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by reifyx 5y ago
Assuming you don't want to keep any "chain state" in between messages (which seems reasonable), you can always consume a fresh one-time key of the recipient for every message. The first downside is how you know that the one-t
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by reifyx 5y ago
There's this old picture from a 1986 MIT lecture: https://miro.medium.com/max/4448/1*-yaqXNO1tUwVkUpyOqTT7Q@2x... .
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by reifyx 5y ago
I don't think people want forward secrecy for their email. If they get a new computer, they probably want all their mail on there, right? Isn't porting over their email efficiently at odds with forward secrecy? Also, is forward se
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Taiwan rejects murder suspect’s surrender offer, wants Hong Kong to extradite(scmp.com)
1 points by reifyx 7y ago|0 comments
16.
by reifyx 8y ago
Thanks for the reference. Haven't looked into this in a few years, cool to see something has shown up about it now. I guess Sweedler was just having some fun then? Still curious about the Trithemius quote and if it has any particular r
17.
by reifyx 8y ago
When doing some research for a final project about using Grobner bases for cryptography, I came across an interesting paper titled aptly titled "Why You Cannot Even Hope To Use Grobner Bases in Public-Key Cryptography: An Open Letter t