Y
HN Search
Hacker News Search
new
|
comments
|
top
|
jobs
philodeon
searching Neon…
1.
▲
2.
▲
3.
▲
4.
▲
5.
▲
6.
▲
6 ms
·
1.
▲
by
philodeon
1mo ago
Henry de Valence is the person mentioned in that quote as having moved in next door to Appelbaum, as documented by djb: https://eindhoven.cr.yp.to/false-statements-by-henry-de-vale...
2.
▲
by
philodeon
1mo ago
No, the original claim was by me. And I gave you a plausible story. You just didn’t want to hear it. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48820336
3.
▲
by
philodeon
1mo ago
Quoting https://archive.fo/3QWJF#selection-801.0-805.168 “Als Appelbaum im September 2015 an der Technischen Universität Eindhoven ein Doktorandenprogramm beginnt, ist auch sie interessiert. Für Appelbaum ist die Universitä
4.
▲
by
philodeon
1mo ago
I enjoyed the @tptacek cameo. I suspect tptacek didn’t.
5.
▲
by
philodeon
1mo ago
The purpose of a system is what it does. https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013...
6.
▲
by
philodeon
1mo ago
The article has at least a dozen side by side highlighted examples of plagiarism. The title is irrelevant.
7.
▲
by
philodeon
1mo ago
Yes, the plagiarism has been amply demonstrated. https://ncofnas.com/p/dei-fraud-and-cover-up-at-cambridge
8.
▲
by
philodeon
2mo ago
And just a few years later, Apple shipped an iTunes 2 installer that could wipe your external hard drives.
9.
▲
by
philodeon
2mo ago
Yes, that’s the deflect part of deflect and minimize.
10.
▲
by
philodeon
2mo ago
Because both the article and your continued arguments about ML-KEM demonstrates that in confirmed cases of NSA sabotage and in hypothetical cases of NSA sabotage, your job is to deflect, minimize, and avoid any responsibility being doled ou
11.
▲
by
philodeon
2mo ago
Ok, let me be clear: the NIST is a proxy organization for the NSA. The declassified internal history of the NSA makes it clear that they were subverting the NIST back when they were still called the National Bureau of Standards. Just beca
12.
▲
by
philodeon
2mo ago
I was making the point that if you have subverted the NIST to do your bidding in what appears to be a neutral way, obviously you’re going to have some feel-good projects in your portfolio. Otherwise, the folks that the Soviets called “usef
13.
▲
by
philodeon
2mo ago
As your article points out, Hoffman wrote a specification for spewing as many NSA-controlled “random” bytes into TLS packets as he could get away with, after Rescorla’s attempt failed. Hoffman’s work became an experimental RFC. Yet, your a
14.
▲
by
philodeon
2mo ago
To quote you: “ (I'm among an elite cadre† of cryptography-adjacents who felt it probably wasn't, but only because I thought it was too stupid to actually be used anywhere --- as soon as it was disclosed that (a) it was a default-
15.
▲
by
philodeon
2mo ago
The Godfather Part 2 demonstrated overwhelmingly that a good part of Vito Corleone’s ill-gotten gains went to strengthening his community. The Italians in his neighborhood adored him.
16.
▲
by
philodeon
2mo ago
DJB wrote a short history of NSA’s malicious meddling in the cryptography we all use, based on a declassified internal history of the NSA. https://blog.cr.yp.to/20220805-nsa.html
17.
▲
by
philodeon
2mo ago
> pure ML-KEM is much more "proven" than people are discussing. The core hardness assumption dates back to 2005, and has been intensely studied (the paper introducing it got a cryptography version of a Nobel prize (Godel prize)
18.
▲
by
philodeon
2mo ago
> Incorrect. My argument is that they aren't the same entity. Your mind is going to be blown when you learn about proxy organizations and cut-outs.
19.
▲
by
philodeon
2mo ago
To be clear, the Schneier Facts on Dual-EC turned out to be far more accurate than the Ptacek Gut Logic.
20.
▲
by
philodeon
2mo ago
You do realize that the NSA spends many millions on employing mathematicians, right? And that they wouldn’t keep doing that if all the mathematicians did was get really shit-hot at Kerbal Space Program? An analysis of the comparative risks
21.
▲
by
philodeon
2mo ago
But the NSA didn’t throw their weight around in the NIST or IETF processes trying to standardize McEliece, isogenies, HQC, or UOV. They threw their weight around trying to standardize ML-KEM. And anticipating your “but SIKE turned out to b
22.
▲
by
philodeon
2mo ago
No, because if the NSA didn’t already know how to break one of the cryptosystems, their engagement with the contest would have looked much different. They’d genuinely engage with the contestants and provide accurate security margin estimat
23.
▲
by
philodeon
2mo ago
It means that your argument is “the NSA couldn’t have subverted ML-KEM, it was written by Europeans”. You assiduously pretend that this scenario isn’t possible: * The NSA reviewed the PQ submissions and realized that there’s one they alread
24.
▲
by
philodeon
3mo ago
I’ve tried to submit code that removed old drivers from the kernel build in some distros, and they were universally rejected. Everyone is afraid of breaking users until Torvalds says it’s ok.
25.
▲
by
philodeon
4mo ago
Not only are there a vast amount of modules you’ll never need, the distros build and distribute most of them.
26.
▲
by
philodeon
7mo ago
There is no support for M3/M4/M5 GPUs, period. Asahi Linux is only installable on M1 and M2 Macs.
27.
▲
by
philodeon
9mo ago
Consider that a car made of plastic is something that only works pre-Ralph Nader. Now the NTSB would veto it in milliseconds.
28.
▲
by
philodeon
10mo ago
Lattices themselves have been analyzed since the days of Gauss. Lattice cryptography is only a couple decades old (in the unclassified literature). The first proposed lattice-based cryptosystem was completely broken within 2 years of its a
29.
▲
by
philodeon
10mo ago
Because Bernstein addresses this: >>> There is a committee at TU/e charged by law with ensuring proper grading, and I have recently learned that claims by Mr. de Valence related to this topic have been formally investigated an
30.
▲
by
philodeon
10mo ago
I’m not sure why you’re hung up on SNTRUP, since DJB didn’t submit it past round 2 of NISTPQC. In round 3, DJB put his full weight behind Classic McEliece. You’ve previously argued that “cryptosystems based on ring-LWE hardness have been w
More ›