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nmadden
searching Neon…
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6 ms
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31.
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nmadden
2y ago
Exactly that. (Hijack session rather than account: any competently designed system should require re-auth before any action that would allow permanent account takeover).
32.
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nmadden
2y ago
> each assignment is creating a new scope No, it’s rebinding the variable within the same scope. Even if you view it as implicitly creating a new scope, the implicit part means it can happen on any line so you have to scan them all and m
33.
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nmadden
2y ago
The ellipses in your straightforward transformation are doing some heavy lifting there. Typically the let…in construct has some way to indicate where the scope of the “in” part ends: indentation (Haskell), explicit “end” marker (SML) etc. E
34.
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nmadden
2y ago
The example given in the article is: counter = 0 counter = counter + 1 This is very different to shadowing where there is a clear scope to the rebinding. In this case, I cannot employ equational reasoning within a scope but mus
35.
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nmadden
2y ago
OK, sure. As far as I’m aware, nobody’s actually made that into an actual AKEM proposal though. (I wish they would, as I think many applications would be fine with pre-quantum authentication and post-quantum confidentiality).
36.
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nmadden
2y ago
Rebinding is nicer than mutation, but neither are referentially transparent.
37.
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nmadden
2y ago
This cuts both ways. The last major revision of SAML predates the iPhone by several years. Things like PKCE, which are essential for security on mobile devices and in other cases don’t exist at all in SAML, yet the same attack vectors apply
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nmadden
2y ago
It used to be the other way around. It’s been a while since I did much UI work, but the web always felt incredibly frustrating for layout compared to Tk. (I think CSS finally has something approaching Tk’s grid layout manager?) There are fe
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nmadden
2y ago
The committee report only looked at the regulator. To be sure, the regulator and the pensions industry should have done more. But the idea that Truss and Kwarteng are blameless innocents in the whole fiasco is ridiculous.
40.
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nmadden
2y ago
Are there? I’ve advocated for such constructions in the past, but I’ve never seen an actual proposal. Do you have a link?
41.
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nmadden
2y ago
Pull the other one. Only some of the tax cuts had been telegraphed in advance. Abolishing the top rate of income tax and cutting the basic rate early hadn’t been. They ignored all the warnings they were given and sidelined the OBR. The Trus
42.
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nmadden
2y ago
Ok, makes sense.
43.
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nmadden
2y ago
As rjsw says, they refuse to disclose who funds them. See https://www.monbiot.com/2022/10/07/thinktanking-the-country/ for some background.
44.
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nmadden
2y ago
One of the authors is from the Centre for Policy Studies. Another is from the Adam Smith Institute. These are the gang of shady right-wing think tanks that brought us Truss and Kwarteng. That tells you everything you need to know about thei
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nmadden
2y ago
The way DH is used typically for encryption (ECIES) or in TLS doesn’t give you authentication. But you can get authentication from DH alone, without PSK or PKI. See https://neilmadden.blog/2021/04/08/from-kems
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nmadden
2y ago
Just want to point out that the article specifically says to use an authenticated KEM (AKEM). A normal, unauthenticated KEM would not work as it provides no authentication. There are no post-quantum authenticated KEMs as yet.
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nmadden
2y ago
Originally it was about scalability - signed/encrypted cookies are stateless, and hence (in theory) allow easy horizontal elastic scaling: just share the key with the new nodes. But I suspect that in a lot of cases now it is because it
48.
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nmadden
2y ago
Yes and no. HMAC is very inefficient for short messages, but that inefficiency quickly vanishes into noise for anything over a kB or two. (HKDF and HMAC-DRBG are probably the worst offenders as they are always running HMAC on small inputs).
49.
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nmadden
2y ago
The article goes into a lot of detail about why the author thinks its unusual.
50.
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nmadden
2y ago
> Here are my priorities, in order of importance. I think these should be your priorities too. I might perhaps consider adding “it’s secure" to that list... (And if I might do some shameless self-promotion: https://www.ma
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nmadden
2y ago
The best way to do cryptographic agility is to associate the algorithm with the key and negotiate keys (from a given set) only. Google’s Tink library does this very well. See https://neilmadden.blog/2018/09/30/
52.
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nmadden
2y ago
Yes, Kyber (ML-KEM) ciphertexts can be compressed somewhat when you are sending the same message to multiple recipients. See https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Events/2024/fifth-pqc-stand... for details: &
53.
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nmadden
2y ago
The Zscaler exchange also listens to incoming connections, as does the OpenZiti edge router. How is this different? I’ve just swapped one vendor’s edge appliance (eg AWS ELB) for another. A CVE in either has the same impact, no? Application
54.
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nmadden
2y ago
But a simple gateway/ELB can protect your apps from the public internet. (But unless you’re pushing a root CA cert to all client devices then those apps aren’t “dark” in any sense due to CT logs). Zscalar’s ZPA docs say: > [ZPA] mit
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nmadden
2y ago
Sure, zero trust implies those things, but I was asking specifically about these kinds of all-in-one “zero trust appliances”. For me, as an AppSec specialist, I’d say ZT is primarily about making sure all your apps enforce authN/Z rega
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nmadden
2y ago
I took tptacek’s comment as implying that ZTNA solutions do do microsegmentation. Otherwise, if I get a shell in one app and have access to the entire network then what was the point of any of it? Are you saying they don’t do microsegmentat
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nmadden
2y ago
Oh ok. I’ve been reading a lot of zscaler zpa docs at work and didn’t come away with that impression at all. (The Zscalar docs are awful though).
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nmadden
2y ago
I don’t really get the threat model of these “zero trust” appliances and how they are really different from a VPN. Can someone explain it to me? It still looks very much like a perimeter.
59.
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nmadden
2y ago
With respect to IND-CCA, it doesn’t matter. Neither is compatible.
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nmadden
2y ago
In Tcl there is an idiom to do things like some_func $value[set value “”] where the [set value “”] bit reduces the refcount. There’s also a fairly widespread idiom of using the K combinator for this[1]: some_func [K $value [s
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