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I don’t really get the threat model of these “zero trust” appliances and how they are really different from a VPN. Can someone explain it to me? It still looks
by nmadden 2y ago
I don’t really get the threat model of these “zero trust” appliances and how they are really different from a VPN. Can someone explain it to me? It still looks very much like a perimeter.
- tptacek 2y agoIt's a "virtual" or "overlay" central reference monitor for the whole network --- imagine collapsing an entire campus network down to a single firewall --- which makes it really easy to draw arbitrary internal perimeters. The real customers for these products all tend to have group-based policies. If you remember NAC products from back in the day (policy-driven 802.1x and filtering, all designed to deal with the "chewy center" problem), this is like the overlay network version of that, and because it's all software it's much easier to deploy and manage.
- nmadden 2y agoOh ok. I’ve been reading a lot of zscaler zpa docs at work and didn’t come away with that impression at all. (The Zscalar docs are awful though).
- PLG88 2y agoI would add, doing Zero Trust Networking properly means deny by default (VPNs are open by default), service based access (not whole host or network), microsegmentation (not whole network), and least privilege. You should also use posture checks to ensure the end device is compliant and personally I prefer 'authenticate before connect' with outbound only connections from source and destination. Note, I am biased though as I work on an open source zero trust networking project - https://openziti.io/ https://openziti.io/.
- nmadden 2y agoI took tptacek’s comment as implying that ZTNA solutions do do microsegmentation. Otherwise, if I get a shell in one app and have access to the entire network then what was the point of any of it? Are you saying they don’t do microsegmentation?
- tptacek 2y agoYes: "microsegmentation" is a good way to describe one strategy (the most popular one) for retrofitting a notion of OMB-style "Zero Trust" onto existing networks. It's the selling point of things like this.
- PLG88 2y agoAgreed. My point was that ZTNA requires more than just micro segmentation, it should also include deny by default, service based access, least privilege, endpoint posture checks etc.
- tptacek 2y agoNot really, no.
- gargan 2y agoZero trust actually goes way beyond traditional VPNs. A key difference is granular access control and continuous verification. With zero trust, you're not only punching a hole through a firewall - you're creating dynamic, context-aware access policies for each user and device. This helps contain breaches and lateral movement much better than VPNs. Plus, it plays nice with cloud and hybrid environments where traditional network perimeters get blurry.
- nmadden 2y agoSure, zero trust implies those things, but I was asking specifically about these kinds of all-in-one “zero trust appliances”. For me, as an AppSec specialist, I’d say ZT is primarily about making sure all your apps enforce authN/Z regardless of whether the users are on an internal network or not. One way to do that is to stick a simple reverse proxy in front of every app that does OIDC to your central IdP, and then arrange your network so that you cannot bypass that (eg using (micro)segmentation or something like IAP’s signed headers). My impression from reading Zscaler’s docs was that it was really just an over-complicated version of this without even doing the segmentation for you, but it sounds like it does do that bit too.
- PLG88 2y agoThe idea of “zero trust appliances” is that you can reduce the attack surface from the external network, that is how Zscaler positions it, to make you apps 'dark'. IMHO though, the logical conclusion is to give every application, as part of the software development lifecycle its own private network, which implements zero trust principles - least privilege, microsegmentation, default deny, strong identity, device authentication, and more. The beauty of this approach is that you eliminate a whole class of vulnerabilities (see 'secure by default from CISA), that is, network/IP attacks, without changing the users experience (they just access the app). Another key aspect is that this approach should be applied to every use case, not just client to server. All of this is possible on the open source project I work on, OpenZiti - https://openziti.io/ https://openziti.io/.
- 2y ago