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mszary
searching Neon…
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1.
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by
mszary
3y ago
Oh, got ya. In that case it's even better to use the same app for authentication. I though mobile app was not an option for that bank.
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by
mszary
3y ago
You're absolutely right - SIM swapping is a major threat in many parts of the world. If you're a target and the attacker is determined, you could be in serious trouble. However, it's more cost-effective for bad guys to launch
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by
mszary
3y ago
What about the transactions authorization?
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by
mszary
3y ago
Authentication is one thing. When it comes to banking - the authorization is the key (no pun intended ;) Believe it or not, SMS is still one of the best ways to authorize sensitive transactions, even when compared to other popular options l
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by
mszary
3y ago
> The private key is stored on your device, say on iOS it would be stored encrypted in the secure enclave and accessible via TouchID/FaceID. What's important is that even though they are stored in the SE, they are no longer ti
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by
mszary
4y ago
Seems like it :) but I would be more pragmatic and didn't bash the system for the reasons you brought up :) ad 1 - IMO, it's still sufficient at scale with some basic infra. hardening ad 2 - AFAIK the "secret" was never
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by
mszary
4y ago
> You didn’t explain how this gives you any protection akin to a physical chip on a debit card… In both cases you (an admin) control how many attempts you wish to accept before sacrificing the usability over security (temporarily disabli
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by
mszary
4y ago
You're over complicating this. In fact it might provide a similar kind of protection the physical chip provides for debit cards. Let me explain: 1. Someone (anyone) initiates the login flow 2. The user record in a DB gets enriched with