mrnoone

5 ms·

1. 1.▲
   IBM Introduces the Spyre Accelerator for Commercial Availability(newsroom.ibm.com)

   1 points by mrnoone 1y ago|0 comments
2. 2.▲
   by mrnoone 1y ago

   You can have a look at this project that shows how with proper abstractions you can minimize unsafe Rust for low level firmware. Specifically look for page token, page allocator and page table implementations: https://github.com&
3. 3.▲
   by mrnoone 1y ago

   I agree with your point, we need common abstractions across different TEE architectures! The CoVE specification addresses fragmentation in the RISC-V ecosystem by defining a unified confidential computing architecture that scales across emb
4. 4.▲
   by mrnoone 1y ago

   The CoVE specification defines a unified confidential computing architecture for RISC-V that scales across embedded, edge, and cloud use cases. The system designers select the appropriate deployment model based on the specific constraints a
5. 5.▲
   by mrnoone 1y ago

   There are two key differences: (1) ACE leverages hardware virtualization support, including an MMU, to enable confidential virtual machines. In contrast, Keystone is designed for simpler processors that rely on just machine/supervisor&
6. 6.▲
   Show HN: Confidential computing for high-assurance RISC-V embedded systems(github.com)

   103 points by mrnoone 1y ago|9 comments
7. 7.▲
   by mrnoone 2y ago

   Some other tool (Coq-based) to formally verify unsafe Rust https://gitlab.mpi-sws.org/lgaeher/refinedrust-dev
8. 8.▲
   by mrnoone 3y ago

   This article simplifies the problem and commits factual errors. TPM is not HSM, not enclave, and it does not allow running arbitrary computation. TPM is a specification of a secure element, that provides some cryptographic primitives, secur
9. 9.▲
   by mrnoone 4y ago

   I recommend going through a course on the database scheme design.