mmalone

19 ms·

1.
by mmalone 3y ago
Just to clarify, are you describing EAP-PEAP or EAP-TTLS wrapping PEAP? I'm still learning a lot of this stuff... but, my understanding is that PEAP doesn't do TLS but TTLS + PEAP does. Right? Fact remains, though, that users will
2.
by mmalone 3y ago
You can roll your own with https://github.com/smallstep/certificates . We maintain major open source projects and contribute a lot to other projects. I don’t think that means everything we do has to be open source. Sorr
3.
by mmalone 3y ago
Correct.
4.
by mmalone 3y ago
Well... the title is hyperbolic (as titles are wont to be), but the goal was to configure Wifi that aligns with the CNSA Suite[1] / CNSSP 15[2], which I think is fair to call "NSA-grade" since they wrote the standard. If the
5.
by mmalone 3y ago
I work at smallstep. For home wifi this is totally overkill. Better security is always nice but, in this case, there's a significant usability & interop tradeoff for home use (though that may change over time... we'll see). Fo
6.
by mmalone 3y ago
I work at smallstep. Yes. This also works with FreeRadius! We decided to integrate RADIUS into our product since setting up FreeRadius is complicated and, if you're just doing EAP-TLS for Wifi, you don't need all of the features.
7.
by mmalone 3y ago
I work at Smallstep. In this case you're getting an industrial-grade CA with a properly managed private key, etc. Still, fair. We usually include warnings about this, but looks like we forgot this time. Curse of knowledge. I'll se
8.
by mmalone 3y ago
I work at smallstep. Not sure about the RADIUS server, but connections to the CA use TLS for SCEP and/or ACME DA so the CA root cert needs to be trusted for TLS. There may be some way to configure more narrow trust for just this one
9.
by mmalone 3y ago
> For the use case cited -- blocking MAC spoofing, EAP-TLS doesn't quite solve it The idea would be to rely on the client certificate authentication and not use MAC filtering at all. For example, you could have an EAP-TLS network th
10.
by mmalone 3y ago
If you're doing EAP-TLS wouldn't the ARP attack you're describing fail at the client when it's unable to verify the RADIUS server's certificate?
11.
by mmalone 3y ago
What would happen if you tried to reconnect to the network and the AP didn't have the pre-shared key? Presumably, you'd prompt the user and ask them if they want to connect. This is the same pattern as trust-on-first-use (TOFU) fo
12.
by mmalone 4y ago
It's a critique of OpenSSL, which also makes no attempt to think of user experience.
13.
by mmalone 5y ago
This is not a technical limitation though. It's a policy limitation. In theory, a name-constrained intermediate for `.example.com` has no more authority and poses no greater risk than a wildcard leaf certificate for `.example.com`. In
14.
by mmalone 5y ago
I'm biased because I'm the founder of the company, but you should check out the certificate management toolchain (CA[1] and CLI[2]) we've built at smallstep. A big focus of the project is human-friendliness. It's not per
15.
by mmalone 5y ago
You can put "name constraints" on an intermediate that, in theory, can restrict the intermediate to only signing certs for a particular subdomain. In theory, name-constrained intermediate certificate for ` .example.com` would have
16.
by mmalone 6y ago
Also, the Web PKI model has no real granular authorization when it comes to which CA can issue for which domain. A trusted CA can issue for any domain. So if you TOFU in my CA to connect to my website you’re also allowing me to issue for go
17.
by mmalone 6y ago
Good question. I know you can add a root CA cert. I’m on iOS and don’t have an Android or ChromeOS device handy. I don’t see a way to remove a cert from Apple’s iOS trust store (settings just tells me what store version I’m running). There
18.
by mmalone 6y ago
That is correct.
19.
by mmalone 6y ago
Yea you’re correct. They were forcing people to add a CA. So this was not a great example. I wouldn’t say the centralization of Web PKI is by design so much as it is (was?) by necessity. There’s a crypto conjecture called Zooko’s Triangle t
20.
by mmalone 6y ago
Neat. I had never heard of TLSA. I’ll also add that certificate transparency (CT) is another mechanism designed to mitigate malicious cert issuance by a CA. A CT log is an public, append-only data structure. It doesn’t actively prevent anyt
21.
by mmalone 6y ago
Firefox is the only browser that ships with a built-in trust store. Other browsers use your operating system’s trust store and you can add & remove trusted CA certs from that trust store using OS-specific utilities. The big three root s
22.
by mmalone 6y ago
Pretty sure CAA is supposed to be enforced by CAs, not by browsers. So, for instance, Let's Encrypt should refuse to issue a cert for your domain if you have CAA setup for digicert.
23.
by mmalone 6y ago
See my response to superkuh elsewhere in this thread. This would introduce new problems and, overall, would probably make Web PKI worse.
24.
by mmalone 6y ago
Counterpoint: this is also a big problem with SSH. When a host key changes with SSH you'll get a "Host Key Verification Failure" that basically says "yo, the key I expected for this host wasn't actually presented, y
25.
by mmalone 6y ago
I think TOFU would be really problematic for browsers & the Web PKI trust model. At this point Web PKI is dealing with attacks from nation-states and other advanced threats that end-users aren't really in a position to handle thems
26.
by mmalone 6y ago
Sure the CA is a new attack vector. That doesn't make it inherently insecure or the same as cleartext transmission. Is running an internal OAuth OIDC identity provider to issue signed identity tokens the same as using cleartext passwor
27.
by mmalone 6y ago
Yea good question. You can email maxey at our domain, which is smallstep.com. He's running the contest. Blow up his inbox!
28.
by mmalone 6y ago
I work at smallstep and we're partnering with yubico to give away five build kits for this project. DM us at @smallsteplabs on twitter to enter. See also: https://twitter.com/smallsteplabs/status/1341800787291
29.
by mmalone 6y ago
Counterpoint: if it hurts, do it more. That’s good operational hygiene. If you’re worried about certificate rotation failing, the surest way to make that process resilient is to do a lot of it. If you’re running the smallstep toolchain, you
30.
by mmalone 6y ago
There are many use cases for internal PKI. This is just one of of them. You’re nitpicking a default. Credential rotation is good security hygiene. To suggest otherwise is malpractice. Our toolchain makes certificate rotation trivially easy.

More ›