mdriley

7 ms·

1.
by mdriley 8mo ago
Just a few more Rust libraries we've shipped in Chromium: - https://github.com/image-rs/image-png - https://github.com/webmproject/CrabbyAvif - https://github.com/RCasatta&#x2
2.
by mdriley 10mo ago
I tend to agree. See also: https://issues.chromium.org/issues/401081629
3.
by mdriley 10mo ago
Happy to report the BMP work is actually being done by our friends on the Edge team at Microsoft! https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/72...
4.
by mdriley 10mo ago
Obligatory oldnewthing: https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20030929-02/?p=42... > Multilingual support also explains why you see things like “1 folder(s)” instead of “1 folder” and “2 folders”. Why not
5.
by mdriley 11mo ago
> TL;DR: use std::simd if you don’t mind nightly, wide if you don’t need multiversioning, and otherwise pulp or macerator. This matches the conclusion we reached for Chromium. We were okay with nightly, so we're using `std::simd`
6.
by mdriley 2y ago
Hi, I lead Chrome's Rust efforts. I think the Typescript folks made a great and well-reasoned decision.
7.
by mdriley 2y ago
> Based on the testing performed before the initial deployment of the Template Type (on March 05, 2024), trust in the checks performed in the Content Validator, and previous successful IPC Template Instance deployments, these instances w
8.
by mdriley 3y ago
Man Yue Mo worked at Semmle ( https://blog.sonatype.com/steps-to-responsible-disclosure ) before it was acquired by GitHub ( https://github.blog/2019-09-18-github-welcomes-semmle/ ). That research function
9.
by mdriley 3y ago
Itanium had sliding register windows too: https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20150729-00/?p=90...
10.
by mdriley 3y ago
The report says the cooling issue caused "a loss of service availability for a subset of [one] Availability Zone". How did a single-AZ failure cause outages for two dozen services? Why did a single-AZ failure mean "approximat
11.
by mdriley 3y ago
(2015)
12.
by mdriley 4y ago
see also: an empirical analysis of how many "u"s the Internet thinks are in "excuuuuuse me, princess", by Ryan North (of Dinosaur Comics and other fine literature) https://qwantz.livejournal.com/112122.ht
13.
by mdriley 4y ago
one relevant datapoint: https://devblogs.microsoft.com/dotnet/announcing-grpc-json-t...
14.
by mdriley 4y ago
It seems like a lot of other technologies in this space have solved the listed problems while remaining compatible with browsers, load balancers, reverse proxies, etc. It was a product choice not to offer a fallback path when HTTP/2
15.
by mdriley 5y ago
Eric Brandwine (VP/DE @ AWS) said publicly in 2019 that EC2 had never scheduled different tenants on the same physical core at the same time, even before we learned about things like MDS. https://youtu.be/kQ4H6XO-iao?t=
16.
by mdriley 5y ago
"EncryptData" https://github.com/microsoft/omi/blob/e4d72481fa2f805148c9c8...
17.
by mdriley 5y ago
See also Rands, “Seven plus or minus three” https://randsinrepose.com/archives/seven-plus-or-minus-three...
18.
by mdriley 5y ago
You might enjoy Uber’s paper on SubmitQueue, their system to run CI on what they guess will be the sequence of commits that test successfully: https://eng.uber.com/research/keeping-master-green-at-scale/
19.
by mdriley 6y ago
Definitely not appropriate for protecting Real Infrastructure, but for my handful of personal machines I put my authorized keys in a Google Doc and configure hosts to download it using `AuthorizedKeysCommand`. Makes it easy to add and revok
20.
by mdriley 6y ago
If you'd like to see the last data that was public, here's the commit that merged in the removal: https://gitlab.com/gitlab-com/www-gitlab-com/-/commit/5ed24d...
21.
by mdriley 6y ago
Er, a few problems with the reasoning here: 1. Windows developers did not build large parts of the product on any regular basis. Windows took ~18 hours to build on incredibly powerful build lab hardware -- as soon as it took longer, it was
22.
by mdriley 6y ago
Heh, nope, `timebuild.pl` is the canonical entrypoint for an "official" Windows build, and has been for a very long time. It's a hideously elaborate dependency resolver and task runner that is responsible for tying together a
23.
by mdriley 6y ago
Sure, it's easy enough to find network-attached screens. The hard part is giving those screens access to anything without them showing up as vectors for every Red Team exercise. Gizmos are used for basically any screen at Facebook that
24.
macOS is vulnerable to SpectreRSB/ret2spec(github.com)
2 points by mdriley 6y ago|0 comments
25.
by mdriley 6y ago
Every problem you describe was successfully worked through for the Google Code turndown in 2016.
26.
by mdriley 6y ago
(disclosure: I work at Google on side-channel stuff and https://github.com/google/safeside ) I'm really excited to read that post! I agree that the best we can claim right now is that we've made Spectre and ot
27.
by mdriley 6y ago
When you say "control over the ISA", I'll assume you mean "precise control over the emitted instructions". In which case: yes! That's Speculative Load Hardening ( https://llvm.org/docs/Specu
28.
by mdriley 6y ago
SGX is a tool in the toolbox, but it solves a different problem: isolating a small section of especially privileged code from the rest of a larger, less-trusted application. The sandbox described in the article is trying to do roughly the o
29.
by mdriley 6y ago
so, some things: 1. Information disclosure is pretty important, especially if your process has AWS credentials in the environment block or it's doing mTLS with a long-lived key. 2. Those operating systems already exist, see e.g. https
30.
by mdriley 6y ago
> Wasm sandboxing is even safe to run in the same process as other code (at least modulo Spectre-type vulnerabilities)... If you want strong security with this big a modulus you may have been looking for RSA. (ugh, sorry) Spectre V1 (spe

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