maltalex

7 ms·

1.
S&P 500 rejects SpaceX, also blocking entry for OpenAI and Anthropic(arstechnica.com)
1484 points by maltalex 3mo ago|502 comments
2.
by maltalex 4mo ago
This looks suspiciously cheap. The same model hosted by other providers is much more expensive [0]. So either DeepSeek can host it much cheaper than anyone else, or their business model is different. I suspect the latter, especially since t
3.
by maltalex 4mo ago
Any automation-friendly email hosting is going to have a serious spam problem, and therefore a blacklisting problem. I suggest taking a look at what providers like Sendgrid, Mailchimp, etc are doing to prevent abuse.
4.
by maltalex 4mo ago
An alternative explanation for this “over-hiring” is that many companies’ operating expenses have grown substantially because of AI spending. Companies can either eat the additional expense, hope AI adoption offsets it, or cut costs. For mo
5.
by maltalex 4mo ago
> 1. human verification for auth. How, at scale?
6.
by maltalex 5mo ago
Wouldn't a "WebRip" have to come from a streaming service by definition?
7.
Warez Scene(en.wikipedia.org)
25 points by maltalex 5mo ago|7 comments
8.
by maltalex 6mo ago
Only with certificate pinning or something similar. Otherwise, the attacker can get valid TLS certificates for any domain hosted on the hijacked IP addresses.
9.
by maltalex 6mo ago
Here are some examples: The attacker can impersonate the victim, get a valid x509 certificate issued to it, and create a perfect replica of their website/api/whatever. The attacker can perform a man-in-the-middle attack on the vic
10.
by maltalex 6mo ago
RPKI doesn't make BGP safe, it makes it safer . BGP hijacks can still happen. RPKI only secures the ownership information of a given prefix, not the path to that prefix. Under RPKI, an attacker can still claim to be on the path to a v
11.
by maltalex 6mo ago
Absolutely. They've made the same mess with "Copilot" as with ".NET" in the early 00's [0]. Everything was ".NET" from consumer oriented services (".NET Passport"), to "Visual Studio .N
12.
by maltalex 6mo ago
“Copilot” is not one product, it’s around 15 different products, seriously. I think that people often compare apples to oranges by comparing the “copilot” they have in Windows/Office/Teams etc to Claude Code which is ridiculous. A
13.
Ten Months with Copilot Coding Agent in Dotnet/Runtime(devblogs.microsoft.com)
2 points by maltalex 6mo ago|0 comments
14.
Emergent Cyber Behavior: When AI Agents Become Offensive Threat Actors(irregular.com)
4 points by maltalex 6mo ago|0 comments
15.
by maltalex 6mo ago
> and nobody cares Everyone cares. In fact, there's an entire industry of tools being developed to solve this very problem. The current governance gaps are obvious to anyone who's ever used an agent. We are still in the very ea
16.
by maltalex 7mo ago
Maybe I'm missing something, but isn't this the same as writing code, but with extra steps? Currently, engineers work with loose specifications, which they translate into code. With the proposed approach, they would need to first
17.
by maltalex 7mo ago
> Dependabot has some value IME, but all naïve tools that only check software and version numbers against a vulnerability database tend to be noisy if they don’t then do something else to determine whether your code is actually exposed t
18.
by maltalex 7mo ago
It's not just open source though. Many high quality sources of information are being (over-)exploited and hurt in the process. StackOverflow is effectively dead [0], the internet archive is being shunned by publishers [1], scientific j
19.
by maltalex 7mo ago
> you are both confusing two issues. How am I confusing the two? My whole point was the same as yours - that the existence of lawful intercept is a separate issue and that the focus should be on securing telecoms.
20.
by maltalex 7mo ago
I get that you don't like lawful intercept. That's fine. But focusing on only that aspect of telcos derails the conversation and prevents us (in the very broad sense of "us") from making progress on things we all agree o
21.
by maltalex 7mo ago
Even if the back door wasn't there, you wouldn't want nation state hackers anywhere near telecoms since they're critical infrastructure. Telecoms should be highly secure. Period.
22.
by maltalex 7mo ago
Yes, telecoms should be forced to invest in their own security if they're not doing it. But the focus on the back door misses the point in my opinion. Even if the back door wasn't there, you wouldn't want nation state hackers
23.
by maltalex 7mo ago
The problem isn't the back door. Every telecom company in every country provides access for "lawful intercept". Phone taps have been a thing for decades and as far as I know, require a warrant. The problem is that telecoms ar
24.
by maltalex 7mo ago
Nice website, but I feel like calling it "wire wiki" is quite ambitious. Currently, it's a (beautiful) DNS lookup tool, but that's about it. I expected something like RIPE Stat [0], or something like the undersea cable m
25.
The Trigger in the Haystack: Extracting and Reconstructing LLM Backdoor Triggers(arxiv.org)
1 points by maltalex 7mo ago|0 comments
26.
BGP Vortex: Update Message Floods Can Create Internet Instabilities [video](youtube.com)
1 points by maltalex 8mo ago|0 comments
27.
by maltalex 8mo ago
Tangentially, the fact that we're still using gigabit connections in our homes and especially offices in 2026 is weird. Gigabit Ethernet is over two decades old, but it's still the most common standard. Both 2.5 and 10 Gbps are ef
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by maltalex 8mo ago
They’re in a tough spot. Stuck between free open-weights models and competitors with deep pockets and access to customers.
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by maltalex 8mo ago
That argument would have made sense if the protests were limited to the US, but they're not. There's clearly something else at play.
30.
by maltalex 9mo ago
Immutable collections exit, they were just added later. See System.Collections.Immutable: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.collecti...

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