jy-tan

9 ms·

1.
by jy-tan 5mo ago
I built Fence ( https://github.com/Use-Tusk/fence ) in Go, a lightweight process sandbox for CLI agents (or any command really) with filesystem and network restrictions. It's also available as a Go library if you wi
2.
by jy-tan 6mo ago
I created a tool for this: https://github.com/Use-Tusk/fence Same thoughts - I wanted a "permission manager" that defines a set of policies agnostic to coding agents. It also comes with "monitor mode&quo
3.
by jy-tan 6mo ago
I built Fence for this! https://github.com/Use-Tusk/fence fence -t code -- opencode
4.
by jy-tan 6mo ago
Agree, I find it hard to support them when the team is so obnoxious on X.
5.
by jy-tan 8mo ago
How does this compare with QMD ( https://github.com/tobi/qmd )?
6.
by jy-tan 8mo ago
Awesome, give it a spin and let me know if you have any feedback!
7.
by jy-tan 8mo ago
You can just install Fence in your deployed service (see the installation instructions in the README), then wrap the user command/script with `fence -t code <command>`. It will probably work fine in an EC2 instance but I'm n
8.
by jy-tan 8mo ago
Yes, Fence is designed for exactly this, the built-in `code` template already allowlists npm and PyPI registries: ``` fence -t code pip install requests fence -t code npm install express ``` This restricts writes to workspace + cache dirs,
9.
by jy-tan 8mo ago
Fence works on macOS and Linux (the install script works for both platforms). I'll make that clearer in the README.
10.
by jy-tan 8mo ago
Unfortunately nested bubblewrap sandboxes don't work. When you run `fence flatpak run <app>`, Fence creates a bwrap sandbox with its own user namespace, Flatpak then tries to create another user namespace inside, so you'd ge
11.
by jy-tan 8mo ago
Hey! Yes, Fence was inspired by sandbox-runtime. Both use the same underlying OS primitives (sandbox-exec on macOS, bubblewrap on Linux) and proxy-based network filtering. Fence adds additional controls on top of what is available on sandbo
12.
by jy-tan 8mo ago
Thanks! And yeah, these are complementary layers. Fence is at the OS/network boundary, while API-level policies (endpoints, parameters, token budgets) need something that actually understands the protocols. I think Fence should stay a
13.
by jy-tan 8mo ago
Yes, currently writes are deny-by-default, but reads are allow-by-default. The challenge is that most programs need read access to system paths (/lib, /usr, /etc, /proc) just to run. A pure "deny all reads" mod
14.
by jy-tan 8mo ago
Fair point, it does raise the bar! The distinction I'm drawing is between "semi-trusted" and "actively malicious". Fence handles well supply-chain scripts that phone home, tools that write broadly across your filesy
15.
Show HN: Fence – Sandbox CLI commands with network/filesystem restrictions(github.com)
78 points by jy-tan 8mo ago|23 comments
16.
by jy-tan 8mo ago
Thanks! Great question, we have a Transforms system that lets you define redaction rules (redact, mask, replace, or drop) using matchers with JSONPath support. Transforms are applied at capture time, so sensitive data never leaves your serv
17.
by jy-tan 8mo ago
Currently Tusk Drift focuses on functional/regression testing - we mock outbound dependencies (DBs, external APIs) for determinism, so we're not measuring real-world performance characteristics today. That said, we're also ex
18.
by jy-tan 8mo ago
Thank you!
19.
by jy-tan 8mo ago
Give it a spin and let us know what you think! :)
20.
Show HN: Tusk Drift – Turn production traffic into API tests(github.com)
33 points by jy-tan 8mo ago|8 comments
21.
Concepts for Reliability of LLMs in Production(jytan.net)
3 points by jy-tan 3y ago|0 comments