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joelanders
searching Neon…
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6 ms
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1.
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by
joelanders
11y ago
Is there a reason "fork over" and "shell out" can both (roughly) mean "fork and exec a shell" or the seemingly unrelated phrase "pay?"
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by
joelanders
12y ago
Stumbled across and started reading A. E. van Vogt's "The World of Null-A" last night. Super trippy. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_World_of_Null-A http://www.amazon.com/World-Null--E
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OpenPGP Best Practices
(help.riseup.net)
4 points
by
joelanders
12y ago
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0 comments
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by
joelanders
12y ago
Here's a pretty comprehensive guide: https://help.riseup.net/en/gpg-best-practices
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by
joelanders
12y ago
I just posted this Linux Journal article from 20 years ago, "Linux in Antarctica." We've come a long way. [0]: http://www.linuxjournal.com/article/2843 [1]: https://news.ycombinator.com/i
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Linux in Antarctica (Nov. 1994)
(linuxjournal.com)
4 points
by
joelanders
12y ago
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0 comments
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by
joelanders
12y ago
Yes, that's my understanding as well; my other comment was sloppy. I'm unsure what was meant by "hook," though. Is that something you set up with the target process running under a debugger? That much privilege wouldn&#x
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by
joelanders
12y ago
See links for a bit of reading about how hard it is to break DRM on Spotify or Netflix. They're doing a lot more than Snapchat. The difference between "you just need to reverse engineer the HTTP API to make a 3rd-party client"
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by
joelanders
12y ago
There are trusted software client things (Spotify, Netflix, etc.) that seem to work well enough. Snapchat should be able to do better.
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by
joelanders
12y ago
I wonder how they "confirm[ed] out of email that the keys we exchanged were not intercepted and replaced by your surveillants." Key exchange is the hardest part.
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by
joelanders
12y ago
I think the weak link in the chain is only after decryption, but before uncompression (for lossy formats, so books excluded). See, for example, [1] and [2], where the authors look at randomness and entropy measures of I/O to find w
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Fun with HTTP Headers (2005)
(nextthing.org)
8 points
by
joelanders
12y ago
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2 comments
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by
joelanders
12y ago
Steven Levy's _Crypto_ (referenced in the article) is quite good (as is everything he writes).
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by
joelanders
12y ago
Check out the stuff made by Alphasmart. A larger display would be nice for editing.
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by
joelanders
12y ago
I'm going to get downvoted for being a grammar nazi, but this disingenuous "spokesperson" should know the difference between "insure" and "ensure."
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by
joelanders
12y ago
Regarding machines and discoverability: I think an interesting comparison to flesh out would be computers vs. cars. Compare how tinkerers in each came to be (opening up their parents' car/computer, for example). Compare how "
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by
joelanders
12y ago
I haven't read this book yet, so I don't know about "triggered" vs. "enabled," but it seems relevant (came up in a talk about American companies providing deep packet inspection / internet censorship tools
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by
joelanders
12y ago
web of trust
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by
joelanders
12y ago
There is an awkward period (after clicking past the warning and before verifying the signed SSL certificate fingerprint) which is no more or less safe than HTTP, but which is more cumbersome and might encourage often-bad behavior in some us
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by
joelanders
12y ago
The site's audience is going to be technical. She explains how to check the SSL certificate fingerprint here: https://blog.patternsinthevoid.net/isis.txt Once you've whitelisted her self-signed cert, you know from
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by
joelanders
12y ago
Her.
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by
joelanders
12y ago
If you like this, you'll also like Peter Stuge's 30c3 talk: Hardening hardware and choosing a #goodBIOS "A commodity laptop is analyzed to identify exposed attack surfaces and is then secured on both the hardware and the firm
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by
joelanders
12y ago
I just submitted a blogpost from the Tor Project (Mission Impossible: Hardening Android for Security and Privacy) which covers everything between removing the microphone (from a Nexus 7) and baseband software to recommended apps and configu
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Mission Impossible: Hardening Android for Security and Privacy
(blog.torproject.org)
61 points
by
joelanders
12y ago
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14 comments
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by
joelanders
12y ago
When we talk about making programming accessible to kids (or anyone new to it), I think of how selling and distributing software is different now than it used to be. Webapps and app stores make it easy to reach thousands or millions of cust
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by
joelanders
13y ago
Another cool piece of mechanics this reminded me of: the Master Lock Speed Dial ( https://toool.nl/images/e/e5/The_New_Master_Lock_Combination... ). I think there's an animation of the internals somewhere
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by
joelanders
13y ago
https://practicingruby.com/articles/low-level-computing?u=64...