ios14

5 ms·

1.
by ios14 6y ago
Also, odds that the govt has secret radically advanced quantum computing tech and does have a QC to recover using Shor’s? (Yea, probably unlikely as it would takes millions of qubits to achieve this..) How long before lattice based crypto i
2.
by ios14 6y ago
What are the odds that big tech and big brother are in bed creating a huge dog and pony show to counter the post-Snowden “going dark” reality? Given: The public knows about mass surveillance. Big tech deploys supposedly unbreakable end to e
3.
by ios14 6y ago
One unfortunate example doesn’t make for a case either way. My understanding is that FB (for example) would hold the keys and turn over only when compelled via warrant. Not mass surveillance. Also, Snowden’s propaganda has worked like a cha
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by ios14 6y ago
We would need statistics to assert one way or another. I suspect it’s the opposite: give people the means to easily maintain their own communication networks completely out of view of the government, and some will abuse it for other kinds o
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by ios14 6y ago
If I understand right, in this example FB would hold the keys to recover the cleartext and turn it over to law enforcement only when compelled to do so with a warrant. This isn’t extreme at all.
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by ios14 6y ago
Sorry, not following how this counters any of my points. Shenanigans via anachronistic laws or corrupt cops isn’t related to encryption, and we know sophisticated criminals can employ their own privacy tools.
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by ios14 6y ago
Not following your slippery slope argument.
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by ios14 6y ago
Offering lawful access to widely deployed encryption is hardly an extreme view. Our IC and their partners, as well as our bureaucrats, are mostly in agreement. An extreme view might entail banning certain forms of math on the internet entir
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by ios14 6y ago
Bananas and bowling balls. Based on your description, the situation you described is a shame and a failure of law enforcement to keep us safe. Not an encryption issue.
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by ios14 6y ago
Forgot to add: I don’t trust the consumer devices including a fully patched brand new iPhone. I am far more concerned about the various private interests abusing data access, data brokers, hackers potentially getting into my endpoint direct
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by ios14 6y ago
Yes, removing such spof’s should be a design requirement. Yes, it’s a difficult problem with social implications, and not simply technical challenges, as you noted. Yes, Snowden shouldn’t have so easily been able to steal so much data. Appa
12.
by ios14 6y ago
Frictionless E2EE at scale is cancerous on society and the FYEV/JP alliance know this all too well. As this subject has been iterated over many times, will keep this comment short. * FB deploying frictionless, unbreakable encryption at
13.
by ios14 6y ago
>criminal empires True, you can’t stop math but you can try to police it. You can regulate consumer access. Doing so means one less “gone dark” area, which makes LE job easier. >security exploits To your point about low level criminal
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by ios14 6y ago
Unpopular view, but unrecoverable encryption deployed at web scale is a cancer on society. While unrecoverable encryption provides additional privacy to law abiding citizens, it normalizes low level criminal activity at scale. There has to
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by ios14 6y ago
Maybe this is possible instead with homomorphic encryption.