hirowan

5 ms·

1.
by hirowan 5y ago
I'm just grateful I'm not a core Python dev after reading this thread. I've never seen so much negativity concentrated in one place in quite some time, for a feature of a programming language which is fairly innocuous.
2.
by hirowan 7y ago
The issue with this and `singledispatch` is that they no longer support pseudo-types from the `typing` module [1] so you can't use them with containers of type `x`, e.g. `List[str]`, or protocols like `Sequence`. [1] https:/&#x2F
3.
by hirowan 7y ago
That doesn't mean it can't use the same _jetway_ (we were discussing jetways, not gate spacing) you'd use on a 737 or that a 737 can't park at a stand wide enough to fit an A380.
4.
by hirowan 7y ago
I can assure you you can use the same jetway on a 737 that you can use on an A380.
5.
by hirowan 7y ago
I think it's a little bit of everything (stairs, tech, loading/unloading) but the main reason prrrobably was being able to throw bags into the cargo hold without the need for GSE - the airstair could've easily been made talle
6.
by hirowan 7y ago
The 737 rudder hardover wasn't discovered until the mid-to-late 90s, a long, loooong time after the 737 entered into service. That does not quite speak to the benefit of a mature product (how mature is 'mature'?). Case in p
7.
by hirowan 7y ago
There is no other modern airliner with a software bodge for static stability. No, Airbuses are not comparable (Airbus FBW control laws are _not_ for stability control) and they are (to the best of my knowledge) positively stable throughout
8.
by hirowan 7y ago
I don't know which one you imagine MCAS to be but see [1]; specifically: MCAS is a longitudinal stability enhancement. It is not for stall prevention (although indirectly it helps) or to make the MAX handle like the NG (although i
9.
by hirowan 7y ago
> After an incident like this ... Clearly, that didn't happen, or a second MAX wouldn't have crashed under very similar circumstances. > Southwest installed additional gear on their planes to help prevent this when the first
10.
by hirowan 7y ago
You're putting the safety record into chauvinist context, to be exact. An AoA failure is sufficiently rare for it to have only occured in a couple of occasions in - shockingly - only a couple of countries.
11.
by hirowan 7y ago
MCAS has absolutely nothing to do with maintaining commonality. An aircraft with decreasing stick force on approach to stall in its normal mode of operation would've never been certificated.
12.
by hirowan 7y ago
> A brand new design would probably introduce more serious flaws than an interation of a mature design As evidenced by the ever-crashing 787s and A350s.
13.
by hirowan 8y ago
I think you've misunderstood. The system you're describing kicks in when (a) the aircraft is on the ground, (b) commanded thrust is idle and (c) the engines continue to produce thrust above idle (when there is an overthrust condi