gsu2

7 ms·

1.
Bridge Guard(sive.rs)
2 points by gsu2 1mo ago|0 comments
2.
Concerning Git's Packing Heuristics (2006)(kernel.org)
1 points by gsu2 2mo ago|0 comments
3.
by gsu2 2mo ago
> All of a sudden you have operations on billions of tiny files that are amplified by AI usage. And object graphs are so fragmented by nature that it's hard to e.g. prefetch a page into memory and ensure that common git operations
4.
by gsu2 9mo ago
Skimming the comments it is a shocker to see people attacking Jordan Lasker (Cremieux) without even some sort of link to more context.
5.
Three Moo Tokens(gist.github.com)
2 points by gsu2 10mo ago|0 comments
6.
by gsu2 1y ago
https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/highlights-from-the-comment...
7.
by gsu2 1y ago
https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/come-on-obviously-the-purpo...
8.
by gsu2 2y ago
Moore Tool Company -- manufacturer of some of the machines that NIST uses to measure stuff[1] -- published a book called Foundations of Mechanical Accuracy that's pretty good: https://archive.org/details/Foundation
9.
by gsu2 3y ago
I might be mistaken, but wouldn't a git signature already be signing trusted things (i.e. the person making the original signature is trusted), making any attack enabled by the input hash function a second preimage attack (i.e. an atta
10.
by gsu2 3y ago
This seems bad? - SSH3 is a bad name: this isn't a successor to SSHv2 and will only cause confusion - The authors don't seem to understand that SSHv2 predates all of their chosen technologies, and provides "robust and time-te
11.
by gsu2 4y ago
> First - if git really didn't care about collision resistance, there wouldn't have been a need to switch to SHA1DC as the hash function. They switched because they care enough that they were willing to accept the performance p
12.
by gsu2 4y ago
> You review the code in the PR, and perhaps even prove it correct. Later on, the malicious actor can do the swapping trick. (Eg by running a mirroring service for your repository.) Having a copy of code that is reviewable and then searc
13.
by gsu2 4y ago
I'm not 100% sure I understand your point, but it sounds like you're concerned about signing something using a weak hash function (i.e. where the hash of something is what actually gets signed)? If that's the case, then my po
14.
by gsu2 4y ago
Git isn't relying on collision-resistance, it's relying on second-preimage[0] resistance, which is to say: in order to sneak a hash collision in to a git repository, you have to sneak _something else_ that's already trusted (
15.
by gsu2 4y ago
Launched ten years ago: https://www.dpreview.com/products/nikon/slrs/nikon_d800 Currently available for ~$600: https://www.ebay.com/sch/i.html?&_nkw=nikon+d800&LH_Sold=1&L...
16.
by gsu2 4y ago
For anybody running into a similar problem: most git hosting services set up a subdomain that will allow SSH traffic over port 443, e.g. ssh.github.com, altssh.bitbucket.org, altssh.gitlab.com, etc.
17.
by gsu2 5y ago
This question reminded me of Project Wonderful[1], which I used on several tiny projects in an attempt to cover hosting costs: $5 per month. I never had enough traffic to make anything close to that, but it was pretty fun trying. [1]: http
18.
Lens Wars: Episode V – Petzval Strikes Back(dpreview.com)
2 points by gsu2 5y ago|0 comments
19.
William Windsor (Goat)(en.wikipedia.org)
1 points by gsu2 5y ago|0 comments
20.
by gsu2 6y ago
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Rise_of_Theodore_Roosevelt
21.
by gsu2 6y ago
Why not force memcached clients to use the binary protocol instead of the ASCII protocol? The length check would still be necessary, but spaces (and other arbitrary bytes) would no longer break things.