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1.
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by
gipsies
2y ago
In the future people might think the same about Bitcoin and AI.
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by
gipsies
2y ago
There needs to be extra evidence before claiming that "virtually all VPNs apps" are vulnerable. From my understanding, they tested WireGuard on multiple platforms. However, other VPN clients may install extra firewall rules, I
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by
gipsies
3y ago
Looks like many VPNs allow access to the local network. And you can assign public IP ranges to the local network which.. is enough to make clients leak traffic to those IP addresses. Website with a short explanain: https://tunnel
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by
gipsies
5y ago
Several of the implementation flaws allow an attacker to essentially inject plaintext frames in a Wi-Fi network. All that's needed is being within range of the network (with an extender you can still be far away). I agree that the desi
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by
gipsies
6y ago
What's actually interesting is that they have some world-top cryptographers and security researchers (e.g. invented AES and SHA-3). So part of that money goes to academia, and with good results :) The government agencies are lagging be
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by
gipsies
7y ago
I again feel that most of these points are all discussed in the paper. Trust-on-first-usage is also used in SSH. Attack uses spoof MAC addresses, hard to rate-limit that. Modern crypto should be designed to reduce chance of implementation f
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by
gipsies
7y ago
If we look at the paper then these remarks are all discussed: - Defending against downgrade attack: "A client should remember if a network supports WPA3-SAE. That is, after successfully connecting using SAE [..] the client must never c
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by
gipsies
10y ago
This is very similar to our earlier work on the security of MAC address randomization: http://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/asiaccs2016.pdf They provide some more practical details if you want to implement our probe request finge
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by
gipsies
10y ago
Exactly, since there is no state machine, an attacker can immediately send the last message. The client will try to check the integrity of this message. But it will use an uninitialized all-zero key to do this! So an attacker can spoof the
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by
gipsies
10y ago
No, the standard is secure. This is a vulnerability in the implementation. The comment in the code merely says that the explicit definition of the state machine behind a 4-way handshake implementation is not in the standard (but it's
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by
gipsies
10y ago
Not really. The STA may know that its message was received, but can never be sure whether the AP replied. The reply from the AP could have been missed due to noise, or maybe it didn't reply at all. You cannot be sure. There are only he
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by
gipsies
10y ago
If you're using a pre-shared key, the password is verified during the 4-way handshake. The thing is, if your password is wrong, then the Message Authentication Code (MAC) of the messages your are sending is wrong. The AP will simply dr
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by
gipsies
10y ago
A wild claim without any source. The owner set the IP to localhost himself. https://twitter.com/briankrebs/status/779144394360381440
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by
gipsies
10y ago
That will be an interesting read. Though not having a table of contents for a 117 page (double column!) report really isn't ideal..
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by
gipsies
10y ago
- At least in computer science, it's generally professors who organise the peer review (the Program Commitee) - I've heard from several collegues that the editor introduced spelling mistakes. Sure, overall they might get some er
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by
gipsies
10y ago
Accurate Wi-Fi based indoor location positioning already exists, though with different pros and cons. For example, the following system still works reliably when walking around, but may be a bit less accurate. And it requires no calibration
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Jamming WiFi Using Cheap USB Dongles
(mathyvanhoef.com)
3 points
by
gipsies
11y ago
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0 comments
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by
gipsies
11y ago
Or by using a trusted minifier on the source code yourself, as mentioned in the link.
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by
gipsies
11y ago
Because in the paper they tested the attack with 1x2^27 requests, then with 2x2^27 requests, then 3x2^27, etc etc.
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by
gipsies
11y ago
Yes, but we present several techniques on how to generate these amounts of data. For TLS and HTTPS you can use JavaScript. For WPA-TKIP you need control of one TCP connection, and that is enough to generate the data. We're not saying i
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by
gipsies
11y ago
> I don't really see someone sitting there for 75 hours while this takes place without closing the browser/window/tab. But that's not a problem. If the user closes the browser or tab, the attack can continue at a la
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RC4 NOMORE: Breaking RC4 in HTTPS
(rc4nomore.com)
3 points
by
gipsies
11y ago
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0 comments
23.
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by
gipsies
12y ago
> No offense, but it doesn't sound like you know fully what you're talking about. About that ... MAC addresses are not checked unless you use an extra tool for this. For example, a large institution (university, company, etc) c
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by
gipsies
12y ago
All WPA or WPA2 secured networks use mutual authentication. Since you do not know the password of my home network, my device will refuse to connect to it. In particular the 4-way EAPOL handshake will fail, since the challenge-response alg
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by
gipsies
12y ago
A bruteforce attack against the PSK handshake requires only a single handshake to be captured. There are no known techniques to speed up the attack if more handshakes are captured. Man-in-the-middle attacks against WPA are not trivial at al
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by
gipsies
12y ago
This is misleading. When using WPA the client and access point perform mutual authentication. This means that if you don't know the password, you cannot set up a rogue access point that "copies the target access point's setti
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by
gipsies
12y ago
Calling it remotely exploitable indeed seems misleading. A lot of the article is just fluf without real content.
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by
gipsies
12y ago
A microwave operates around the 2.4 GHz frequency, so it likely shields only against those frequencies. This is where WiFi lives (in particular the higher channel numbers around 11 and 13). So test the impact on WiFi reception?
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by
gipsies
13y ago
Ha, I've read that paper before, Mr. Guido Pallemans :)
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by
gipsies
13y ago
When you turn your WiFi on, you can be tracked and attacked very easily. This is been known for a while, though not widely enough. If at one time you connected to an open network, your devices continues to scan for that network. I can spoof
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