ewillbefull

7 ms·

1.
by ewillbefull 6y ago
There's no absolute requirement for using Facebook to communicate with others over the Internet, so there's no sensible reason why they (or anyone else) should be compelled to host content they don't like. Just because certai
2.
by ewillbefull 6y ago
> Banks, electricity companies, railway operators These are bad examples in a discussion about speech protections... those businesses are providing services, not just engaging in speech. Also, those businesses _do_ act to arbitrarily ref
3.
by ewillbefull 8y ago
> The 'trapdoor' is in the protocol by design. Only due to ignorance. It is well known that the bases of a Pedersen commitment can and should be sampled randomly; a trusted setup is only subverting the security of the primitive
4.
by ewillbefull 8y ago
That's great! There are many issues with trusted setups that people aren't paying enough attention to.
5.
by ewillbefull 8y ago
There is nothing new about this article. The article is pointing out that in addition to the trapdoors of the proving system, it's possible to subvert the arithmetic circuit used as well. The ceremonies used by Zcash have the property
6.
The strange story of “Extended Random”(blog.cryptographyengineering.com)
2 points by ewillbefull 9y ago|0 comments
7.
Announcing the world's largest multi-party computation ceremony(z.cash.foundation)
14 points by ewillbefull 9y ago|0 comments
8.
by ewillbefull 9y ago
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brainfuck The HolyJit repo has a brainfuck jit example in the repository: https://github.com/nbp/holyjit/blob/master/examples/brainfuc...
9.
by ewillbefull 9y ago
In our case, the use of grsec was one of the simplest counter-measures that achieved an almost purely additive security improvement. That's even when accepting the risk that grsec has security bugs in it. If the participant did everyth
10.
by ewillbefull 9y ago
I'm Sean from Zcash, I coordinated the MPC and wrote the software. I messaged you on twitter or emailed you or something about this last year. > it made it sound like I repeated the number uncritically I didn't say you regurg
11.
by ewillbefull 9y ago
https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/602 The protocol scales linearly with respect to the number of participants, but as you can tell, each participant needs to do a lot of time-consuming computations. Each participant needs t
12.
by ewillbefull 9y ago
The protocol could not scale to a large number of participants at the time. Just with six participants it took an entire weekend to perform.
13.
by ewillbefull 9y ago
> To both yourself and the person you're replying too, please don't put words in my mouth. What words did I put in your mouth? I cited the 2^80 figure in your blog post and a reasonable theory for why you would bring up such a
14.
by ewillbefull 9y ago
> 2^80 is not very weak. That's the level of brute forcing a SHA-1 collision. It's low for a new system, but not very weak. Note that the 2^80 figure from Peter's blog post is really unsubstantiated. There's another c
15.
by ewillbefull 9y ago
Zooko explained afterward: https://twitter.com/zooko/status/864341289374023680
16.
by ewillbefull 9y ago
Zero-knowledge proofs for a given statement, by definition, reveal nothing about its witness. zk-SNARKs (used by Zcash) are statistically zero-knowledge; there are no cryptographic assumptions involved.
17.
by ewillbefull 9y ago
There is a tradeoff here that keeps being missed. Ring signatures with small anonymity sets have very serious privacy drawbacks, but they have more sensible assumptions for protecting the monetary base integrity. zk-SNARKs are the opposite:
18.
by ewillbefull 9y ago
Zcash's zk-SNARKs are totally private even if that ceremony failed and even if the cryptographic assumptions underlying zk-SNARKs fall apart. I find the comparison with Bitcoin perfect. The same people trusting PoW cartels to keep thei
19.
by ewillbefull 9y ago
The next survey should ask which nightly-only features are keeping them on nightly. :)
20.
by ewillbefull 9y ago
I think you misread the parent comment. :)
21.
by ewillbefull 9y ago
It depends entirely on what you're doing. There are people who "save" cryptocurrency and depend on its long-term value, but there are also people who are more worried about going to prison (or being murdered/extorted) th
22.
by ewillbefull 9y ago
Some people (myself included) would rather the system become worthless than anyone's privacy being at risk.
23.
by ewillbefull 9y ago
At the time, the multi-party computation protocol could not scale to a large number of participants.
24.
Bellman: zk-SNARKs in Rust(z.cash)
2 points by ewillbefull 9y ago|0 comments
25.
by ewillbefull 10y ago
> Worth adding here that it also appears Zcash stakeholders have been internally buying/selling their own ZEC at inflated prices on Poloniex to artificially increase both volume and the market price. I don't understand this. No
26.
by ewillbefull 10y ago
> Mostly, I would urge people not to use Zcash for situations that require real anonymity. E.g. wikileaks accepting donations, or routing around captial controls in oppressive countries. And this is because I do not believe that the cryp
27.
by ewillbefull 10y ago
> why only six The protocol is expensive; it took 2 days with 6 people. After a certain point, it's not practical to add more participants without increasing risk. It requires gigabytes worth of communication per participant and man
28.
by ewillbefull 10y ago
The article you're citing is wrong. (I know because I fixed the bug.)
29.
by ewillbefull 10y ago
You misread my comment. There _is_ an oustanding privacy issue in Monero, one that is often overlooked by its proponents. Transactions involving the same individuals will appear closer together in the transaction graph, and this remains the
30.
by ewillbefull 10y ago
There's a lot of absurdity in your comment, but I wanted to reply to one thing: > Not only that, the anonymity feature didn't work. You can't send to "z addresses" only. This is untrue, there was a bug that _dela

More ›