ekr____

7 ms·

1.
by ekr____ 2mo ago
This isn't quite how TLS feature negotiation works. Version numbers are negotiated and some of the parameters are carried along with the version, but a lot of functionality (e.g., cipher suites) is individually negotiated and to some e
2.
by ekr____ 2mo ago
TLS is an extensible protocol. For instance, you can add new key establishment algorithms or cipher suites. What this specification is saying is that the IETF will not be publishing such extensions for TLS 1.2. For example, they will not be
3.
by ekr____ 2mo ago
No disagreement there.
4.
by ekr____ 2mo ago
I have no opinion on ULA+NPTv6, other than Experimental doesn't mean you shouldn't use it. How else would people experiment. It does mean that the level of vetting by the IETF is potentially lower. WRT IPv4 NAT, I'm not sure
5.
by ekr____ 2mo ago
In fairness, I do think that this situation is somewhat different. As I noted above ( https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48812792 ), there are two main routes to an Informational RFC of this kind. * Through the IETF * Throu
6.
by ekr____ 2mo ago
This document actually is being advanced as Informational, though there are also non-IETF Informational RFCs (see upthread).
7.
by ekr____ 2mo ago
> What’s his next step if the authors publish as an information RFC? He can’t stop that, right? This is a slightly complicated question. There are several main routes to an Informational RFC. * Through the IETF Stream, either through the
8.
by ekr____ 2mo ago
Good question. If the document is dropped by the IETF, nothing at all would happen. It's already a valid code point registration, and indeed the authors could have just published the document, registered the code points, and stopped (s
9.
by ekr____ 2mo ago
You're right. Bad writing on my part. Edited to make it clear.
10.
by ekr____ 2mo ago
Adding a little color here... There are already code points registered for pure ML-KEM on the basis of the draft. The hybrid code point you reference is "preliminary" in the sense that when the RFC for hybrid ECC/ML-KEM is pu
11.
by ekr____ 2mo ago
> (2) The RFC at issue documents the possibility of running TLS with pure MLKEM rather than in a hybrid configuration with ECDH. Hybrid TLS is already the mainstream, documented, standardized method for using PQC in a TLS connection. Ber
12.
by ekr____ 3mo ago
That's not really possible to explain in this space, unfortunately, but the overall idea is that there are mathematical techniques that allow you to prove that you have a valid certificate without revealing which one it is.
13.
by ekr____ 3mo ago
This isn't correct. With ZKP-based systems even the CA can't track you. That's the "zero-knowledge" part.
14.
by ekr____ 3mo ago
The proof is bound to a cryptographic key stored in a tamper-resistant module (as in a phone). See https://educatedguesswork.org/posts/age-verification-id/#dev... for some more detail.
15.
by ekr____ 3mo ago
Note that the EU is proposing to do this [0]. The ZKP part is a bit of a WIP and there have been some questions about the quality [1]. [0] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/faqs/eu-age-verific... [1] https
16.
by ekr____ 3mo ago
My sense is that many jurisdictions do not consider this sufficient, as they want to prevent parents from allowing their children to access restricted material (as happens fairly frequently). However, I guess we'll see.
17.
by ekr____ 3mo ago
> You don't wind up in a database for buying alcohol. I don't think this is a good assumption. It's not uncommon for stores to scan your ID when you buy alcohol. > This proposal puts your name right next to the category
18.
by ekr____ 3mo ago
Note that California AB1043 isn't actually age verification; rather it just requires the OS to ask for your age, not check it.
19.
by ekr____ 3mo ago
Hence Encrypted Client Hello ( https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9849/ ), though deployment is still thin.
20.
by ekr____ 3mo ago
Typically these APIs are designed so you can't make arbitrary queries, but rather there are fixed age brackets.
21.
by ekr____ 3mo ago
RFC 10000 will not be published. They're just going to skip past the number. https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tools-discuss/EpoQcVt_... RFC #s are issued sometime before publication, so they can com
22.
by ekr____ 3mo ago
Original author here: Yeah a lot of the evergreening techniques (chiral switch, etc.) don't prevent anyone from getting the original, though of course doctors may try to switch you. The inhaler thing is double bad because of the CFC ba
23.
by ekr____ 3mo ago
That's amazing. A lot of people import them from Canada, but this is much more interesting.
24.
by ekr____ 3mo ago
Let's Encrypt certificates are free.
25.
Understanding Age Assurance Accuracy(educatedguesswork.org)
3 points by ekr____ 4mo ago|0 comments
26.
by ekr____ 4mo ago
Thanks for your explanation. I understand what you're talking about, but this all just seems to be entirely orthogonal to age assurance mandates, which are largely about controlling which content and experiences minors engage with, in
27.
by ekr____ 4mo ago
I'm not following you here. Certainly parents can install parental control software, but what does this have to do with children's PII being shared with sites? Just so we're on the same page, the way AB1043 works is that the
28.
by ekr____ 4mo ago
> The only device mandates that should be taking place is for the default installations of web clients should be checking to see if parental controls are enabled. This only impacts the major browsers. An intern at each browser company co
29.
by ekr____ 4mo ago
Sure. I'm not saying it's not better to use public key authentication (it is!). Just that it's still possible to have problems.
30.
by ekr____ 4mo ago
This is one of those situations where it's necessary to be very precise about the security properties. Specifically, if you bind authentication to the connection, then an attacker who impersonates the server (in this case because it&#

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