deian

6 ms·

1.
by deian 5y ago
It is doable, but it's hard to make it fast on all platform. See the SegmentZero32 description in < https://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~dstefan/pubs/kolosick:2022:isolatio... > for an example prototype.
2.
by deian 11y ago
Yep, isolated worlds is definitely what we want, and part of the inspiration for the particular (DOM modification) feature we proposed. I think CSP helps with 1 & 2, unless I'm missing something? (Our labels map down to CSP policie
3.
by deian 11y ago
"Unfortunately, since the entire point of it is to protect against malicious leaks..." That's actually not the entire point. At least in this paper, we do not claim to address attacks that leverage covert channels. But the at
4.
by deian 11y ago
Rather than reply individually to the messages from this thread, I'm going to try to clarify some things here. I think a lot of good points were brought up both with regards to the "taint" mechanism and timing covert channels
5.
by deian 11y ago
Right, minimizing attack surface is pretty important. Though the described attack scenario (a form of self-exfiltration attacks [1]) is something we did think about. (The details of the core IFC mechanism are describe in the COWL paper [2]
6.
by deian 11y ago
Even worse, they only update if they don't need any additional permissions. Thus incentivizing developers to ask for more permissions up front.
7.
by deian 11y ago
"I believe that concerns like this are why Apple will introduce the "content blocking" extensions in iOS 9 and OS X 10.11. They enable the most popular types of extension (ad blocking and privacy protection) without letting e
8.
by deian 11y ago
"Do you mean that you'll compare the network requests made from the main and the shadow pages?" Essentially, yes. Requests from the extension should be treated as if they are of an origin different from the page. (We could
9.
by deian 11y ago
That's a tricky question. Some extension (e.g., HTTPS Everywhere[1]) can improve your privacy on the Web and are arguably written by developers that as trustworthy as your browser developers. But, in general, I would be cautious. [1]
10.
by deian 11y ago
Yep, you are right. If the crypto/label API didn't force a fixed-length blob (which may be hard to do), it would certainly be leaking some information.
11.
by deian 11y ago
Very good points. We proposed a way to deal with DOM manipulation in the paper [1], but Stefan omitted this in the blog post. Specifically, Section 4 of the paper (the "Page access" paragraph) briefly describes this. (Sorry for re