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blucaz
searching Neon…
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8 ms
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1.
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by
blucaz
8mo ago
"While the above attack did use the systemd vsock sshd listener for Escape to Host, the attacker could have just directly listened over the vsock loopback." https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/202
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by
blucaz
9mo ago
Maintaining separate upstream sources and downstream patches does provide value. Maybe not to you, but it does. For example, it's trivial from a web browser with a couple of clicks to go and find out all the downstream changes to a pac
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by
blucaz
9mo ago
It gracefully falls back if the new option is not available at runtime
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blucaz
1y ago
No, the graphics stack needs to be native and in sync for obvious reasons, and that includes the mesa libraries. What can be in the runtime is already in the runtime.
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by
blucaz
1y ago
> The reality is that no such documentation is provided, so the only way to avoid systemd is to become an expert in its internals. The blog post subject of the thread literally links to the documentation. If you can't even be bother
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by
blucaz
1y ago
It's not even that, that whole story's main point was about how an incredibly complex, sophisticated and lengthy social engineering attack was carried out, probably by a nation-state actor, after singleing out an over-worked open
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by
blucaz
1y ago
> I’m somewhat a fan of systemd and I’m interested in immutable images, but I don’t want to build systemd from source: You don't have to, we build packages and publish repositories from latest main, and the particle configs can use
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by
blucaz
2y ago
> So how do I replace any of them with my own, small tool? You write them with an equivalent public interface. > They have no stable interfaces. This is nonsense. All the D-Bus (and now Varlink too) interfaces are stable, documented a
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by
blucaz
2y ago
> The fact the initramfs is not signed/verified on any desktop Linux distro means secure boot is completely pointless right now on Linux, and is very dissapointing. It is not. There are other, very real and very important problems w
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by
blucaz
2y ago
> When configuring boot media, like an SD card, for an embedded ssystem that is not the running system where the configuration is occurring, this is an impediment. There is systemd-firstboot, etc, but this is not as convenient as just be
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blucaz
2y ago
Debian, Ubuntu and all derivatives thereof use initramfs-tools, which does not use systemd in the initrd, and things work just fine
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by
blucaz
2y ago
malloc_info() is not consumed internally but it is only wired up as a debugging utility via systemd-analyze, which is sorely needed when things go bad in strange and weird ways. It would be entirely fine for a libc to just implement a stub
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blucaz
2y ago
For the record, it turned out this was just a series of misunderstandings on the part of the OP on how configuring networking works on Linux, and the differences between how the kernel and how userspace manage and configure addresses. These
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by
blucaz
2y ago
> Systemd-boot, any boot loader, that aims to replicate the things that the kernel does is ultimately going to run into the same problems as grub. We're going to have the font CVEs, we're going to have filesystem and storage an
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by
blucaz
2y ago
Yes: it's a joke. Here, have some chills, on the house:
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by
blucaz
2y ago
The fact that YOU have a particular use case doesn't necessarily mean much either. Just customize your configuration accordingly, and move on.
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by
blucaz
2y ago
Or what about, delete it after 10 days it was last accessed (regardless of whether for read or write)? Hint: that's already how tmpfiles.d works
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by
blucaz
2y ago
> Why not just have the installer _ask_ me what configuration I prefer? Because nobody bothered to actually put in some work to implement that. As I've said on the ML, if somebody does the work, I'll review it. But it's on
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by
blucaz
2y ago
What a genius idea, how bizarre that nobody ever thought about that before! We just need to get the bus dependencies up first and then... oh. Oh wait. Oh no.
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by
blucaz
2y ago
> kdbus didn't even make it into staging. Project mainline put in some serious work to get where it got. > > And quite probably part of it going better was not insisting on becoming mandatory solution for everyone. If anything
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by
blucaz
2y ago
D-Bus will never be removed. Varlink was added because the kernel refused to provide usable IPC primitives, like other OSes have, so a brokered IPC is simply unfeasible in early userspace. So now we have two IPCs that will work in parallel,
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by
blucaz
2y ago
> That's my point: Binder got merged before kdbus started development. It didn't, it was merged in 2015, a year after or so. No, staging doesn't count, it's a dumping ground for all sort of things that do not see the
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by
blucaz
2y ago
By "making it available" it doesn't necessarily mean a fully-working, configured broker, but only having enough working primitives that you can bring up userspace without races, with requests that can immediately be accepted,
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by
blucaz
2y ago
kdbus/bus1 were about making IPC primitives available race-free to userspace since the very first moment it is started. Perf was icing on the cake. Binder is Google-only, so nobody else can really use it, given they might kill it at an
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blucaz
2y ago
No, performance wasn't the main reason (although that was a big part), it was mainly about race conditions. If userspace implements the bus, then only the half of userspace that comes up after the daemon can use it. Having a reliable I
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by
blucaz
2y ago
Me too, it's been my phone's notification sound for about 20 years now
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by
blucaz
2y ago
No, the OP was not sent any harassment, the OP _did_ the harassment as it can be seen in the tweets. I mean, they are right there, just click on the links you shared. One of the OP's followers even openly called for the assassination o
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by
blucaz
2y ago
The only thing this demonstrates is that the author has no clue about how these things work on Linux. There is no real security boundary between different processes of the _SAME_ uid, especially when controlling the parent process. The exac
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by
blucaz
2y ago
> As a trade-off you now have a user-accessible IPC system with the _gazillion_ possible vulnerabilities it entails. At least before you needed root to talk to pid1.. Read the linked post again. This is all already available, and always
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blucaz
2y ago
Requires root not just for the ptrace protection, but also to gain membership of the 'tty' group which gives control over all ttys. And then goes all surprised pikachu when it turns out that allows taking over ttys. Duh?
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