bigmac

15 ms·

1.
Blockchain Staking and Inflation Explained(medium.com)
6 points by bigmac 8y ago|0 comments
2.
by bigmac 9y ago
Folks need to worry about being able to protect more than just passwords. Engineers should be doing a good job of protecting SSNs, phone numbers, home addresses, etc. Crypto-anchoring can help for the general case of protecting sensitive in
3.
by bigmac 9y ago
This isn't only about HSMs or dedicated services. To anyone reading this thread: the key thing to understand here is: How do crypto-anchors help against attacks that allows `select *` from a database? A: Per-record encryption mediated
4.
by bigmac 9y ago
FWIW I was concerned folks would get caught up on the password storage use case since so many are familiar with that problem. The crux of the idea of crypto-anchoring is to segment crypto operations in to dedicated microservices and use tho
5.
by bigmac 9y ago
We discuss exactly this architecture in the talk we gave back in 2014. See here for the part where we discuss it: https://youtu.be/lrGbK6fE7bI?t=16m31s Basically we 100% agree with you that an authentication service should
6.
by bigmac 9y ago
Folks shouldn't necessarily be scared off by the use of HSMs in this model -- HSMs are an add-on that adds an additional layer of security. That said, there are still significant wins to segmenting the applications that hold keys, part
7.
by bigmac 9y ago
One of the great things that helps when building a crypto-anchor enabled infrastructure is to have Mutual TLS between all applications/containers. This allows you to authn/authz and only allow connections from specifically allowed
8.
The Two Metrics That Matter for Host Security(diogomonica.com)
1 points by bigmac 9y ago|0 comments
9.
by bigmac 9y ago
Importantly updates are not handled by LinuxKit itself[1] but the concept is that that a higher level system or packager might take care of via CloudFormation and an out-of-band re-provisioning method. This was an explicit omission, at le
10.
by bigmac 9y ago
For those interested in security in particular, we've outlined the opinions and design decisions here: https://github.com/linuxkit/linuxkit/blob/master/docs/securi... In short: Kernel Security
11.
by bigmac 10y ago
At a design level, push removes an entire class of vulnerabilities, full stop. Pull requires good ACL'ing and properly implemented controls for the lifetime of the orchestration system's implementation. Pull makes the system vul
12.
by bigmac 10y ago
There's no way to schedule anything from a worker node -- Swarm follows a push model for all scheduling decisions; worker nodes never pull anything. This is the best ACL model possible: the one that doesn't exist because worker no
13.
by bigmac 10y ago
We're working with Red Hat now. Folks can expect more technical details when everyone is on the same page. That said, the solution is the same as with every other piece of software -- update to latest to get security fixes.
14.
by bigmac 10y ago
This post is incorrect. SELinux does not fully mitigate this issue. We recommend users update to 1.12.6. I expect Red Hat to issue a retraction shortly. We notified them last night that this post was incorrect. Source: Security at Docker.
15.
by bigmac 10y ago
Do not use Docker distributed by Red Hat, full stop. It has been irresponsibly patched to be insecure. They disable important seccomp filters. Instead, install using instructions here: https://docs.docker.com/engine/ins
16.
by bigmac 10y ago
In terms of signing and verification, doing trusted pulls of the official ubuntu image (or any other official image) is quite easy: export DOCKER_CONTENT_TRUST=1 docker pull ubuntu
17.
by bigmac 10y ago
You're right -- it needs to be enabled manually using `--opt encrypted`. 1.13 is shooting for this to be the default.
18.
by bigmac 10y ago
We've done a ton of work on image signing. Look in to Docker Content Trust ( https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/trust/content_trust/ ) and Notary ( https://github.com/docker/n
19.
by bigmac 10y ago
Great points, we're working on a bunch of this stuff. Docker 1.12 in swarm mode, for example, does automatic key rotation and issuance of the TLS certs assigned to every node in the cluster. These certs are used for automatic TLS betwe
20.
by bigmac 10y ago
We are on the case right now. The solution is going to be really, really good. We had to get cryptographic node identity rolled out first and we're designing secrets management on top of that.
21.
by bigmac 10y ago
The important metric with patching vulnerabilities is time-to-patch. Docker based environments are able to significantly reduce time-to-patch precisely because the libs are bundled with the application. Most orgs have trouble rolling out pa
22.
by bigmac 10y ago
This couldn't be further from the truth. Docker containers run with default seccomp profiles, namespacing (filesystem, PIDs, mounts, etc), LSM policies (AppArmor, SELinux), and capability dropping. These are all common sense security c
23.
by bigmac 10y ago
Responding to your edit: Notary, the underlying project that implements Docker's Content Trust feature, is an implementation of The Update Framework (TUF). Generally, you want a software update system to deal with a whole host of issue
24.
by bigmac 10y ago
The several daemons serve two purposes: 1. We have to host the signatures somewhere, so we host them in a store we call the notary server. 2. Notary has a concept of timestamping, so we spin up a timestamping server alongside a notary serve
25.
by bigmac 10y ago
Sorry about that; I will get that page of the docs fixed. Open invitation to anyone here: Our implementation of TUF via notary has been serving us well. If you decide to try it out and run in to any snags let me know and I can help you with
26.
by bigmac 10y ago
You cannot (repeat: cannot) sign Docker containers any other way, so it's barely a half feature and does not work for enterprises at all. What makes you think this? It is 100%, patently false. Private notary servers can be deployed a
27.
by bigmac 11y ago
We're working on fixing that in two ways: 1. Implementing oauth: https://github.com/docker/distribution/pull/1418 2. Using credential helpers: https://github.com/docker/docker/p
28.
by bigmac 11y ago
You're right, wrappers can abstract away complexity. That's effectively what TUF is: a wrapper framework around low level crypto primitives that achieves a secure content distribution system. GPG alone would not have given suffici
29.
by bigmac 11y ago
And user namespaces are really close to being merged: https://github.com/docker/docker/issues/15187
30.
by bigmac 11y ago
This integration is built on The Update Framework, which has some distinct advantages over GPG's model. First, TUF allows you to have freshness guarantees over the content. In GPG's model a MITM or malicious mirror can serve you o

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