andreadev

5 ms·

1.
Max severity Flowise RCE vulnerability now exploited in attacks(bleepingcomputer.com)
3 points by andreadev 5mo ago|1 comments
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Show HN: SentinelGate – Access control for AI agents (open-source MCP proxy)(github.com)
6 points by andreadev 6mo ago|0 comments
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by andreadev 6mo ago
Not surprised by the 73%. Even people who never carry cash anymore can see the problem with going fully digital — you're one outage or one policy change away from not being able to buy groceries. Cash doesn't need wifi, doesn&#x27
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by andreadev 7mo ago
You are wrong but I am not going to keep going back and forth.
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by andreadev 7mo ago
Which part specifically?
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by andreadev 7mo ago
The framing in this thread is full-duplex vs composable pipeline, but I think the real architecture is both running simultaneously — and this library is already halfway there. The fact that qwen3-asr-swift bundles ASR, TTS, and PersonaPlex
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by andreadev 7mo ago
The bit about multiplication being ~12x faster than addition is worth pausing on. In silicon, addition is the "easy" operation — but here the complexity hierarchy completely inverts. Makes sense once you think about it: multiplica
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by andreadev 7mo ago
I think everyone's focusing on the core count, but the packaging story is way more interesting here. This thing is 12 separate chiplets on 18A stacked on base dies made on Intel 3, connected to I/O tiles on Intel 7. Three differen
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by andreadev 7mo ago
The strongest point here is one that rarely gets enough attention: the leap from "very smart" to "all-powerful" is completely unjustified. Even if you grant every assumption about alignment failures and emergent goals, y
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by andreadev 7mo ago
Hi HN, I'm Andrea. I run AI agents connected to databases, APIs, and filesystems. The problem: every agent gets full access to everything, with no enforcement layer between intent and execution. SentinelGate is a firewall that sits bet
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Show HN: SentinelGate – Universal Firewall for AI Agents (Open Source, Go)(github.com)
2 points by andreadev 7mo ago|1 comments
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by andreadev 7mo ago
Fair point, if it's a true point-to-point VPN between just the two boxes, there's not much "in between" to worry about. TLS on top is mostly defense in depth at that point. What I had in mind was the more common setup wh
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by andreadev 7mo ago
Encrypted in transit yes, but only between the VPN endpoints. Anything already inside the network (compromised host, rogue container, bad route) sees your queries in cleartext. TLS on the connection itself gives you end-to-end encryption b
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by andreadev 7mo ago
Exactly, and that's one more reason I went with a userspace proxy — no kernel deps, runs anywhere, way easier to debug.
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by andreadev 7mo ago
True, but logging tells you what happened, a proxy lets you decide what's allowed to happen before it hits the database. Policy enforcement, tenant isolation, that kind of thing. They're complementary really.
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by andreadev 7mo ago
Yeah, more and more. Zero-trust is pushing TLS everywhere, even inside VPNs — lateral movement is a real thing. And several compliance frameworks now expect encryption in transit regardless of network topology. With connection pooling the o
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by andreadev 7mo ago
The proxy vs packet capture debate is a bit of a non-debate in practice — the moment TLS is on (and it should always be on), packet capture sees nothing useful. eBPF is interesting for observability but it works at the network/syscall
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by andreadev 7mo ago
You're right, the GRANT layer is closed by default in PostgreSQL and PostgREST respects that. But in practice with Supabase, the very first thing you do is `GRANT ALL ON table TO authenticated` (and often `anon`) because nothing works
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by andreadev 7mo ago
The prompt injection thing is especially nasty for agents because they process untrusted input (web pages, emails, documents) and can take real actions. With a chatbot, prompt injection makes it say something dumb. With an agent that acts a
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by andreadev 7mo ago
RLS on Postgres is fine — I use it in production for tenant isolation and it works great. The problem is that Supabase puts it as the only thing standing between the public internet and your data. PostgREST translates HTTP straight into SQL
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by andreadev 8mo ago
Hi HN, MCP gives agents access to tools — databases, file systems, APIs. The problem is there's no access control layer. An agent with a database tool can run any query. An agent with file access can read anything. The only safeguard r
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Show HN: Sentinel Gate – Open-source RBAC firewall for MCP agents(github.com)
2 points by andreadev 8mo ago|1 comments