abhisek

6 ms·

1.
by abhisek 28d ago
This is exactly what PMG is designed for ie. install/build time process level sandboxing. It currently doesn't support cargo, but I believe the challenges are same. Here is my learning building PMG: Sandboxing is good when the wor
2.
Malicious Rust crate Arrayref runs a build-time payload(safedep.io)
554 points by abhisek 28d ago|513 comments
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by abhisek 1mo ago
GitHub announced this a while back: https://github.blog/changelog/2026-07-28-npm-publish-time-ma...
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by abhisek 2mo ago
#2 post on HN currently is: India’s first privately developed rocket reaches orbit on dramatic debut launch. In the same page, there is this news about banning an OSS app, built on open tech. Just saying.
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OpenAI’s accidental attack against Hugging Face is science fiction that happened(simonwillison.net)
587 points by abhisek 2mo ago|450 comments
6.
Show HN: PMG, open source package firewall(github.com)
4 points by abhisek 2mo ago|2 comments
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by abhisek 2mo ago
Over engineering is really an NFR of green field projects.
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by abhisek 2mo ago
Building Package Manager Guard (PMG) - https://github.com/safedep/pmg With all the supply chain attacks on OSS ecosystems targeting developers, PMG is a practical protection using a combination of threat intel, policy
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Jscrambler 8.14.0 Compromised with Credential Stealer(safedep.io)
3 points by abhisek 2mo ago|0 comments
10.
by abhisek 3mo ago
Smells like contagious interview campaign by DPRK folks. They have been doing this for a while. Even using IDE settings, Claude hooks for malicious code execution.
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by abhisek 4mo ago
Attackers are just having fun due to abysmal state of npm and some of the insecure design choices by GitHub and GitHub Actions. Every attack gives them credentials which in turn used to stage more attacks.
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by abhisek 4mo ago
I partly agree. Agents are not going to replace senior devs. Exactly for the internal context and the decision making that comes with it. But senior devs are also expected to have a compounding effect even pre-AI. Writing a single doc, refa
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by abhisek 4mo ago
Just implemented Landlock + seccomp notify based sandbox in PMG. A tool to protect cli package managers against malicious packages. There were quite a few quirks involved due to Go routines when it comes to handling messages from the kernel
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Claude Mythos and Cybersecurity(schneier.com)
4 points by abhisek 5mo ago|0 comments
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Coruna: The Mysterious Journey of a Powerful iOS Exploit Kit(cloud.google.com)
1 points by abhisek 6mo ago|0 comments
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by abhisek 6mo ago
We just analysed the payload. Technical details here: https://safedep.io/malicious-litellm-1-82-8-analysis/ We are looking at similar attack vectors (pth injection), signatures etc. in other PyPI packages that we know
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by abhisek 6mo ago
I have been using superpowers for Gryph development for a while. Love the brainstorming and exploration that it brings in. Haven’t really compared token usage but something in my bucket.
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by abhisek 6mo ago
I think this is the right approach to building sandbox for agents ie. over existing OS native sandbox capabilities so that they are truly enforced. However the challenge is, sandbox profiles (rules) are always workload specific. How do you
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by abhisek 7mo ago
We found a malicious npm package pino-sdk-v2 impersonating pino, one of the most widely used Node.js loggers with nearly 20 million weekly downloads. The package is a near copy of pino’s source, docs, and README with one addition: an obfusc
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Step by Step Analysis of Malicious NPM Package(safedep.io)
1 points by abhisek 7mo ago|0 comments
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OpenClaw bot calls out maintainer when its PR got rejected(crabby-rathbun.github.io)
1 points by abhisek 7mo ago|0 comments
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by abhisek 7mo ago
Everybody wants to build infra. Automate something which is known and well understood. Hoping someone else will use it to solve end user's problem which is hard to understand, messy and often highly contextual. To summarize: Everyone w
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by abhisek 8mo ago
110 tools. That’s probably a reason why Anthropic is probably switching to sandboxed code execution over MCPs. It’s just easier to write code and do something specific for a task than load so many tool metadata. I did not go past IDA. But I
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by abhisek 8mo ago
I see this as “libs” for the agents. They can discover relevant skills by searching a known index, extend their capability for on a given task. While this makes sense for higher autonomy, it brings the well known supply chain security issue
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by abhisek 8mo ago
LFS. Brings back so many painful memories. But then, learned so much.
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by abhisek 8mo ago
Loved the idea of AI talking to AI and inventing something new. Sure. You can dump the DB. Most of the data was public anyway.
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Show HN: Gryph – Audit Trail for AI Coding Agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Gemini)(github.com)
1 points by abhisek 8mo ago|0 comments
28.
by abhisek 8mo ago
Tried installing clawdbot. Got blocked by (my own) sandbox because it tried to git clone some stuff which in turn was accessing my private keys. - clawdbot depends on @whiskeysockets/baileys - @whiskeysockets/baileys depends on li
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Agent Skills Threat Model(safedep.io)
3 points by abhisek 8mo ago|0 comments
30.
by abhisek 8mo ago
I still think metadata associated with packages (like stars, download count and more) are easy to fake and not the best metric. OpenSSF scorecard has some adoption among project maintainers but hardly any adoption in terms of making securit

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