W_rey45

7 ms·

1. 1.▲
   by W_rey45 8mo ago

   Great question this is exactly the tension we’re trying to be explicit about. CIRCE separates cryptographic verification from semantic interpretation. The signature covers a minimal, stable signed_block (canonicalized → hashed → signed). Ev
2. 2.▲
   by W_rey45 8mo ago

   Great questions. 1) Crash/orphan side-effect: agreed this needs an intent/commit model. The clean pattern is WAL-style: emit/sign an “INTENT” receipt before side-effect + a “COMMIT” receipt after; absence of COMMIT is itself
3. 3.▲
   by W_rey45 8mo ago

   Threat model / scope: This design assumes the signer’s private key is trusted at issuance time; it does not attempt to prove semantic correctness of the agent’s reasoning or inputs. The signature covers only the canonicalized signed_bl
4. 4.▲
   Show HN: Circe – Deterministic, offline-verifiable receipts for AI agent actions(github.com)

   2 points by W_rey45 8mo ago|5 comments