Y
HN Search
Hacker News Search
new
|
comments
|
top
|
jobs
Veserv
searching Neon…
1.
▲
2.
▲
3.
▲
4.
▲
5.
▲
6.
▲
6 ms
·
1.
▲
by
Veserv
4d ago
Since lawyers just love engaging in language lawyering when things get to court and always use to most uncharitable interpretation of words, we have no choice but to interpret their words in the most uncharitable and technically correct fas
2.
▲
by
Veserv
5d ago
This is why you should not use low-resolution summarys as exhaustive and authoritative. "Bullshit jobs are jobs which even the person doing the job can’t really justify the existence of, but they have to pretend that there’s some reaso
3.
▲
by
Veserv
5d ago
I do not see how you are disagreeing with his definition. What do you think his definition is? You seem to be using the definition: “A job that people think is worthless”. The actual definition he uses is: “A job where the person doing it t
4.
▲
by
Veserv
7d ago
The commonly cited fatality statistics do not discuss fault, so, absent more precise information, a apples to apples comparison should not conditionalize on fault. Why? Well let us try to imagine a world where Waymo has the statistically av
5.
▲
by
Veserv
7d ago
You are correct, I missed the adjective on my second use. As my points were exclusively about fatal crashes and I never mentioned the injury or crash rate at any point and previously used 5,500 years exclusively in relation to fatal crashes
6.
▲
by
Veserv
7d ago
Sir this is a Wendy's, I mean a discussion about autonomous vehicles. The benchmark for the autonomous vehicles in the USA is in comparison to humans in the USA. That means autonomous vehicles need to go ~5,500 person-years worth of dr
7.
▲
by
Veserv
7d ago
The fatality rate is 1.19 per 100 million vehicle miles [1], ~83 million miles per fatality. The mean driver averages ~15,000 miles per year. So, the mean driver encounters a fatal crash after ~5,500 years of driving. If you started d
8.
▲
Tesla Full Self-Driving likes trains a bit too much
(electrek.co)
3 points
by
Veserv
19d ago
|
1 comments
9.
▲
by
Veserv
19d ago
A public, well documented safety defect for multiple years with clear, incontrovertible evidence: https://bsky.app/profile/realdanodowd.bsky.social/post/3lz6h... https://www.jalopnik.com/19832
10.
▲
by
Veserv
21d ago
Only if you think penetrating holes in a paper vest and then patching those holes constitutes “improving”. If that worked Windows and Linux would be impenetrable fortresses with all the holes that keep getting punched in them. Cyberdemoliti
11.
▲
by
Veserv
21d ago
That makes as much sense as saying that better gun technology results in body armor that can stop it. It might incentivize that, but in no way "results" in that; the fundamental technologys underpinning advancements in offense ver
12.
▲
by
Veserv
1mo ago
What is the "same one"? Define item in "I" formally. Are we talking about Values? Then inigyou is correct. Memory locations? Then it is trivially true, but that does not prevent me from writing 0 into every memory locati
13.
▲
by
Veserv
1mo ago
You are correct. However, that specification is not trivial. Almost nobody correctly articulates property 1 when first encountering the problem if they do not already know the answer or are already aware it is a trick question (and even the
14.
▲
by
Veserv
1mo ago
Huh? Sorting does not have a trivial specification. In fact, it is usually used as the first example of how easy it is to make specification errors because it seems trivial, but is actually not.
15.
▲
by
Veserv
1mo ago
You are objectively wrong. The math is straightforward to show that you can operate on a ciphertext securely in some cryptosystems. Consider two integers M1 and M2. Consider RSA with private key (E), public key (D), and public modulus (N).
16.
▲
by
Veserv
1mo ago
Shadow memory mappings are only needed when you do not have hardware virtualization or when doing nested virtualization. From the page: "it can threaten the guest-host isolation of KVM/x86 hosts that accept untrusted guests and e
17.
▲
by
Veserv
2mo ago
You can prove a program is correct and terminates for all inputs and, absent a hardware or other assumption vulnerability that breaks the abstract machine assumptions, there would be no inputs that "break" anything. In fact, almos
18.
▲
by
Veserv
2mo ago
> You claimed without evidence, or more accurately, bad evidence, confusing RTOS with "reliability and security." That sentence is grammatical nonsense. Try again to articulate your point so it is coherent. Furthermore, you hav
19.
▲
by
Veserv
2mo ago
You have a serious misunderstanding of the consequences of the undecidability of the Halting Problem. The Halting Problem says you can not prove the precise halting behavior in every problem. Precise and every are very important qua
20.
▲
by
Veserv
2mo ago
You did not claim that microkernels were less commercially successful. You claimed that microkernels suffer from the same security problems that plague commercial monolithic kernels such as Linux, Windows, macOS, iOS, Android, etc. You cl
21.
▲
by
Veserv
2mo ago
> history has proven What history? What proof? What evidence? What commercial microkernel systems are you referencing that suffer from trivial LPEs? Or whole system DoS from unprivileged code execution? To the extent that you argue your
22.
▲
by
Veserv
2mo ago
Have they figured out how to implement free() yet? Last I looked you need a garbage collector to deallocate at which point you might as well use Java which is actually designed for that use case.
23.
▲
by
Veserv
2mo ago
Sure, this is why virtualization is a valuable feature, it is just not the basis of security/isolation. One of the points I am making is that when deploying on a modern multi-tenant VM-based platform, VM orchestration is analogous to p
24.
▲
by
Veserv
2mo ago
Yes, you do enjoy evading the argument. You continuously point at implementation and operational model differences as proof that virtualization is the key factor. Theo's argument is literally that virtualization versus non-virtualizati
25.
▲
by
Veserv
2mo ago
Cool, show me a LPE in a seL4 deployment. Do you believe that is easier or harder than finding a KVM escape? Since you are varying the security basis, implementation, and operational model simultaneously when you are comparing KVM to Linux
26.
▲
by
Veserv
2mo ago
Great, then falsify it. Point at a system with the same operational model as KVM-based multi-tenant systems with large numbers of platform vulnerabilitys. Let us review a standard operational model: Virtual machines are usually pre-allocate
27.
▲
by
Veserv
2mo ago
Virtualization is responsible for effectively none of those security benefits. It is the reduction to a smaller “kernel” that is responsible. If you applied the same design and operational model to running regular old processes instead of v
28.
▲
by
Veserv
2mo ago
Claims do not support themselves. The claim is unsupported by evidence and thus the burden of proof is on them or you to produce that evidence. As the author and implementer of the algorithm allegedly prepared, ran, and analyzed benchmarks
29.
▲
by
Veserv
2mo ago
Writers make conscious trade offs between time, cost, feasibility. Are writers language engineers? Literally everybody makes trade offs, that is not a distinguishing aspect. I am confused how you got to “make the minimal thing that ticks of
30.
▲
by
Veserv
2mo ago
To add on, engineering is about objective guarantees to meet objective responsibility. This bridge is rated for 10 tons. This chemical process produces 1 mg 99% purity crystals. This biological process produces 90% pure insulin. This circ
More ›