NicolaiS

6 ms·

1.
by NicolaiS 2mo ago
> "make your clients trust the CA" There's no single trust store: the OS has one, Firefox, Java (cacerts), Python (certifi), Node, Go containers, all your Docker images, ... Failure? People just toggle TLS verification off
2.
by NicolaiS 5mo ago
badssl.com is an amazing tool especially for testing "TLS intercepting" boxes. I've seen more than one fortune 500 company that re-sign certain broken certs with their own CA, allowing silent MITM.
3.
by NicolaiS 6mo ago
This exists, but not very well supported: https://github.com/C2SP/C2SP/blob/main/well-known-ssh-hosts.... But DNSSEC + SSHFP is a better supported solution at the moment
4.
by NicolaiS 9mo ago
> Have mitmproxy gotten any better in usability over the years? The new-ish "Local Capture" and "WireGuard"-mode are quite nice. And running e.g. `mitmproxy --ignore-hosts '.*' --show-ignored-hosts` [1] for
5.
by NicolaiS 9mo ago
TLS inspection can _never_ be implemented in a good way, you will always have cases where it breaks something and most commonly you will see very bad implementations that break most tools (e.g. it is very hard to trust a new CA because each
6.
by NicolaiS 9mo ago
Got acquired by a Fortune 500 and recieved new laptop. First hour I'm seeing TLS errors everywhere except the browser. They'd half-baked their internal CA rollout, so wasn't trusted properly. By day two I started validating t
7.
by NicolaiS 11mo ago
Do you have any sources that the infected USB contained AV updates? I can't find any sources saying that..
8.
by NicolaiS 1y ago
Note that this requires an authenticated user, so most redis installations are not directly at risk. The github issue has these workarounds: > An additional workaround to mitigate the problem without patching the redis-server executable
9.
by NicolaiS 1y ago
was pi: raspberry, but it was changed a long time ago to have no default user:pass
10.
by NicolaiS 1y ago
I guess a bunch of "roll your own X.509 validation"-logic will have that bug, but to exploit it you need a misbehaving CA to issue you such a cert (i.e. low likelihood)
11.
by NicolaiS 1y ago
After the Linux Foundation became a CNA (CVE Numbering Authority), it started issuing CVEs for a broad range of "vulns", such as local denial-of-service, memory errors with no viable exploit path, and logic flaws lacking meaningfu
12.
by NicolaiS 1y ago
Parent comment writes: "ship[ing] the tree root hash", for a merkle tree ("bitcoin style") this would just be a single (small) hash no matter the tree size, i.e. 32 bytes is enough.
13.
by NicolaiS 1y ago
Agree Caddy even supports 'ACME profiles' for people that want to follow the latest recommendation from CAB / want shortlived certs
14.
by NicolaiS 1y ago
Another approach that avoids symlinks and avoids a git repo in $HOME (i.e. everything is a subdir of that git repo) is to use the option "git-dir" to clone into a subdir, e.g. `$HOME/.dotfiles/` but checkout into $HOME:
15.
by NicolaiS 1y ago
A confidential channel can be established over an insecure medium using e.g. Diffie-Hellman key exchange. To protect against MITM, an out-of-band QR/bluetooth can be used.
16.
by NicolaiS 1y ago
Biggest reason to avoid DES is the short key. Double-DES doesn't fix that due to the meet-in-the-middle attack. Triple DES "solves" the short key problem.
17.
by NicolaiS 1y ago
beg bounty hunters
18.
by NicolaiS 1y ago
Amazing to see post-quantum crypto (PQC) by-default, and support for Encrypted ClientHello (ECH) and ACME Profiles!
19.
Caddy v2.10(github.com)
11 points by NicolaiS 1y ago|1 comments
20.
by NicolaiS 1y ago
This will not work as any attacker that can MITM the client (likely scenario for end-users), can also MITM this "certificate issuing" setup and issue their own cert. The reason an attacker can't MITM Let's Encrypt (or si
21.
by NicolaiS 1y ago
Sorry, but this will never work very well. The tool contains a bunch of "denylist regexes", i.e. `user (should not|must not|cannot) see` But these can easily be bypassed. Any real security tool should use allowlists, but
22.
by NicolaiS 2y ago
Self-hosting Conduit as my homeserver using SQLite as by database and Caddy as reverse proxy. That is: 2 binaries (conduit + caddy) + 5 lines of toml config for Conduit and 2 line of config for Caddy + 1 database file. That's all you n
23.
by NicolaiS 2y ago
A note for Ubuntu users; if Firefox is installed using `snap` (default) and you run `snap refresh` it will output "All snaps up to date" - but this is not true! You have to close firefox, then run `snap refresh` for snap to upgrad
24.
by NicolaiS 2y ago
Corporate MITM'ing is always a bad practice, it breaks a lot of TLS (e.g. mTLS) and can't be implemented in a way that will not break legitimate workflows (e.g. cert pinning a untrusted leaf vs the middlebox trusting everything an
25.
by NicolaiS 3y ago
Slightly related, but mostly for fun: You can do valid HTTP & SSH on the same port: https://media.ccc.de/v/bornhack2023-56142-sexy-ssh-hacks#t=4... (Without detecting which client connects, it works just like the &
26.
ClamAV Critical Patch Review(onekey.com)
3 points by NicolaiS 4y ago|0 comments
27.
by NicolaiS 4y ago
You are misunderstanding the attack. The attacks requirement is: replace two encrypted files (e.g. by gaining access to someone's dropbox that contains the synced db), wait for them to leak "secretA" on "siteB" beca
28.
(In)Security of the “Pass” password manager(rot256.dev)
52 points by NicolaiS 4y ago|84 comments
29.
by NicolaiS 4y ago
openssl packaged as `3.0.2-0ubuntu1.7` fixes the issue. So `>1, <= 3.0.2-0ubuntu1.6` is vulnerable. If you are using an APT mirror, you might not see the update yet. Consider adding `deb http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubunt
30.
by NicolaiS 4y ago
It's in the post: a specially constructed file can result in arbitrary code execution

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