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You must assume that the NSA already has master keys for all domestic CA root certificates, and given how many were hacked recently, foreign ones too. In which
by malloc2x 13y ago
You must assume that the NSA already has master keys for all domestic CA root certificates, and given how many were hacked recently, foreign ones too. In which case SSL traffic is effectively the same as plaintext to them.
The solution could be a distributed CA system like http://convergence.io/ http://convergence.io/
- jeltz 13y agoPerfect forward security should prevent the master key from working.
- karlmdavis 13y agoIs this correct? Wouldn't they still need all of the leaf private keys to decrypt things? My understanding was that having a CA's private key just enables someone to issue new child keys for that CA. That vulnerability could be addressed with certificate pinning.
- malloc2x 13y agoTo decrypt after-the-handshake bytes I think you're right, they would need a leaf private key. However, they absolutely can mount a MITM with the CA root. EDIT: Further, if they can compel a master key then they can also compel a copy of all the private keys the CA generates.
- juhanima 13y agoNot quite sure what you mean, but for the record, as a general rule CAs do not generate keys. They just sign the public keys coming in as Certificate Signing Requests. Without ever seeing the accompanied private key.