> It's not rational, for example, for them to build nuclear weapons, deprive their people of economic prosperity, kill thousands of protestors, fund militant gr

> It's not rational, for example, for them to build nuclear weapons, deprive their people of economic prosperity, kill thousands of protestors, fund militant groups spreading terrorism and murder throughout the region, yet they do it anyway. Iran's behavior (not its rhetoric) is largely pragmatic in the sense of pursuing national and regime security. For example, its strategy of funding military groups allows it to project power across the Middle East relatively cheaply, and meant that for decades most Iran-US and Iran-Israel fighting happened outside Iran. Of course, after the October 7 attacks the network lost much of its deterrent value once Israel decided that escalation was worth the costs the militant groups could impose, and began direct attacks on Iran. Still, it worked well for the prolonged gray-area conflict it was designed for. Similarly, if Iran got a nuclear weapon, it wouldn't achieve much beyond self-defense. Iran wouldn't be able to blackmail or coerce its neighbors for the same reason that North Korea isn't able to extract concessions from the West, or that Israel isn't able to push around its neighbors. Nuclear weapons are not useful tools of coercion. If they were, maybe Israel's status as a nuclear power would have dissuaded Iran from pursuing nuclear enrichment. Any state that used a nuclear weapon would have the whole world turn against it and risk nuclear retaliation. Both Iran and its neighbors know this, so any hypothetical nuclear threats would not seem credible. This explains Iran's historical strategy of being a "threshold" nuclear state- possessing the expertise and capability to build a nuclear weapon without suffering the political consequences of actually building one. However, the US-Israeli attacks on Iran in 2025 and 2026 (including assassinating the head of state and his family) may lead the Iranian leadership to conclude that having a threshold capability is insufficient and that the country needs an actual nuclear deterrent to protect its sovereignty in the future.