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Show HN: Geiger – See every AI agent on your machine and what it can touch

49 points by atomburst 8d ago

coder-pm 7d ago
[dead]
asamadx 8d ago
[dead]
ramen0w0 8d ago
Nice!
ptidhomme 8d ago
"Geiger" Prepping for AI apocalypse I see
- atomburst 8d ago
  Haha The radiation was already there — I just built the counter. :)
atomburst 8d ago
[flagged]
Betelbuddy 8d ago
See every AI agent on your machine...is this like, see every recently released criminal in your neighborhood ?
deleted 7d ago
[deleted]
ckor 7d ago
[dead]
codebyvictor 6d ago
[flagged]
getatme32 8d ago
Seems like something that could also have enterprise applications for Shadow AI within an organization. Wouldn't be surprised if some of the observability/governance companies pick this up to use in their stack.
- atomburst 8d ago
  [flagged]
embedding-shape 8d ago
> One read-only command that inventories every AI agent, harness, MCP server, plugin, and AI extension on a machine If this tool is returning even a single hit from this, you're probably using these agents wrong. You really want to run these in a way so they cannot touch your system drive/general filesystem that you use to do real work on. Even SOTA models at the end of their context limit behave REALLY illogical and does mistakes frequently. Don't run them straight on your machine unless you have backups and confirmed your backups work.
- mdspan 8d ago
  Aside from random errors made by the model, another reason to sandbox is that prompt injection could make your agent behave in an actively harmful manner.
- atomburst 8d ago
  [flagged]
- cookiengineer 7d ago
  Came here to write this. Built my own harness with much better sandboxing, because I am using abliterated models for the implementations and they sure try to escape out of their sandboxes. A lot. The sandbox from other harnesses like e.g. OpenCode essentially is useless. They think parsing arguments alone to detect paths helps, and LLMs know that because they will just pipe data differently then to escape the path traversal checks. Happened a lot to me (and was the primary reason for my to write my own harness from scratch). Thinking in filesystem access alone is also a futile attempt at sandboxing. A much better way to think about sandboxes is policies and capabilities, with temporary access for agent roles rather than sessions (or, well, forever). [1] UI still needs lots of work though: https://github.com/cookiengineer/exocomp https://github.com/cookiengineer/exocomp
  - everforward 7d ago
    I’ve been looking along a similar line, but I came at it from the infra side rather than the software. Mine pretends to be a local ACP agent, but it’s actually managing a Docker container and proxying the ACP connection into the container over websocket. You can specify a bunch of utility stuff in the YAML definition like directories to bind-mount, directories to copy from the host, scripts to run when the container starts, etc. You can also toggle whether ACP-native tools like read/write file and shells execute on your host or in the container (in container by default). Works well, I forget whether I’m on that or pi-ACP directly until it spits out a time in the wrong timezone or I forget that it can’t check my DNS settings or something. Really cuts down on the damage it can do. Mine is basically down to “it can delete my ~/.pi and the repo it’s working on” and that’s about it unless it can escape the container. https://github.com/SethCurry/abyss https://github.com/SethCurry/abyss
dpflan 8d ago
Wes McKinney has a project for agent visibility: https://www.agentsview.io/ https://www.agentsview.io/
- atomburst 8d ago
  [dead]
deleted 8d ago
[deleted]
Muromec 8d ago
I need to wire a pixel-display to show emoji faces of the agents and how they roll their eyes and all of that. I have the display, I have the prompt to pick a mood from emotional vocabulary, a custom harness and all of that. I just can't figure out how to make the eyes move on a statically pre-rendered emoji.

49 points by atomburst 8d ago

coder-pm 7d ago

[dead]

asamadx 8d ago

[dead]

ramen0w0 8d ago

Nice!

ptidhomme 8d ago

"Geiger" Prepping for AI apocalypse I see

atomburst 8d ago
Haha The radiation was already there — I just built the counter. :)

atomburst 8d ago

[flagged]

Betelbuddy 8d ago

See every AI agent on your machine...is this like, see every recently released criminal in your neighborhood ?

deleted 7d ago

[deleted]

ckor 7d ago

[dead]

codebyvictor 6d ago

[flagged]

getatme32 8d ago

Seems like something that could also have enterprise applications for Shadow AI within an organization. Wouldn't be surprised if some of the observability/governance companies pick this up to use in their stack.

atomburst 8d ago
[flagged]

embedding-shape 8d ago

> One read-only command that inventories every AI agent, harness, MCP server, plugin, and AI extension on a machine If this tool is returning even a single hit from this, you're probably using these agents wrong. You really want to run these in a way so they cannot touch your system drive/general filesystem that you use to do real work on. Even SOTA models at the end of their context limit behave REALLY illogical and does mistakes frequently. Don't run them straight on your machine unless you have backups and confirmed your backups work.

mdspan 8d ago
Aside from random errors made by the model, another reason to sandbox is that prompt injection could make your agent behave in an actively harmful manner.
atomburst 8d ago
[flagged]
cookiengineer 7d ago
Came here to write this. Built my own harness with much better sandboxing, because I am using abliterated models for the implementations and they sure try to escape out of their sandboxes. A lot. The sandbox from other harnesses like e.g. OpenCode essentially is useless. They think parsing arguments alone to detect paths helps, and LLMs know that because they will just pipe data differently then to escape the path traversal checks. Happened a lot to me (and was the primary reason for my to write my own harness from scratch). Thinking in filesystem access alone is also a futile attempt at sandboxing. A much better way to think about sandboxes is policies and capabilities, with temporary access for agent roles rather than sessions (or, well, forever). [1] UI still needs lots of work though: https://github.com/cookiengineer/exocomp https://github.com/cookiengineer/exocomp
- everforward 7d ago
  I’ve been looking along a similar line, but I came at it from the infra side rather than the software. Mine pretends to be a local ACP agent, but it’s actually managing a Docker container and proxying the ACP connection into the container over websocket. You can specify a bunch of utility stuff in the YAML definition like directories to bind-mount, directories to copy from the host, scripts to run when the container starts, etc. You can also toggle whether ACP-native tools like read/write file and shells execute on your host or in the container (in container by default). Works well, I forget whether I’m on that or pi-ACP directly until it spits out a time in the wrong timezone or I forget that it can’t check my DNS settings or something. Really cuts down on the damage it can do. Mine is basically down to “it can delete my ~/.pi and the repo it’s working on” and that’s about it unless it can escape the container. https://github.com/SethCurry/abyss https://github.com/SethCurry/abyss

dpflan 8d ago

Wes McKinney has a project for agent visibility: https://www.agentsview.io/ https://www.agentsview.io/

atomburst 8d ago
[dead]

deleted 8d ago

[deleted]

Muromec 8d ago

I need to wire a pixel-display to show emoji faces of the agents and how they roll their eyes and all of that. I have the display, I have the prompt to pick a mood from emotional vocabulary, a custom harness and all of that. I just can't figure out how to make the eyes move on a statically pre-rendered emoji.