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> Iran has exposed many limitations and weaknesses in America's defense capabilities I'm far from a fan of current US policy nor an apologist, but this is a fl

by mft_ 12d ago

> Iran has exposed many limitations and weaknesses in America's defense capabilities I'm far from a fan of current US policy nor an apologist, but this is a flawed analysis. The war with Iran has exposed the stupidity of entering into that particular conflict, where: * the goal (if there was one?) was something like regime change at arm's length * 'arm's length' means using expensive long distance precision weapons, as there was/is very little taste for an invasion * the target (Iran) is situated next to US allies which also happen to be hugely important as oil producers/exporters * the target can also threaten a hugely important global shipping channel - the Strait of Hormuz * the target has prepared for this action for years if not decades, and has good-enough drone technology to hand to threaten its neighbours and the Strait of Hormuz This is an almost unique case in the world, and as such, its lessons of "US weakness" of "US failure" simply can't be assumed to translate more broadly. Iran is/was far more a strategic blunder which could/should have been foreseen, than a sign of America's weakness. Yes, America currently has low stocks of long-range precision munitions and Patriots, but it still has the most powerful conventional military by far, and a globally-unrivalled ability to project that power around the world, if it chooses to. --- "But what about Ukraine? What about drone warfare? America is far behind there." This may have changed the game. The heavy usage of drones in Ukraine evolved, noting Russia didn't initially invade with swarms of drones. If the US had had a strong reason to support Ukraine (imagine Russia had instead invaded Florida) they could likely have used conventional means (air superiority, tanks, men) and ended the war within a few weeks. Admittedly, now it's far less certain how those tanks and men would fare in current drone battlefield. > and it's a fraction of the threat China is It depends entirely on the nature of the war envisaged (see the points about Iran being a unique situation.). In particular, China does not have anything like the US Navy to project power in the way that the US still can.

ElProlactin 11d ago
> * 'arm's length' means using expensive long distance precision weapons, as there was/is very little taste for an invasion Do you think Americans have a taste for invading China? > * the target (Iran) is situated next to US allies which also happen to be hugely important as oil producers/exporters China itself is the factory of the world, the world's second largest economy and America's third largest trading partner. It doesn't even have to strike surrounding countries to take aim at the US economy. Yes, that would hurt China too, but China has been preparing for this and the COVID supply chain shock in the US was just a small taste of what life could be like for Americans who are used to being able to buy everything under the sun for cheap at Walmart or on Amazon. > * the target can also threaten a hugely important global shipping channel - the Strait of Hormuz About a fifth of maritime trade goes through the Taiwan Strait. It's also one of the world's most important global shipping channels. > * the target has prepared for this action for years if not decades, and has good-enough drone technology to hand to threaten its neighbours and the Strait of Hormuz China has been preparing for a Taiwan contingency in earnest for well over two decades, with a particular focus on the A2/AD capabilities needed to keep the US from establishing superiority in a relatively small area. The US on the other hand, spent 20 years chasing goat herders and insurgents and is now trying to reorient itself back to preparation for major power conflict. Which is a huge challenge when China is, for example, has an estimated shipbuilding capacity that's 100+ times greater than America's. Don't get me wrong. The US still obvious has a very powerful military, but it has been trying to be be all things for all conflicts in all places. China has been laser-focused on a military that can accomplish just a few things. > Iran is/was far more a strategic blunder which could/should have been foreseen, than a sign of America's weakness. You're treating an inability to strategize as a strategic blunder and not weakness. You should reconsider that. Because it's the very thing that has caused the US to fail at achieving its long-term strategic aims in basically all but one of the significant conflicts it has been involved in since the end of WW2. > In particular, China does not have anything like the US Navy to project power in the way that the US still can. In a Taiwan contingency, China doesn't have to. China is just ~100-150 miles away from its target. Again, it has spent more than 2 decades investing in A2/AD capabilities for that specific contingency.
- mft_ 10d ago
  I agree with most of what you've written here. However, this is not the topic (I thought I) was responding to. I was disagreeing that America's issues in Iran "has exposed many limitations and weaknesses in America's defense capabilities" - because the Iran situation is somewhat of an edge case, as I detailed. If the point you were originally making (I now infer) was something more like "some of the challenges that the US has faced in its war with Iran may also apply to a potential future war with China, should China invade Taiwan, such as..." then with respect that's what you should have written, rather than assuming your readers would just guess correctly. (There are also major differences between the cases of Iran and China, which would warrant more detailed analysis.) > You're treating an inability to strategize as a strategic blunder and not weakness. You should reconsider that. No... you're conflating cause and effect. The strategic blunder was an outcome, the cause of which we can debate; an "inability to strategise" would be one potential cause.

by mft_ 12d ago

ElProlactin 11d ago

> * 'arm's length' means using expensive long distance precision weapons, as there was/is very little taste for an invasion Do you think Americans have a taste for invading China? > * the target (Iran) is situated next to US allies which also happen to be hugely important as oil producers/exporters China itself is the factory of the world, the world's second largest economy and America's third largest trading partner. It doesn't even have to strike surrounding countries to take aim at the US economy. Yes, that would hurt China too, but China has been preparing for this and the COVID supply chain shock in the US was just a small taste of what life could be like for Americans who are used to being able to buy everything under the sun for cheap at Walmart or on Amazon. > * the target can also threaten a hugely important global shipping channel - the Strait of Hormuz About a fifth of maritime trade goes through the Taiwan Strait. It's also one of the world's most important global shipping channels. > * the target has prepared for this action for years if not decades, and has good-enough drone technology to hand to threaten its neighbours and the Strait of Hormuz China has been preparing for a Taiwan contingency in earnest for well over two decades, with a particular focus on the A2/AD capabilities needed to keep the US from establishing superiority in a relatively small area. The US on the other hand, spent 20 years chasing goat herders and insurgents and is now trying to reorient itself back to preparation for major power conflict. Which is a huge challenge when China is, for example, has an estimated shipbuilding capacity that's 100+ times greater than America's. Don't get me wrong. The US still obvious has a very powerful military, but it has been trying to be be all things for all conflicts in all places. China has been laser-focused on a military that can accomplish just a few things. > Iran is/was far more a strategic blunder which could/should have been foreseen, than a sign of America's weakness. You're treating an inability to strategize as a strategic blunder and not weakness. You should reconsider that. Because it's the very thing that has caused the US to fail at achieving its long-term strategic aims in basically all but one of the significant conflicts it has been involved in since the end of WW2. > In particular, China does not have anything like the US Navy to project power in the way that the US still can. In a Taiwan contingency, China doesn't have to. China is just ~100-150 miles away from its target. Again, it has spent more than 2 decades investing in A2/AD capabilities for that specific contingency.

mft_ 10d ago
I agree with most of what you've written here. However, this is not the topic (I thought I) was responding to. I was disagreeing that America's issues in Iran "has exposed many limitations and weaknesses in America's defense capabilities" - because the Iran situation is somewhat of an edge case, as I detailed. If the point you were originally making (I now infer) was something more like "some of the challenges that the US has faced in its war with Iran may also apply to a potential future war with China, should China invade Taiwan, such as..." then with respect that's what you should have written, rather than assuming your readers would just guess correctly. (There are also major differences between the cases of Iran and China, which would warrant more detailed analysis.) > You're treating an inability to strategize as a strategic blunder and not weakness. You should reconsider that. No... you're conflating cause and effect. The strategic blunder was an outcome, the cause of which we can debate; an "inability to strategise" would be one potential cause.