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The argument regarding no certificate pinning seems to miss that just because I might be on a network that MITM's TLS traffic doesn't mean my device trusts the
by r4indeer 6mo ago
The argument regarding no certificate pinning seems to miss that just because I might be on a network that MITM's TLS traffic doesn't mean my device trusts the random CA used by the proxy. I'd just get a TLS error, right?
- thegagne 6mo agoNot if you are part of an org that uses MDM and pushes their own CA to devices.
- r4indeer 6mo agoOk, fair point. However, I would consider any MDM-enabled device fully "compromised" in the sense that the org can see and modify everything I do on it.
- p2detar 6mo agoAn MDM orga cannot install a trusted CA on non-supervised (company owned) devices. By default on BYOD these are untrusted and require manual trust. It also cannot see everything on your device - certainly not your email, notes or files, or app data.
- somebudyelse 6mo agoAs someone who has an MDM-managed device, I beg to differ. Although, this one uses newer style android MDM, which involves factory resetting and doing special things during OOBE. Even if it used the older style, nothing's stopping the app for requesting file access, notification access, etc. and not working until you grant the permissions.
- Melatonic 6mo agoAndroid has multiple options for MDM - the mess invasive one has a completely separate work profile that should not give the org that kind of access.
- p2detar 6mo agoNothing is stopping any app from the Play store to request any particular permission, not just MDM apps, right? And yet, no app can read arbitrary filesystem data including random app data without your device being rooted first. If anything, one of many MDM purposes is to prevent orgas from enrolling rooted devices in their fleet.
- layer8 6mo agoIf it is untrusted, you also won’t have a TLS connection be established based on that CA.
- subscribed 6mo agoNot if someone can issue the certificate signed by the CA your phone trust. Imagine being in a cafe nearby, say, embassy of the certain north African country known for pervasive and wide espionage actions, which decides to hijack traffic in this cafe. Or imagine living in the country where almost all of the cabinet is literally (officially) being paid by the propaganda/lobbying body of such country. Or living int he country where lawful surveillance can happen without the jury signoff, but at a while of any police officer. Maybe its not common but frequent enough.
- layer8 6mo ago> Imagine being in a cafe nearby, say, embassy of the certain north African country known for pervasive and wide espionage actions, which decides to hijack traffic in this cafe. How would they get your phone to trust their CA? Connecting to a Wi-Fi network doesn’t change which CAs a device trusts.
- Galanwe 6mo agoBecause there is a quadrillion trusted CAs in every device you might use. A good chunk of these CAs have been compromised at one point or another, and rogue certificates are sold in the dark market. Also any goverment can coerce a domiciled CA to issue certs for their needs.
- technion 6mo agoIf you go down this path you argue desktop browsing https is broken, which i dont think is a serious argument.
- quesera 6mo agoNo one is trying to go that far down the path. https (specifically the CA chain of trust) is imperfect, and can be compromised by well-placed parties.
- fc417fc802 6mo ago
- greenchair 6mo agothat argument also misses because it is based on old best practices which are no longer relevant.
- kevincox 6mo agoCertificate pinning can be useful, especially in particularly sensitive areas. But I wouldn't expect it as a standard security practice. If anything I appreciate that it isn't done so that reverse engineers can thoroughly study the traffic on their own devices. I agree that it was odd that the article mentioned it more than a quick note, let along made a big deal out of it.