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This is why I only run open source extensions that I can actually audit. uBlock Origin, SponsorBlock, the kind of tools where the code is available and the deve
by singularfutur 7mo ago
This is why I only run open source extensions that I can actually audit. uBlock Origin, SponsorBlock, the kind of tools where the code is available and the developer isn't anonymous. The Chrome Web Store is basically unregulated and Google doesn't care as long as they get their cut. Open source at least gives you a chance to see what you're installing before it starts exfiltrating your data to some server in a country you've never heard of.
- deleted 7mo ago[deleted]
- randunel 7mo agoHow do you check that the open sourced code is the same one that you are installing from the extension repository and actually running?
- fn-mote 7mo agoThis kind of nihilistic comment doesn’t do anything for me. There’s always a possibility of problems along the chain. You are reducing your risk not eliminating it.
- chrisjj 7mo ago> This kind of nihilistic comment doesn’t do anything for me. Got to say, mischaracterising a neutral question as a nihilistic comment doesn't do anything for me.
- endsandmeans 7mo agoI agree but let me play the devil's advocate. I'll channel Stallman: Same argument can be applied to all closed source software. In the end its about who you trust and who needs to be verified and that is relative, subjective, and contextual... always. So unless you can read the source code and compile yourself on a system you built on an OS you also built from source on a machine built before server management backdoors were built into every server... you are putting your trust somewhere and you cannot really validate it beyond wider public percetptions.
- anonymars 7mo agoDon't forget to channel Ken Thompson ("Reflections on Trusting Trust") -- you can read the source code, but where did you get the compiler?
- fsflover 7mo agoThis can be mitigated by Bootstrappable builds: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41368835 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41368835
- nickjj 7mo ago> How do you check that the open sourced code is the same one that you are installing from the extension repository and actually running? Extensions are local files on disk. After installing it, you can audit it locally. I don't know about all operating systems but on Linux they are stored as .xpi files which are zip files. You can unzip it. On my machine they are installed to $HOME/.mozilla/firefox/52xz2p7e.default-release/extensions but I think that string in the middle could be different for everyone. Diffing it vs what's released in its open source repo would be a quick way to see if anything has been adjusted.
- AJ007 7mo agoExtensions are trivial unless they have to run external software or services. Download the extension, extract the source, audit it with a good thinking model and either strip out all third party URLs/addresses or have the agent clone the functionality you want.
- insin 7mo agoCRX Viewer is handy for quickly checking what's been published: https://robwu.nl/crxviewer/ https://robwu.nl/crxviewer/
- pbhjpbhj 7mo agoI'm running Uniget on Win11 and this is my worry there. Provenance of installs vs the actually released files.
- pezgrande 7mo agoI wish we had something like "source hash" available in all repositories.
- oj-hn-dot-com 7mo agoThe open source one automatically publishes to the Chrome Store from GH actions so that there is no human involvement in the deployment process. I'm currently in the process of setting that up for the one I'm building, because this transparency is very important to me) and it is a pain in the butt to do so. You have to go through a few verification processes at Google to get the keys approved.
- mixedbit 7mo agoAn extension from a trusted, non anonymous developer which is released as open source is a good signal that the extension can be trusted. But keep in mind that distribution channels for browser extensions, similarly to distribution channels for most other open source packages (pip, npm, rpm), do not provide any guarantee that the package you install and run is actually build verbatim from the code which is open sourced.
- jakub_g 7mo agoActually, npm supports "provenance" and as it eliminated long lived access tokens for publishing, it encourages people to use "trusted publishing" which over time should make majority of packages be auto-provenance-vefified. https://docs.npmjs.com/trusted-publishers#automatic-provenance-generation https://docs.npmjs.com/trusted-publishers#automatic-provenan...
- elashri 7mo agopypi also added this last year [1] and encouraging people to use trusted publishing as well. [1] https://docs.pypi.org/trusted-publishers/ https://docs.pypi.org/trusted-publishers/
- LtWorf 7mo agoIf the build doesn't happen without network access, it doesn't really work.
- smithza 7mo agokey word "encourages" when someone uses `npm install/add/whatever-verb` does it default to only using trusted publishing sources? and the dependency graph? either 100% enforcement or it won't stick and these attack vulnerabilities are still there.
- btown 7mo agoUnless the Chrome web store integrates with this, it puts the onus on users to continuously scan extension updates for hash mismatches with the public extension builds, which isn’t standardized. And even then this would be after an update is unpacked, which may not run in time to prevent initial execution. Nor does it prevent a supply chain attack on the code running in the GitHub Action for the build, especially if dependencies aren’t pinned. There’s no free lunch here.
- lapcat 7mo ago> This is why I only run open source extensions that I can actually audit. How far does your principle extend? To your web browser too? Google Chrome itself is partly but not entirely open source. Your operating system? Only Linux? Mac and Windows include closed source.
- nemomarx 7mo agoOn HN of all places it's not that implausible that someone might be running Linux and Chromium or Firefox, surely?
- lapcat 7mo agoI didn't claim that it's implausible. I asked a question. On the other hand, it's not that implausible either that someone might be running Google Chrome, Windows, Mac, etc. We know that many HN commenters do. Thus, while the OP may be 100% consistent, "I only run open source extensions that I can actually audit" would not be a consistent principle for those who also use closed source software.
- notpushkin 7mo agoWhy do you think it’s not consistent? You don’t have to apply the same policies to everything you use.
- lapcat 7mo ago> You don’t have to apply the same policies to everything you use. What's the reasoning behind it, though? You can arbitrarily apply different policies to different things, but there's no rhyme or reason to that. If the difference ultimately comes down to trusting certain developers to an extent that you don't need to audit their source, then I'm not sure why that couldn't also be true of certain extension developers.
- mixmastamyk 7mo ago
- bennydog224 7mo agoThis is the safest way. You also want to disable auto update to version lock, which means using Firefox or Safari or loading unpacked if you use Chrome.
- Rebuff5007 7mo agoDo you also audit every part of every car you buy or medicine you take? Or do you rely on large well-established institutions to do that for you? "Dont trust google" imo is the wrong response here. We are at the mercy of our institutions, and if they are failing us we need mechanisms to keep them in check.
- __alexs 7mo agoMy car can't login to my bank account.
- deleted 7mo ago[deleted]
- abenga 7mo agoYour car and fellow road users' cars generally have your life, your passengers' lives, and other road users' lives in its hands while in use.
- falcor84 7mo agoWell, I see how, especially for people who are close to death and want to provide for their loved ones, the answer to "Your money or your life" might lean in the other direction.
- __alexs 7mo agoMy car probably could be hacked to murder me in secret but frankly I'm not worth expending that kind of access on. The threat model is really very different.
- haritha-j 7mo agoGive it a few years. After all how will Tesla get that $99 every month for your self driving susbscription?
- coldtea 7mo ago>Do you also audit every part of every car you buy or medicine you take? Or do you rely on large well-established institutions to do that for you? Cars are under quite strict laws that software isn't. And there is only a small number of car vendors, while there are several orders of magnitude more extension vendors. Also a car vendor is a big company with many audits and controls, an extension "vendor" could just be some guy in his garage office, who just sold it to scammers, even for popular extensions. And I still wouldn't trust a modern car using subscriptions and code updated.
- Angostura 7mo agoIt’s one of the reasons I run Safari, which strictly limits what extensions can do for these reasons
- lapcat 7mo agoNo, Safari is really no different here from Chrome, and indeed there's broad compatibility between the extension API, such that in many cases you can use a Chrome extension unmodified in Safari.
- Angostura 7mo agoAh, thanks interesting. I remember the kerfuffle when Safari introduced its new model and I didn’t realise Chrome had followed suit
- lofaszvanitt 7mo agoAnd you audit every update? Ahem.
- falcor84 7mo agoAnnoyed with how the AWS console sometimes changes regions on its own, I recently decided that I need an extension to make the current region displayed prominently. After a bit of research, I found the AWS Colorful Navbar [0] extension, which does pretty much exactly what I wanted, but (understandably) requires granting it "This extension can read and change your data on sites" on `://.console.aws.amazon.com/*`, which I'm not willing to give to an external extension. So my solution was forking the repo [1], carefully auditing the code, and then installing it from a local clone (which they actually have a nice explanation for). Going forward, I think I'll try using this approach for all sensitive extensions. [0] https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/aws-colorful-navbar/kgifmgnlchjjippdpkblbdlfidcpceme https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/aws-colorful-navbar... [1] https://github.com/nalbam/aws-navbar-extension https://github.com/nalbam/aws-navbar-extension
- smithza 7mo agoconsider how the xz supply-chain attack occurred 2 years ago [0]. the malware isn't auditable with a `git clone` as easily as you might want. [0] https://research.swtch.com/xz-timeline https://research.swtch.com/xz-timeline
- cachius 7mo agoThis is why it's so sad that Tampermonkey isn't open source. https://github.com/Tampermonkey/tampermonkey/discussions/1735#discussioncomment-5295493 https://github.com/Tampermonkey/tampermonkey/discussions/173...
- joquarky 7mo agoTM is capable of doing most of what other extensions do, so it's too bad it's not open source because the ecosystem is inherently transparent.