6 ms·

Okay so here's the argument I've heard: if arbitrary replacements of the lid sensor were possible, it would be feasible to create a tampered sensor that failed

• throwaway314155 1y ago
  Isn't there software that does exactly this? Called caffeine, I believe?
  • vlovich123 1y ago
    Installing software generally requires user permission. Replacing Hw can be done surreptitiously. At least that’s the strongman variant of the security argument.
    • wpm 1y ago
      `caffeinate` is installed by default on macOS.
  • classichasclass 1y ago
    ITYM "caffeinate" DESCRIPTION caffeinate creates assertions to alter system sleep behavior. If no assertion flags are specified, caffeinate creates an assertion to prevent idle sleep. If a utility is specified, caffeinate creates the assertions on the utility's behalf, and those assertions will persist for the duration of the utility's execution. Otherwise, caffeinate creates the assertions directly, and those assertions will persist until caffeinate exits.
• ryandrake 1y ago
  The line should be drawn by the owner of the device. As the user and owner of the product, I should be the sole decider about my own security posture, not some company who doesn’t know my use case or needs. It’s crazy how we’ve managed to normalize the manufacturer making these kinds of blanket decisions on our behalf.
  • vlovich123 1y ago
    How does Apple know the owner of the product has authorized the HW change? There’s a secondary argument you could make here whereby because the replacements must be valid Apple parts that have uniform behavior and tolerances, the strength of the secondary market is stronger and Apple products have a stronger resale value as a result, because you’re not going to encounter a MacBook with an arbitrary part replaced that you as the second-hand buyer know nothing about (this is why the secondary market for cars doesn’t work without the ability to lookup the car history by VIN).
    • userbinator 1y ago
      Apple doesn't need to know. Once it's sold Apple is no longer the owner.
      • aurareturn 1y ago
        What happens when you indirectly cause the machine to fail by installing some shout 3rd party part? Are you still going to claim warranty? Walk into an Apple Store to ask for help?
        • userbinator 1y ago
          We have the https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnuson%E2%80%93Moss_Warranty_Act https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnuson%E2%80%93Moss_Warranty... to rely on.
          • aurareturn 1y ago
• hayleox 1y ago
  If repair shops can buy the $130 calibration machine, presumably the super spy in this story (who for some reason couldn't steal the data while they were replacing the lid sensor, nor can they steal the data when the laptop's in use, but somehow can steal the data when it's idle with the lid down) can also get a calibration machine, and then deliberately set the zero point incorrectly.
• Lammy 1y ago
  If we're talking Bond-tier assessments then Apple already sell a covert microphone: AirTags. They “have no microphone” according to product specs, but they do have a huge speaker, and a speaker and microphone are the same thing like a generator and motor are the same thing: https://in.bgu.ac.il/en/Pages/news/eaves_dropping.aspx https://in.bgu.ac.il/en/Pages/news/eaves_dropping.aspx
  • ungreased0675 1y ago
    There’s a fairly large jump between having a microphone and being able to be used as a surveillance device.
  • Kirby64 1y ago
    Just because a speaker can technically operate as a microphone doesn’t mean that AirTags would be capable of this. The speaker driver definitely doesn’t have any recording capability. The only reason the 3.5mm jack mentioned in your article is capable of this is because the jack has functionality to allow analog recording for mic/line in cases. No dedicated speaker driver would have this because it would be worthless and costly.
• bri3d 1y ago
  Keeping a victim device unlocked when the lock state is responsible for encryption key state is a totally legitimate risk. With that being said, I don’t think Apple see this specific part as a security critical component, because the calibration is not cryptographic and just sets some end point data. Apple are usually pretty good about using cryptography where they see real security boundaries.
  • arcticbull 1y ago
    It doesn't need to be encrypted if it's one-time programmable. The calibration data is likely written into efuses which are physically burned and cannot be reset.
    • bri3d 1y ago
      The sensor and its data stream would need to be authenticated, though.
      • arcticbull 1y ago
        For the mic cut-off? My understanding is that it outputs an electrical signal that's routed to the audio codec that literally prevents the audio from getting to system memory in the same way a physical switch would. It autonomously, at an electrical level, disconnects the mic without OS or software intervention. As it cannot be programmed again, you would have to crack open the laptop and modify the PCB to override it.
        • bri3d 1y ago
          Oh, I understand now - you're right, OTP sensor data does protect against a real threat model I hadn't considered before: * A remote attacker gains whatever privilege lets them get to the sensor SPI. * Without OTP calibration, the attacker could reprogram the sensor silently to report a different endstop, keeping the machine awake and the hard-cuts active. * With OTP calibration, this is closed. So perhaps it is more security-related than I initially thought. I was more considering the counterfeit part / supply chain / evil maid scenario, where the fact that Apple's sensors are OTP is meaningless (since a replacement sensor doesn't need to be, plus, you could just put a microcontroller pretending to be a sensor in there since there's no actual protection). Thanks, you made me think again and figure it out!
• naikrovek 1y ago
  Yes. “Sure, you can borrow my laptop. It’s fine. Take it home. I promise not to spy on you while the lid is closed. I promise not to record aaaaaany audio or anything! And I definitely won’t hear any conversation that contains information that I’ll use to stalk you later!” There are a million ways that some nefarious person could spy on another, but at least this isn’t one of them. And I am a very suspicious person, thanks to some eye opening experiences that I’ve had. When someone says that they want to do something that not a lot of people want to do, I immediately wonder how they will use that against myself or someone else. Because that has happened multiple times to me. I also hate that I am suspicious of people who want to at least have the opportunity to fully own their devices; something that is perfectly reasonable to want, but I am. What would that additional ability do for them? What will they be capable of doing that they can’t do now? How and when will they use it to get what they want out of someone? Or out of me? If you don’t think like this, I really envy you. For the longest time, every teacher, every supervisor, every commander, every non-familial authority figure I had until I was probably 35, used and manipulated me for the purpose of advancing themselves. Every single one. The ones in the military didn’t even attempt to hide it. I’m so scarred because of people convincing me to help them screw me over that I no longer trust anyone who is concerned about things like laptop lid angle sensors. Because who are you trying to screw over and why does that angle sensor stand in your way?
  • AnonHP 1y ago
    > When someone says that they want to do something that not a lot of people want to do, I immediately wonder how they will use that against myself or someone else. Because that has happened multiple times to me. I’m intrigued. Would you be comfortable sharing some of these real experiences here (with sensitive details fudged/removed)?
    • naikrovek 1y ago
      I'd rather not. They're very foggy memories now, and the ones that aren't are all attempted sexual abuse. Conmen are everywhere, and they will say things in the nicest most innocuous ways possible to sway you to do things for them. They'll do it over time, and they will very gradually ramp things up. "this is just a small change from that, what's the matter" ugh. people suck.
• saurik 1y ago
  If you have access to my laptop long and deep enough to replace the hinge sensor with a fake one that prevents the lid from closing as a way to turn it into a recording device -- which of course would also require installing software on it -- instead of just putting a tiny microphone into it (or my bag), you are simultaneously a genius and dumb. And if you really are going to that level of effort, hoping that I don't notice my laptop failing to go to sleep when I close it so you might be able to steal it is crazy when you can 100% just modify the hardware in the keyboard to log my password. Hell: what you really should do is swap my entire laptop with a fake one that merely shows me my login screen (which you can trivially clone off of mine as it happily shows it to you when you open it ;P) and asks for my password, at which point you use a cellular modem to ship it back to you. That would be infinitely easier to pull off and is effectively game over for me because, when the laptop unlocks and I don't have any of my data (bonus points if I am left staring at a gif of Nedry laughing, though if you showed an Apple logo of death you'd buy yourself multiple days of me assuming it simply broke), it will be too late: you'll have my password and can unlock my laptop legitimately. > There are good security reasons for a lot of what Apple does. So, no: these are clearly just excuses, sometimes used to ply users externally (such as yourself) and sometimes used to ply their own engineers internally (such as wherever you heard this), but these mitigations are simply so ridiculously besides the point of what they are supposedly actually securing that you simply can't take them seriously if you put more than a few minutes of thought into how they work... either the people peddling them are incompetent or malicious, and, even if you choose to believe the former over the latter, it doesn't make the shitty end result for the owner feel any better.
  • moshib 1y ago
    I can imagine a different attack vector: A malicious actor doing laptop repairs can absolutely replace the hinge sensor and install software on it. They could draw in people by offering cheaper prices, then steal their info or use it to setup more complex scams. The counterpoint to this is that car body shops can also plant recording devices in your car. This is true, but the signal-to-noise ratio in terms of stealing valuable data is much lower. I don't have data to back this up, but I assume way more people use their laptops for online purchases and accessing their bank account than doing the same with phone calls in the car.
• nicman23 1y ago
  those are over-complicated bollocks. there are easier and less detectable software only ways to do all that.
  • arcticbull 1y ago
    If you were to come up with one, I suspect you'd have a solid bug bounty waiting for you.
    • nicman23 1y ago
      you just set the pc to not sleep on screen down? it is literally a feature
      • arcticbull 1y ago
        As far as I know the mic is still shut off when the machine is set to clamshell mode. That's the point. You cannot use the mic when the lid is closed. It's a hardware cut-off, you cannot configure it in software. Hence my comment about the bug bounty.
        • aae42 1y ago
          $5 USB mic?
          • arcticbull 1y ago
            If the point is to hide the recording that's not a great way. Especially when many corporate IT solutions monitor USB device connections.
• raxxorraxor 1y ago
  Then Apply tying the angle sensor to microphone status is a security issue. I would read that as a cheap excuse to be honest.
• KurSix 1y ago
  A properly gated, user-authorized override in recoveryOS or similar would give advanced users and third-party repair shops a legitimate path without blowing up the security model
• Spooky23 1y ago
  How you can characterize this type of threat as a “James Bond” fantasy in 2025 is breathtaking. The Federal government is forensically collecting phones during routine border crossings to see if you reposted Fat JD Vance memes. That’s publicly disclosed and well know. I have no trouble believing that potential enemies of the state like the governor of California and his cabinet are bugged. If I were a person like that, I’d try to take supply chain countermeasures.
• knowaveragejoe 1y ago
  > This could then be combined with some software on the machine to turn a MacBook into a difficult to detect recording device, bypassing protections such as the microphone and camera privacy alerts, since the MacBook would be closed but not sleeping. Isn't this already possible if the MB is connected to a power source like a portable battery?