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I take this blog post as confirmation that: 1) ANY one message can be intercepted even if the sender exhibits ideal levels of alertness [Whatsapp server drops

by psranga 10y ago

I take this blog post as confirmation that: 1) ANY one message can be intercepted even if the sender exhibits ideal levels of alertness [Whatsapp server drops message to recipient; sends a rekey request with a fake key; message is intercepted since fake key was generated by server. Sender will see a warning if they turned on that setting (default is to show no warning), but it's too late]. 2) Only Whatsapp has this vuln, not Signal app. 3) Depending on sloppiness of sender, more extensive interception is possible. [E.g., server not supplying delivery reports + sender doesn't have warning for key changes + sender sloppy about noticing lack of double check mark => full transcript can be generated]

dangero 10y ago
Best summary I've seen. There are two significant facts here that surprised me: 1. The double checkmark has security implications. How would a typical user know that? 2. Even if you are completely vigilant, follow best practices, etc, Whatsapp messages can be intercepted. They claim this is a "wontfix" UX choice. I'm skeptical why the non-default feature cannot even provide the protection that almost everyone assumed it would.
- Vinnl 10y ago
  > How would a typical user know that? I think that's basically the main problem: there is no way to get a typical user to understand security implications of anything without having that user give up before reaching that point...
artefacts 10y ago
This. So much this. Let's consider three other facts: 1.) WhatsApp is owned by Facebook. This is a company that's has publicly said through a former, nepotistically appointed director that privacy needs to 'go away'. Their sole purpose is to extract as much PII from users as possible for resale. Offering a completely private messaging service doesn't seem to be in their financial interest. 2.) There is no way to independently verify anything being claimed by Moxie/Facebook. No WhatsApp specific source code - which is clearly different from Signal - why? Furthermore, no view into the infrastructure at Facebook. The latter is more reasonable, but seriously, why are we trusting a company whose CEO calls its users "Dumb fucks" for trusting it with their data? 3.) The Client is updated regularly through auto updates, so it seems possible that many of these notifications could simply be bypassed based on Moxie's own described MITM attack. Moxie, fuck your blog post. It has some decent points, but helping Facebook is probably the opposite of what decent privacy advocates should be doing. More likely you've helped them be more covert about doing evil shit than helping users. Hope you enjoyed the cheque though.

by psranga 10y ago

dangero 10y ago

Best summary I've seen. There are two significant facts here that surprised me: 1. The double checkmark has security implications. How would a typical user know that? 2. Even if you are completely vigilant, follow best practices, etc, Whatsapp messages can be intercepted. They claim this is a "wontfix" UX choice. I'm skeptical why the non-default feature cannot even provide the protection that almost everyone assumed it would.

Vinnl 10y ago
> How would a typical user know that? I think that's basically the main problem: there is no way to get a typical user to understand security implications of anything without having that user give up before reaching that point...

artefacts 10y ago

This. So much this. Let's consider three other facts: 1.) WhatsApp is owned by Facebook. This is a company that's has publicly said through a former, nepotistically appointed director that privacy needs to 'go away'. Their sole purpose is to extract as much PII from users as possible for resale. Offering a completely private messaging service doesn't seem to be in their financial interest. 2.) There is no way to independently verify anything being claimed by Moxie/Facebook. No WhatsApp specific source code - which is clearly different from Signal - why? Furthermore, no view into the infrastructure at Facebook. The latter is more reasonable, but seriously, why are we trusting a company whose CEO calls its users "Dumb fucks" for trusting it with their data? 3.) The Client is updated regularly through auto updates, so it seems possible that many of these notifications could simply be bypassed based on Moxie's own described MITM attack. Moxie, fuck your blog post. It has some decent points, but helping Facebook is probably the opposite of what decent privacy advocates should be doing. More likely you've helped them be more covert about doing evil shit than helping users. Hope you enjoyed the cheque though.