RandomLensman

5 ms·

31.
by RandomLensman 19d ago
Is there any indication from our current understanding that brains are nothing more than probabilistic token generators? Not like we have no understanding of the brain.
32.
by RandomLensman 19d ago
We don't anthropomorphise humans. Edit: quite literally not possible.
33.
by RandomLensman 19d ago
Not the OP, but complex emergent behavior and intelligence don't need to go together. Understanding what happened might not need intelligence in the mix when a large number of machines with some randomness interact a lot.
34.
by RandomLensman 19d ago
I don't think looking at the language output without tracking the inner state and reward functions is the way to understand what happened (the language also incorporates the randomness in the output generation, if I understand correct
35.
by RandomLensman 21d ago
I disagree there. Gut bacteria or parasites might have some control over us, for example. Likewise humans can control more intelligent humans, for example - not really an issue. Intelligence isn't some magic to escape physics, for exam
36.
by RandomLensman 21d ago
Align the possible outcomes, not necessarily the thing itself. Do we align heavy machinery the way AI is suggested to be aligned (or align pathogens when in a laboratory)? My point is that something more like containment & control (i.e.
37.
by RandomLensman 22d ago
Is there data on how frequently and what types of security levels? Military has varying levels of security and secrecy, for example. Also, not a reason not to pursue processes etc., no? I doubt that things fail all the time, for example.
38.
by RandomLensman 22d ago
Regulations can help align processes, incentives, etc. Not sure heavy machinery is aligned in the sense that people talk about AI, for example.
39.
by RandomLensman 22d ago
I don't want such a world either. So far I'd say these entities are hypothetical (unless you include a lot of other machinery that does unexpected things at times - but then it's a different discussion). I generally think we
40.
by RandomLensman 22d ago
Simple examples here would be higher financial transparency obligations or more closely policing transactions.
41.
by RandomLensman 22d ago
That is about persuasion with evidence on various topics, not about persuading people to abandon safty protocols and processes and highly policed settings. Yes, many things could happen, but again, that failure is possible is not a reason t
42.
by RandomLensman 22d ago
I am not anthropomorphising the LLMs at all, I was talking about the obligations we put on humans using/making/etc. machines etc.
43.
by RandomLensman 22d ago
The current issues are not caused by some malicious god-like AI - maybe we need to focus on the issues at hand first rather than hypotheticals? (And we do have experience policing people around financial incentives, too. Nothing perfect, bu
44.
by RandomLensman 22d ago
With humans (and some machines) we tend to put/manadate additional processes for certain risks instead of just relying on their own good nature. Why just rely on the machine when elsewhere we have learned not to necessarily just trust
45.
by RandomLensman 22d ago
I didn't say it doesn't happen, but that it is a low probability. And we have ways to reduce probabilities in critical areas. There is no omnipotent AI currently (and there might never be) and I don't see why with current AI
46.
by RandomLensman 22d ago
We have all sorts of processes , procedures, and regulations for people, machine use etc. to address "alignment" in all sorts of fields - don't think we need to narrowly rely on the machine here and can look at things with a
47.
by RandomLensman 22d ago
A low probability thing when looking at how many human prisoners escape by talking a guard into just getting them out. And even lower probability when looking at truly high risk situations, I think.
48.
by RandomLensman 22d ago
I think we need to see something like an actual evaluation of the reward functions; not sure just words are sufficient to understand the state of the system (isn't there randomness in the generation, too?).
49.
by RandomLensman 23d ago
We regulate these things (incl. access) all the time for various things (e.g., dangerous substances or pathogens) so that we don't need to just rely on people's discipline in respect of risks. I don't think it is all new prob
50.
by RandomLensman 23d ago
But the people directing them are there. We have long experience with limiting people although it might sometimes not look like that so much.
51.
by RandomLensman 23d ago
Same issue with humans in a way. I disgree on the advisory nature of constraints, though. Unconnected physically limits would still matter, for example (and we use those with humans as a matter of course, too). In this case here, no model c
52.
by RandomLensman 23d ago
Humans can and have been directed en masses by (what I would consider) malicious actors, too. The issue isn't new.
53.
by RandomLensman 23d ago
Which is why with organic intelligence we (sometimes) limit what they can actually do instead of relying on alignment. Can do the same here.
54.
by RandomLensman 23d ago
What "own objectives"? Isn't it more that specifying objectives is hard (AI or organic) and typically supplement them by boxing things in (again, AI or organic).
55.
by RandomLensman 23d ago
Why should the agents consider it a prisoners delimma to start with? Why would they consider the communication risky? Where they given a reward functions that way? Given how unexpected and complex behavior can come from simple reward functi
56.
by RandomLensman 23d ago
I see. I would have thought of "rogue" here to mean something more like that the AI selects and acts on its own objectives that are not related or caused by the given (initial) objectives (e.g., creating only cookie recipes instea
57.
by RandomLensman 23d ago
How would that be rogue?
58.
by RandomLensman 23d ago
Why is it not an example of tacit or autonomous algorithmic collusion? The agents were started with something as task at some point, I presume (if untasked, aren't they just accepting a task?)
59.
by RandomLensman 23d ago
Reward hacking/going for unanticipated solutions is nothing new in ML/AI, already much simpler systems have done/do "weird" things (gut feeling is that iterative and ensemble use majes the surface for that much larg
60.
by RandomLensman 23d ago
Why woukd they? Was that part of their objective? What was there to whistle blow?

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