18 ms·

WoSign: Free two-year multi-domain SSL certificate

104 points by freerk 12y ago

rmoriz 12y ago
Nice find! But given the amount of hassle to get one, your hourly rate must be very low. But I'm sure it will be the future to get near-0$ DV-certificates. It's a pity no CA besides StartCom and Comodo pick up the S/MIME market. Both options are not very usable for non-IT people.
- thejosh 12y ago
  Cloudflare offer free SSL now, so if you are small and can't afford a certificate, they could be a good choice.
  - rmoriz 12y ago
    S/MIME != SSL http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S/MIME http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S/MIME
    - Nostromov 12y ago
      Yes, that would be @ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S/MIME https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S/MIME (ffs, lol; we're talkin' about SSL :))
      - rmoriz 12y ago
        No we were talking about X509 certificates
  - grakic 12y ago
    Cloudflare Univeral SSL uses SNI https://support.cloudflare.com/hc/en-us/articles/203041594-What-browsers-work-with-Universal-SSL- https://support.cloudflare.com/hc/en-us/articles/203041594-W...
    - thejosh 12y ago
      Sure, but looking at: Current inclusion status in major CA certificate stores: Included by default in NSS 3.16.3 or newer (Mozilla Firefox 32+). Included by default in Microsoft Windows since September 2014 on Windows Vista+ (should automatically update as mentioned here). Included by default in Android 5.0+ (no source, but on my Nexus tablet with Android 4.4.4 it is not yet included but on my Nexus phone with Android 5.0 it is) It is not yet included in the Apple certificate store. This is not a big issue however, since the WoSign root CA is cross-signed by the StartCom CA which itself is included almost everywhere since >5 years. SNI isn't included in Windows XP, yet the SSL won't work in XP anyway.
- iancarroll 12y ago
  > It's a pity no CA besides StartCom and Comodo pick up the S/MIME market. A lot of CAs sell S/MIME certs, including GlobalSign and CyberTrust. They're not heavily advertised, though.
drdaeman 12y ago
That's really neat. I just thought my past employee (used to have StartSSL but got rejected recently) have to buy an wildcard one for a year while "Let's Encrypt" is not yet here, but this is just great. Will tell them to save their money. Hope they'll update MAC soon. Wonder if they have an option to sign only for an year, so expiry date won't get past 2017. SHA1 should suffice for an year.
- rmoriz 12y ago
  I wonder if they provide an easy way to revoke and re-issue a certificate, too. Probably not.
  - Hexcles 12y ago
    Yes they do. Support free reissue and CRL: https://www.wosign.com/english/DV_KuaiSSL.htm https://www.wosign.com/english/DV_KuaiSSL.htm And there is a revoke & reissue button in the control panel, though I haven't tried myself.
aroch 12y ago
Seems they just recently passed Mozilla's/Google's CA root inclusion process: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=851435 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=851435 Edit: Hmm, looks like the free certs will never pass strict OCSP checks. As broken as the OCSP system is, I would still like to be able to check against it.
- rmoriz 12y ago
  Usually it's quite easy to pass this (a single vendor) - you just need to get verified by a WebTrust recognized company (E&Y or some other bookkeeping company) and be able to convince the vendor (the process is pretty much the same with each vendor). However you'll need to build and run your infrastructure upfront so you're already burning some years money just to get those documents. When you finally get them and become ready to apply for inclusion with the vendors (Apple/MSFT/GOOG/Mozilla/Debian etc) it will take another couple of months. Even when you're included there is a big chance that it will take a couple of years to reach a high enough distribution rate to be acceptable for business purposes (think of old android devices or Windows XP). Getting cross-signed by another CA costs money and they will re-validate your setup as you will sign "below" their root CA. I wonder what the total initial and running costs of starting up a CA (including WebTrust & yearly re-audit) are today...
  - iancarroll 12y ago
    > apply for inclusion with the vendors (Apple/MSFT/GOOG/Mozilla/Debian etc) it will take another couple of months Mozilla takes ~1.5 years to include a CA. > I wonder what the total initial and running costs of starting up a CA (including WebTrust & yearly re-audit) are today... Without including man-hours, I've estimated it to be $550k for creating and maintaining a CA for three years. The audits make up a large majority of this. Big firms like E&Y charge a lot, which is what my estimate is based off of. You also need HSMs + places to store the HSMs, a CP(S), etc. If you've ever read the WebTrust guidelines, you'll know you need a lot of accountability and security. You could probably reduce the figure with a small auditing firm. My estimates of course are estimates. Certly got quoted $120k/yr (not including a readiness audit) for a WebTrust audit by E&Y.
noxenook 12y ago
At risk of sounding xenophobic, you have to wonder if this is simply an effort to have Chinese-issued certificates become common place in the west. A common form of certificate pinning is based on the CA that issued the certificate (to allow certificate rotation). More Chinese issued certificates being used intentionally will make the mere fact that a certificate was issued by a Chinese CA less suspicious.
- rmoriz 12y ago
  Yes and no. Nothing is 100% secure and new CA players will bring a higher encryption usage overall (in this case -> other business model/regional reach). Higher usage will also drive the amount of criminals (including secret agencies) trying to MITM/intercept those encryption. This will push vendors and developers to increase certificate pinning and other models of "bottom-up" models besides the top-down model that the CA-model implements. IMHO it would be great to have a "working by default" model (which the CA-model is compared to something like pgp) and a protocol-independent way to pin public keys (eg not tied to http/s like HSTS and HKPK). People and companies in need of "higher" security can pin keys and eg ignore the root trust of their OS/browser. So IMHO the best of "both" worlds. HSTS http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security HPKP https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Public_Key_Pinning https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Public...
  - aroch 12y ago
    Honestly I'd like to see something in the vein of TACK [1] over the other various key pinning methods. [1]http://tack.io/ http://tack.io/
    - noxenook 12y ago
      Agreed. This plus Certificate Transparency (Google) will go a really long way.
      - pipeep 12y ago
nadams 12y ago
> great free StartSSL It looks like they cleaned up their forums from when they were last mentioned[1] but I'll still keep my distance. Anything like this is really a bandaid for the real problem with SSL/CA. As in why can't I be a CA for my own domain? I think Android is a perfect example of this problem - if you import a CA cert using the built in Android credential storage every time you reboot it will show a vague and useless message saying that people may be spying on you. Not which CA cert was added and when - just "hey, you added, on purpose, a CA cert. I'm just making sure you are aware of this".[2] I understand the warning? error?...err simply because now I can sign a cert for ANY domain and Android will accept it as legit. This makes sense for the average users who don't understand or care what a CA is, not advanced users or enterprise users who will most likely use their own CA infrastructure. In this case - it would make more sense for them to be a CA over just company.tld rather than any domain. Personally - I'm using a modified version of PHP-CA[3] (as in changed the OpenSSL defaults to something sane and fixed some small issues). It's obviously not very advanced (for lack of better words kind of sucks) - but I wanted to hit the ground running with being my own CA for personal use and I have other projects I'm working on. [1] - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8901822 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8901822 [2] - https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=82036 https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=82036 [3] - http://php-ca.sourceforge.net/ http://php-ca.sourceforge.net/
- Animats 12y ago
  As in why can't I be a CA for my own domain? Because then anyone who can hijack DNS for your domain can also be a CA for your domain.
  - nadams 12y ago
    I'm sorry I didn't make that more clearer - that was a hypothetical question. The question is a loaded question and it raises other deeper rooted issues like what you pointed out (MITM attacks against DNS being one such example). There would have to be some sort of authoritative list where it says "this CA cert can sign certificates only for this domain". However, such a system I described would basically be CAs as they currently stand. The question/problem is who would maintain such a list? This is hard question considering we can't even agree on web standards coughMicrosoftcough.
cnst 12y ago
This offer sounds great! However, I must ask -- what's their business model? Even as great as the offer is, this is akin to the free sample... Because once you deploy the https:// https:// address scheme, there is no going back. On the other hand, this would have been perfect if there was opportunistic encryption within HTTP.
- iancarroll 12y ago
  > Because once you deploy the https:// https:// address scheme, there is no going back. Unless you send the HSTS header, that's not true. Even so, you could just set the HSTS expiry time to the certificate's expiry (which would have to be done within your code, sadly).
  - cnst 12y ago
    What do you mean it's not true without HSTS? Do modern browsers now automatically switch to the http:// http:// address scheme if https:// https:// is no longer available? Because otherwise, unless you don't care about incoming links, bookmarks etc, there is indeed absolutely no going back, with or without HSTS. That's the problem, only solvable with opportunistic encryption. And if you have dozens of domains and subdomains, what would you do in 2 years if this only CA is then kaput? The value of their offering is definitely above 100 USD, it would appear.
    - technomancy 12y ago
      > Do modern browsers now automatically switch to the http:// http:// address scheme if https:// https:// is no longer available? Browsers do not, humans do.
- Xorlev 12y ago
  State-sponsored CA perhaps? I'd be a little suspicious of anything too free like that. I hate to be too xenophobic but I can't say the thought didn't cross my mind.
- indrax 12y ago
ridgewell 12y ago
Stolen right off of LowEndTalk.
- throwaway643423 12y ago
  The objective truth is that no theft has happened. Laws about theft are not applicable to copyright infringement. But you're right, it's taken from LowEndTalk[1] and it remains unknown to us if the author asked for permission to copy the instructions to his or her blog. [1]: http://www.lowendtalk.com/discussion/41289/free-chinese-2-year-ssl-certificate-dv-kuaissl-by-wosign-com http://www.lowendtalk.com/discussion/41289/free-chinese-2-ye...
  - freerk 12y ago
    Yep, I have full permission do use the instructions :)
wavee 12y ago
Anyone else is getting "提交请求中,包含非法数据" (Submit request contains invalid data) after completing all the steps?
- hoechst 12y ago
  yea,i also can't get it to work. been bashing my head against this for hours. i did this to make the multidomain cert: http://stackoverflow.com/a/9158662/4202492[1] http://stackoverflow.com/a/9158662/4202492[1] then i'm doing this: "openssl req -out example.com.csr -new -sha256 -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -keyout example.com.key -config openssl.cnf" do i need to attach a mail adress to the csr? do i need to set a challenge password? what is the "free binding domain" on wosign?
nailer 12y ago
In case you missed it: this is SHA 1, and will trigger browser warnings because it's considered insecure.
AlyssaRowan 12y ago
They might've passed the WebTrust audit, but I'm still pretty worried about their security posture. Remember, unless you're pinning your certificate using DNSSEC+DANE or HPKP, in practice any CA in the world can issue certificates for any domain. Let's recap: It's 2015. They're using SHA-1 for everything (NOOOO!). They're based in China, which has just said it wants to ban encryption. (So has Cameron in the UK, yes, but at least he hasn't won an election yet. Edit: he pledged to if he wins; we have a coalition government, nobody won last time, least of all us! <g>) It looks like they've messed up OSCP, so even their own cert doesn't pass. Oh, and RC4, TLS 1.0 only, check out their login server: https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=login.wosign.com https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=login.wosign.... - let's put the (slightly) stronger ones at the end, everyone! Ugh. Let's Encrypt will do it properly. Or Else™. ;)
- nailer 12y ago
  You're completely right, and up voted because THIS IS AN SHA1 CERTIFICATE, IT WILL TRIGGER BROWSER WARNINGS, YOU DONT WANT IT should remain the top post, but David Cameron did actually win an election and is currently the Prime Minister of the UK.
  - deleted 12y ago
    [deleted]
  - iuguy 12y ago
    In the spirit of your most thorough pedantry, I thought I'd correct your correction to say that OP is right, David Cameron didn't win an election, he won a seat as an MP. None of the parties achieved the 326 seats required for an overall majority under the First Past the Post system. The Conservatives won the largest number of votes and seats but under FPTP rules were 20 seats short.
    - nailer 12y ago
      Good point. Such a pity the conservatives elect their own leader with preferential voting but campaigned against the public doing the same.
ibejoeb 12y ago
>Before you stop reading because you don't trust a Chinese company for your website encryption please keep in mind that you don't have to trust them at all! You generate the SSL key on your server and only send them the CSR (certificate signing request) which doesn't contain any private information. That's not really the reason we might not trust a CA. The CA needs to make assurances that it won't improperly sign certificates for an entity purporting to be the principal, e.g., DigiNotar. Maybe this CA has, but that's still a weak argument.
- NKCSS 12y ago
  I don't get your DigiNotar reference; they were hacked; how is that different from any other CA that got hacked?
  - ibejoeb 12y ago
    DigiNotar failed to disclose the known breach for 6 weeks (https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2011/09/02/diginotar-removal-follow-up/. https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2011/09/02/diginotar-remov...) Whether it was incompetence, coercion, or complicity matters little. I still have my doubts that China provides a climate suitable to a properly functioning CA.
freedombeer 12y ago
WhoaSSL
freerk 12y ago
update: WoSign now has a new page https://buy.wosign.com/free/ https://buy.wosign.com/free/ which is in English, works without creating a account first and wraps up all the steps in one simple page. The issue with "Submit request contains invalid data" some people ran into was fixed as well :)

104 points by freerk 12y ago

Nice find! But given the amount of hassle to get one, your hourly rate must be very low. But I'm sure it will be the future to get near-0$ DV-certificates. It's a pity no CA besides StartCom and Comodo pick up the S/MIME market. Both options are not very usable for non-IT people.

thejosh 12y ago
Cloudflare offer free SSL now, so if you are small and can't afford a certificate, they could be a good choice.
- rmoriz 12y ago
  S/MIME != SSL http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S/MIME http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S/MIME
  - Nostromov 12y ago
    Yes, that would be @ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S/MIME https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S/MIME (ffs, lol; we're talkin' about SSL :))
    - rmoriz 12y ago
      No we were talking about X509 certificates
- grakic 12y ago
  Cloudflare Univeral SSL uses SNI https://support.cloudflare.com/hc/en-us/articles/203041594-What-browsers-work-with-Universal-SSL- https://support.cloudflare.com/hc/en-us/articles/203041594-W...
  - thejosh 12y ago
    Sure, but looking at: Current inclusion status in major CA certificate stores: Included by default in NSS 3.16.3 or newer (Mozilla Firefox 32+). Included by default in Microsoft Windows since September 2014 on Windows Vista+ (should automatically update as mentioned here). Included by default in Android 5.0+ (no source, but on my Nexus tablet with Android 4.4.4 it is not yet included but on my Nexus phone with Android 5.0 it is) It is not yet included in the Apple certificate store. This is not a big issue however, since the WoSign root CA is cross-signed by the StartCom CA which itself is included almost everywhere since >5 years. SNI isn't included in Windows XP, yet the SSL won't work in XP anyway.
iancarroll 12y ago
> It's a pity no CA besides StartCom and Comodo pick up the S/MIME market. A lot of CAs sell S/MIME certs, including GlobalSign and CyberTrust. They're not heavily advertised, though.

drdaeman 12y ago

That's really neat. I just thought my past employee (used to have StartSSL but got rejected recently) have to buy an wildcard one for a year while "Let's Encrypt" is not yet here, but this is just great. Will tell them to save their money. Hope they'll update MAC soon. Wonder if they have an option to sign only for an year, so expiry date won't get past 2017. SHA1 should suffice for an year.

rmoriz 12y ago
I wonder if they provide an easy way to revoke and re-issue a certificate, too. Probably not.
- Hexcles 12y ago
  Yes they do. Support free reissue and CRL: https://www.wosign.com/english/DV_KuaiSSL.htm https://www.wosign.com/english/DV_KuaiSSL.htm And there is a revoke & reissue button in the control panel, though I haven't tried myself.

aroch 12y ago

Seems they just recently passed Mozilla's/Google's CA root inclusion process: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=851435 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=851435 Edit: Hmm, looks like the free certs will never pass strict OCSP checks. As broken as the OCSP system is, I would still like to be able to check against it.

rmoriz 12y ago
Usually it's quite easy to pass this (a single vendor) - you just need to get verified by a WebTrust recognized company (E&Y or some other bookkeeping company) and be able to convince the vendor (the process is pretty much the same with each vendor). However you'll need to build and run your infrastructure upfront so you're already burning some years money just to get those documents. When you finally get them and become ready to apply for inclusion with the vendors (Apple/MSFT/GOOG/Mozilla/Debian etc) it will take another couple of months. Even when you're included there is a big chance that it will take a couple of years to reach a high enough distribution rate to be acceptable for business purposes (think of old android devices or Windows XP). Getting cross-signed by another CA costs money and they will re-validate your setup as you will sign "below" their root CA. I wonder what the total initial and running costs of starting up a CA (including WebTrust & yearly re-audit) are today...
- iancarroll 12y ago
  > apply for inclusion with the vendors (Apple/MSFT/GOOG/Mozilla/Debian etc) it will take another couple of months Mozilla takes ~1.5 years to include a CA. > I wonder what the total initial and running costs of starting up a CA (including WebTrust & yearly re-audit) are today... Without including man-hours, I've estimated it to be $550k for creating and maintaining a CA for three years. The audits make up a large majority of this. Big firms like E&Y charge a lot, which is what my estimate is based off of. You also need HSMs + places to store the HSMs, a CP(S), etc. If you've ever read the WebTrust guidelines, you'll know you need a lot of accountability and security. You could probably reduce the figure with a small auditing firm. My estimates of course are estimates. Certly got quoted $120k/yr (not including a readiness audit) for a WebTrust audit by E&Y.

noxenook 12y ago

At risk of sounding xenophobic, you have to wonder if this is simply an effort to have Chinese-issued certificates become common place in the west. A common form of certificate pinning is based on the CA that issued the certificate (to allow certificate rotation). More Chinese issued certificates being used intentionally will make the mere fact that a certificate was issued by a Chinese CA less suspicious.

rmoriz 12y ago
Yes and no. Nothing is 100% secure and new CA players will bring a higher encryption usage overall (in this case -> other business model/regional reach). Higher usage will also drive the amount of criminals (including secret agencies) trying to MITM/intercept those encryption. This will push vendors and developers to increase certificate pinning and other models of "bottom-up" models besides the top-down model that the CA-model implements. IMHO it would be great to have a "working by default" model (which the CA-model is compared to something like pgp) and a protocol-independent way to pin public keys (eg not tied to http/s like HSTS and HKPK). People and companies in need of "higher" security can pin keys and eg ignore the root trust of their OS/browser. So IMHO the best of "both" worlds. HSTS http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security HPKP https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Public_Key_Pinning https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Public...
- aroch 12y ago
  Honestly I'd like to see something in the vein of TACK [1] over the other various key pinning methods. [1]http://tack.io/ http://tack.io/
  - noxenook 12y ago
    Agreed. This plus Certificate Transparency (Google) will go a really long way.
    - pipeep 12y ago

nadams 12y ago

> great free StartSSL It looks like they cleaned up their forums from when they were last mentioned[1] but I'll still keep my distance. Anything like this is really a bandaid for the real problem with SSL/CA. As in why can't I be a CA for my own domain? I think Android is a perfect example of this problem - if you import a CA cert using the built in Android credential storage every time you reboot it will show a vague and useless message saying that people may be spying on you. Not which CA cert was added and when - just "hey, you added, on purpose, a CA cert. I'm just making sure you are aware of this".[2] I understand the warning? error?...err simply because now I can sign a cert for ANY domain and Android will accept it as legit. This makes sense for the average users who don't understand or care what a CA is, not advanced users or enterprise users who will most likely use their own CA infrastructure. In this case - it would make more sense for them to be a CA over just company.tld rather than any domain. Personally - I'm using a modified version of PHP-CA[3] (as in changed the OpenSSL defaults to something sane and fixed some small issues). It's obviously not very advanced (for lack of better words kind of sucks) - but I wanted to hit the ground running with being my own CA for personal use and I have other projects I'm working on. [1] - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8901822 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8901822 [2] - https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=82036 https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=82036 [3] - http://php-ca.sourceforge.net/ http://php-ca.sourceforge.net/

Animats 12y ago
As in why can't I be a CA for my own domain? Because then anyone who can hijack DNS for your domain can also be a CA for your domain.
- nadams 12y ago
  I'm sorry I didn't make that more clearer - that was a hypothetical question. The question is a loaded question and it raises other deeper rooted issues like what you pointed out (MITM attacks against DNS being one such example). There would have to be some sort of authoritative list where it says "this CA cert can sign certificates only for this domain". However, such a system I described would basically be CAs as they currently stand. The question/problem is who would maintain such a list? This is hard question considering we can't even agree on web standards coughMicrosoftcough.

cnst 12y ago

This offer sounds great! However, I must ask -- what's their business model? Even as great as the offer is, this is akin to the free sample... Because once you deploy the https:// https:// address scheme, there is no going back. On the other hand, this would have been perfect if there was opportunistic encryption within HTTP.

iancarroll 12y ago
> Because once you deploy the https:// https:// address scheme, there is no going back. Unless you send the HSTS header, that's not true. Even so, you could just set the HSTS expiry time to the certificate's expiry (which would have to be done within your code, sadly).
- cnst 12y ago
  What do you mean it's not true without HSTS? Do modern browsers now automatically switch to the http:// http:// address scheme if https:// https:// is no longer available? Because otherwise, unless you don't care about incoming links, bookmarks etc, there is indeed absolutely no going back, with or without HSTS. That's the problem, only solvable with opportunistic encryption. And if you have dozens of domains and subdomains, what would you do in 2 years if this only CA is then kaput? The value of their offering is definitely above 100 USD, it would appear.
  - technomancy 12y ago
    > Do modern browsers now automatically switch to the http:// http:// address scheme if https:// https:// is no longer available? Browsers do not, humans do.
Xorlev 12y ago
State-sponsored CA perhaps? I'd be a little suspicious of anything too free like that. I hate to be too xenophobic but I can't say the thought didn't cross my mind.
indrax 12y ago

ridgewell 12y ago

Stolen right off of LowEndTalk.

throwaway643423 12y ago
The objective truth is that no theft has happened. Laws about theft are not applicable to copyright infringement. But you're right, it's taken from LowEndTalk[1] and it remains unknown to us if the author asked for permission to copy the instructions to his or her blog. [1]: http://www.lowendtalk.com/discussion/41289/free-chinese-2-year-ssl-certificate-dv-kuaissl-by-wosign-com http://www.lowendtalk.com/discussion/41289/free-chinese-2-ye...
- freerk 12y ago
  Yep, I have full permission do use the instructions :)

wavee 12y ago

Anyone else is getting "提交请求中,包含非法数据" (Submit request contains invalid data) after completing all the steps?

hoechst 12y ago
yea,i also can't get it to work. been bashing my head against this for hours. i did this to make the multidomain cert: http://stackoverflow.com/a/9158662/4202492[1] http://stackoverflow.com/a/9158662/4202492[1] then i'm doing this: "openssl req -out example.com.csr -new -sha256 -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -keyout example.com.key -config openssl.cnf" do i need to attach a mail adress to the csr? do i need to set a challenge password? what is the "free binding domain" on wosign?

nailer 12y ago

In case you missed it: this is SHA 1, and will trigger browser warnings because it's considered insecure.

AlyssaRowan 12y ago

They might've passed the WebTrust audit, but I'm still pretty worried about their security posture. Remember, unless you're pinning your certificate using DNSSEC+DANE or HPKP, in practice any CA in the world can issue certificates for any domain. Let's recap: It's 2015. They're using SHA-1 for everything (NOOOO!). They're based in China, which has just said it wants to ban encryption. (So has Cameron in the UK, yes, but at least he hasn't won an election yet. Edit: he pledged to if he wins; we have a coalition government, nobody won last time, least of all us! <g>) It looks like they've messed up OSCP, so even their own cert doesn't pass. Oh, and RC4, TLS 1.0 only, check out their login server: https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=login.wosign.com https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=login.wosign.... - let's put the (slightly) stronger ones at the end, everyone! Ugh. Let's Encrypt will do it properly. Or Else™. ;)

nailer 12y ago
You're completely right, and up voted because THIS IS AN SHA1 CERTIFICATE, IT WILL TRIGGER BROWSER WARNINGS, YOU DONT WANT IT should remain the top post, but David Cameron did actually win an election and is currently the Prime Minister of the UK.
- deleted 12y ago
  [deleted]
- iuguy 12y ago
  In the spirit of your most thorough pedantry, I thought I'd correct your correction to say that OP is right, David Cameron didn't win an election, he won a seat as an MP. None of the parties achieved the 326 seats required for an overall majority under the First Past the Post system. The Conservatives won the largest number of votes and seats but under FPTP rules were 20 seats short.
  - nailer 12y ago
    Good point. Such a pity the conservatives elect their own leader with preferential voting but campaigned against the public doing the same.

ibejoeb 12y ago

>Before you stop reading because you don't trust a Chinese company for your website encryption please keep in mind that you don't have to trust them at all! You generate the SSL key on your server and only send them the CSR (certificate signing request) which doesn't contain any private information. That's not really the reason we might not trust a CA. The CA needs to make assurances that it won't improperly sign certificates for an entity purporting to be the principal, e.g., DigiNotar. Maybe this CA has, but that's still a weak argument.

NKCSS 12y ago
I don't get your DigiNotar reference; they were hacked; how is that different from any other CA that got hacked?
- ibejoeb 12y ago
  DigiNotar failed to disclose the known breach for 6 weeks (https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2011/09/02/diginotar-removal-follow-up/. https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2011/09/02/diginotar-remov...) Whether it was incompetence, coercion, or complicity matters little. I still have my doubts that China provides a climate suitable to a properly functioning CA.

freedombeer 12y ago

WhoaSSL

freerk 12y ago

update: WoSign now has a new page https://buy.wosign.com/free/ https://buy.wosign.com/free/ which is in English, works without creating a account first and wraps up all the steps in one simple page. The issue with "Submit request contains invalid data" some people ran into was fixed as well :)