5 ms·
I'm aware of simple brute-force attacks on short key IDs [0], which are just the last 32 bits of the fingerprint (e.g. 438CF0E2). With significant effort, one m
by croikle 12y ago
I'm aware of simple brute-force attacks on short key IDs [0], which are just the last 32 bits of the fingerprint (e.g. 438CF0E2). With significant effort, one might be able to extend that to 64 bits.
I'd be much more surprised by a full fingerprint match. Wouldn't that imply a SHA-1 collision?
[0] http://www.asheesh.org/note/debian/short-key-ids-are-bad-news.html http://www.asheesh.org/note/debian/short-key-ids-are-bad-new...
- zimbatm 12y agoYes I was referring to the 64bit long key ID. The full fingerprint is a SHA-1 and not vulnerable. See https://www.debian-administration.org/users/dkg/weblog/105 https://www.debian-administration.org/users/dkg/weblog/105
- AlyssaRowan 12y agoThe 64-bit has been done: I've seen it. 0000000000000001, I think?