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What is a good reason for openssl.org not to utilize HSTS[1]? $ curl -I https://www.openssl.org/ HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Sun, 29 Dec 2013 03:57:54 GMT Se

What is a good reason for openssl.org not to utilize HSTS[1]? $ curl -I https://www.openssl.org/ HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Sun, 29 Dec 2013 03:57:54 GMT Server: Apache/2.2.22 (Ubuntu) Accept-Ranges: bytes Vary: Accept-Encoding Content-Length: 15686 Content-Type: text/html [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security

peterwwillis 13y ago
Because it doesn't need it. Technically no website needs it. Only people who don't know how to type "https" need it.
- netik 13y ago
  No. HSTS prevents SSLStrip attacks when the intended destination is always meant to be in SSL.
  - peterwwillis 13y ago
    SSLStrip does not work on valid HTTPS requests. If you request an HTTPS page, it can not be subverted into HTTP. If it could, HTTPS would be pointless. So, yes, HSTS is not required for a valid HTTPS request. This is not some semantic argument, or some sort of side channel attack crap. HSTS is not necessary for HTTPS requests, period.
    - thirsteh 13y ago
      It's necessary for HTTP requests. Are you being deliberately obtuse?
      - ars_technician 13y ago
        It doesn't work if the user hasn't visited the site before because the HSTS header can be stripped just as easily.
        gtklocker 13y ago
        https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6978539 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6978539
        lvh 13y ago
        The HSTS specification tells you not to put those headers in regular HTTP requests anyway. Also, you're forgetting about browsers that ship with lists of HSTS-enabled sites.
    - gtklocker 13y ago
      https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security#Applicability https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security...
- dionyziz 13y ago
  Which is, to say, 99.99% of people. Noone types "https://" https://" or "http://"; http://"; 99% of people don't even know what https means. Us developers should know better and protect our users. It's our responsibility to make sure the default is secure.
  - peterwwillis 13y ago
    But you expect 99% of all people are downloading vanilla OpenSSL libraries. Because that's a thing that everyone does.
    - dbaupp 13y ago
      You did say "technically no website needs it", and I assume dionyziz was responding to that.
- gtklocker 13y ago
  Point is, I should not be able to access a plaintext version of a website hosting such cryptographically crucial software/information. It's obvious why it can be a grand target for Man in the Middle, defacement and worst of all integrity attacks. Apart from preventing many of the latter, implementing HSTS could have really mitigated the problem. Anyone who had already visited the site wouldn't see the defaced page. Furthermore, they could get added to an STS preloaded list[1], making the attack invisible to anyone using a modern browser. If you are interested, the Wikipedia page[2] does a fair job at explaining more about why HSTS is needed. [1]: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome/trunk/src/net/http/transport_security_state_static.json https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome/trunk/src/net/http/tr... [2]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security#Applicability https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security...
  - peterwwillis 13y ago
    Or maybe they should have plaintext access, because then they can get the software if they don't have an SSL-enabled HTTP client, and they can compare the digital signature of the sources later via 3rd parties. But this is all crap, really. OpenSSL is a library distributed across tens of thousands of independent providers all over the internet. Nobody needs to get it from the main site, and even if they do, there's a multitude of ways to tell if it's the real deal or not. If you know what OpenSSL is, you can type in "https" and be totally secure without HSTS. Even if you needed HSTS (which you don't), who's going to the OpenSSL.org website time after time that HSTS would even be useful? People make way too big a deal over half-baked countermeasures that don't apply to every case. You find me the person who's downloading vanilla OpenSSL libraries from the main site over multiple visits and is at risk of a client-side MITM and not verifying their sources, and i'll show you someone who's going to get owned even without a MITM.
    - dionyziz 13y ago
      You seem to have completely missed the fact that HSTS can be combined with an STS preloaded list, to which the previous comment author also gave you a reference to read. HSTS is TOFU (trust-on-first-use) by default, but the TOFU portion can be upgraded to a full PKI-based authentication mechanism just fine using preloaded lists, which doesn't require any previous visits whatsoever. Furthermore, it's just embarrassing to see such attacks on these high-profile sites. If they can't defend their site (even for users who don't type "https://" https://"), who is to say their library is secure? These kinds of attacks threaten the confidence we have on our fundamental cryptographic building blocks and should be avoided.

peterwwillis 13y ago

Because it doesn't need it. Technically no website needs it. Only people who don't know how to type "https" need it.

netik 13y ago
No. HSTS prevents SSLStrip attacks when the intended destination is always meant to be in SSL.
- peterwwillis 13y ago
  SSLStrip does not work on valid HTTPS requests. If you request an HTTPS page, it can not be subverted into HTTP. If it could, HTTPS would be pointless. So, yes, HSTS is not required for a valid HTTPS request. This is not some semantic argument, or some sort of side channel attack crap. HSTS is not necessary for HTTPS requests, period.
  - thirsteh 13y ago
    It's necessary for HTTP requests. Are you being deliberately obtuse?
    - ars_technician 13y ago
      It doesn't work if the user hasn't visited the site before because the HSTS header can be stripped just as easily.
      - gtklocker 13y ago
        https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6978539 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6978539
      - lvh 13y ago
        The HSTS specification tells you not to put those headers in regular HTTP requests anyway. Also, you're forgetting about browsers that ship with lists of HSTS-enabled sites.
  - gtklocker 13y ago
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security#Applicability https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security...
dionyziz 13y ago
Which is, to say, 99.99% of people. Noone types "https://" https://" or "http://"; http://"; 99% of people don't even know what https means. Us developers should know better and protect our users. It's our responsibility to make sure the default is secure.
- peterwwillis 13y ago
  But you expect 99% of all people are downloading vanilla OpenSSL libraries. Because that's a thing that everyone does.
  - dbaupp 13y ago
    You did say "technically no website needs it", and I assume dionyziz was responding to that.
gtklocker 13y ago
Point is, I should not be able to access a plaintext version of a website hosting such cryptographically crucial software/information. It's obvious why it can be a grand target for Man in the Middle, defacement and worst of all integrity attacks. Apart from preventing many of the latter, implementing HSTS could have really mitigated the problem. Anyone who had already visited the site wouldn't see the defaced page. Furthermore, they could get added to an STS preloaded list[1], making the attack invisible to anyone using a modern browser. If you are interested, the Wikipedia page[2] does a fair job at explaining more about why HSTS is needed. [1]: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome/trunk/src/net/http/transport_security_state_static.json https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome/trunk/src/net/http/tr... [2]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security#Applicability https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security...
- peterwwillis 13y ago
  Or maybe they should have plaintext access, because then they can get the software if they don't have an SSL-enabled HTTP client, and they can compare the digital signature of the sources later via 3rd parties. But this is all crap, really. OpenSSL is a library distributed across tens of thousands of independent providers all over the internet. Nobody needs to get it from the main site, and even if they do, there's a multitude of ways to tell if it's the real deal or not. If you know what OpenSSL is, you can type in "https" and be totally secure without HSTS. Even if you needed HSTS (which you don't), who's going to the OpenSSL.org website time after time that HSTS would even be useful? People make way too big a deal over half-baked countermeasures that don't apply to every case. You find me the person who's downloading vanilla OpenSSL libraries from the main site over multiple visits and is at risk of a client-side MITM and not verifying their sources, and i'll show you someone who's going to get owned even without a MITM.
  - dionyziz 13y ago
    You seem to have completely missed the fact that HSTS can be combined with an STS preloaded list, to which the previous comment author also gave you a reference to read. HSTS is TOFU (trust-on-first-use) by default, but the TOFU portion can be upgraded to a full PKI-based authentication mechanism just fine using preloaded lists, which doesn't require any previous visits whatsoever. Furthermore, it's just embarrassing to see such attacks on these high-profile sites. If they can't defend their site (even for users who don't type "https://" https://"), who is to say their library is secure? These kinds of attacks threaten the confidence we have on our fundamental cryptographic building blocks and should be avoided.